

**Apparent Exemption from Condition A:
a Perspective-Based Analysis of French Anaphors**
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1. Introduction

Chomsky's Condition A of Binding Theory (1981, and subsequent versions of it) is the most widely adopted theory of anaphora despite a fundamental problem: it has been challenged by exceptions from different languages - including English – known as 'long distance anaphors', 'free anaphors' or 'exempt anaphors', among others, which escape the locality requirements it describes.

This article concentrates on the many cases where the instances of anaphors subject to locality requirements are morphologically identical to other instances of anaphors lacking any structural requirement (languages where the latter anaphors are morphologically different from the former or are subject to some structural requirements with respect to their antecedent are not relevant). The goal is to show that in such languages, instances of anaphors exempt from locality requirements are in fact not exceptional by proposing a theory of exemption: seemingly exempt anaphors are actually not exempt from Condition A, but locally bound just like plain anaphors; that's why they have the same form as plain anaphors. The only difference between plain anaphors and exempt anaphors is that the former have overt antecedents, while the latter have covert ones so that local binding is not directly visible.

The covert antecedents for exempt anaphors are, I propose, logophoric operators. This hypothesis is based on the pervasive idea that exempt anaphors appear to behave like logophors, i.e. they require a center of perspective as antecedent. The notion of logophor is however unclear in the literature: originally, it referred to morphologically specific pronouns in West African languages denoting the source of an indirect discourse (Hagège 1974, Clements 1975, Culy 1994, a.o.); in the semantic literature, logophors are assimilated to *de se* elements or shifted indexicals (Schlenker 2003, Anand 2006, a.o.); in the syntactic literature, 'logophor' sometimes just means exempt anaphor without implying any specific interpretation (Reinhart & Reuland 1993, a.o.). To make the idea of logophoricity more precise, I divide logophoric centers into subtypes, elaborating on, but modifying Sells (1987)'s proposal. Specifically, based on French data and crosslinguistic comparisons, I use specific tests to demonstrate that exempt anaphors can be anteceded by three types of perspective centers: intellectual centers of perspective in attitude contexts, i.e. attitude holders; emotional centers of perspective, i.e. empathy loci; perceptual centers of perspective, i.e. spatial reference points. The variable availability of these

three types in languages explains crosslinguistic variation with respect to the distribution of exempt anaphors.

Based on French detailed data, this paper proposes the following threefold hypothesis to account for apparent exemption from Condition A (in languages where the same anaphoric form is subject to strict locality requirements in some cases, but to none in other cases).

(1) *Main hypothesis of the article:*

- i. Apparent exemption – seemingly exempt anaphors are in fact plain anaphors obeying Condition A: they are always locally bound by a silent, syntactically represented logophoric operator.
- ii. Logophoricity - exempt anaphors are logophoric: the interpretation of an anaphor is wholly derived from the interpretation of its binder.
- iii. Crosslinguistic variation – exempt anaphors can exhibit variation in their distribution: logophoric operators can refer to three types of logophoric centers (attitude holders, empathy loci, deictic centers) variously available in languages.

The first section will be mainly descriptive: based on French data and crosslinguistic comparisons, I will show in detail that in these languages, exempt anaphors do not have structural, but interpretive requirements, i.e. they have to be anteceded by perspective centers, which come in three flavors characterized by specific tests. The second section will be analytic: I will demonstrate that this behavior of exempt anaphors can be explained if we assume that they are locally bound by logophoric operators; this hypothesis accounts for all the properties that seem to distinguish exempt from plain anaphors.

2. How to identify exempt anaphors

2.1. The issue

The goal of this article is to account for the exceptional behavior of anaphors that appear to be exempt from Condition A (the term *exempt anaphor* comes from Pollard & Sag 1992). This raises a methodological issue: how can we guarantee that such anaphors are indeed exceptions? Assuming that anaphors disobeying the Chomskian Condition A are subject to exceptional conditions indeed presupposes that the Chomskian Condition A is right. But in principle, it could well be the case that such exceptions in fact demonstrate the failure of this theory. This has been the reasoning of many linguists who tried to redefine Condition A so as to capture all the data.

All these attempts however failed (see Huang & Liu 2001: 4-8 for a review), thereby suggesting that distinguishing between plain anaphors (obeying some version of Condition A)

and exempt ones¹ is on the right track. But given the morphological identity of plain and exempt anaphors, how can we determine the scope of Condition A and the scope of the exceptions without presupposing the validity of any theory? This is basically a two-variable problem: *a priori*, we neither know the notion of locality that is relevant to anaphors, i.e. what is the generalization capturing the distribution of anaphors (and in fact, different theories have been proposed, such as most famously Chomsky 1986 and Reinhart & Reuland 1993), nor the notion of exception that is needed, i.e. what is the generalization capturing the distribution of anaphors that we can qualify as exceptions. Crucially, instances of both plain anaphors and exempt anaphors are morphologically identical in many languages (English *himself*, French *lui-même* and *son propre*, Mandarin *ziji*, Japanese *zibun*, a.o.). In the absence of an independent criterion, it is therefore impossible to distinguish instances of plain anaphors and instances of exempt anaphors: assuming a specific theory (say, Chomsky 1986 or Reinhart & Reuland 1993) to identify plain anaphors (according to the aforementioned theories, anaphors bound within the smallest XP with subject distinct from them, or anaphors having a coargument) and thereby exceptions (anaphors disobeying these conditions) would be biased. Once we recognize the existence of exceptions and cannot modify the theory as to incorporate all of them in it, we thus need to reevaluate the descriptive generalizations and find independent criteria to safely identify the two sets of elements and be able to build two theories, that is in our case, a theory of Condition A and a theory of exemption from Condition A.

2.2. The solution: inanimacy

I here adopt Charnavel & Sportiche (2016)'s strategy to handle this problem, that is, the use of a criterion independent of the definition of Condition A to distinguish between plain and exempt anaphors in a given sentence. A property that meets these conditions for French is inanimacy: inanimate anaphors are always plain anaphors in French (Charnavel & Sportiche 2016). The reasoning behind this idea goes as follows. Many crosslinguistic generalizations have been proposed, showing that the antecedents of exempt anaphors are logophoric centers, but these diverse generalizations do not agree on a precise definition of logophoricity: the definition of

¹ The terms 'plain anaphor' and 'exempt anaphor' (used in Charnavel & Sportiche 2016) are technical: 'plain anaphor' refers to anaphors that standardly obey Condition A, while 'exempt anaphor' refers to anaphors that seem to be exempt from Condition A. Ultimately, we will show that 'exempt anaphors' are in fact not exempt so that plain and exempt anaphors are actually one and the same element. But the term 'exempt anaphor' is used descriptively.

perspective center is too vague and too diverse in the literature to safely identify exempt anaphors (see subsection 3.1). However, all these generalizations agree on one fact, namely that a logophoric center must be a live person. This conversely means that inanimates cannot be logophoric centers and therefore cannot antecede exempt anaphors.

The following contrasts involving the French anaphors *son propre* ('his own')² and *lui-même* (lit. *him-same*, 'himself')³ illustrate the relevance of inanimacy for locality.

- (2) a. [Cette auberge]_i fait de l'ombre à son_i propre jardin et au jardin de la maison voisine.
 ' [This inn]_i gives shade to its_i own garden and to the garden of the neighboring house.'
 b. Marie_i fait de l'ombre à sa_i propre fille et à la fille de la voisine.
 ' Marie_i is in the light of her_i own daughter and the neighbor's daughter.'
 c. *[Cette auberge]_i bénéficie du fait que les touristes préfèrent son_i propre jardin à ceux des auberges voisines.
 '* [This inn]_i benefits from the fact that the tourists prefer its_i own garden to that of the neighboring inns.'
 d. Marie_i bénéficie du fait que les touristes préfèrent son_i propre hôtel à ceux de ses concurrents.
 ' Marie_i benefits from the fact that the tourists prefer her_i own hotel to those of the competitors.'
- (3) a. [La Terre]_i tourne sur elle_i-*(même).
 ' [The earth]_i spins on it_i*(self).'
 b. [Le derviche]_i tourne sur lui_i-*(même).
 ' [The dervish]_i is spinning on him_i*(self).'
 c. [La Terre]_i subit l'effet gravitationnel des nombreux satellites qui tournent autour d'elle_i-*(même).
 ' [The earth]_i is subject to the gravitational effect of the many satellites that revolve around it_i*(self).'
 d. Marie_i subit l'influence des nombreux politiciens qui tournent autour d'elle_i-*(même).
 ' Marie_i is subject to the influence of the many politicians that revolve around her_i*(self).'⁴

Both sets of sentences exhibit a correlation between animacy and locality. In the structures used in (a) and (b), all the anaphors are licensed, but in the structures in (c)-(d), only the animate ones (in d) are. Moreover, (a)-(b) and (c)-(d) contrast with respect to the locality of the antecedent: under any definition of locality, the antecedent is more local to the anaphor in (a)-(b) than in (c)-

² In the case of *son propre*, explicit contrasts with another contextual possessor are made to guarantee that we deal with anaphoric possessor *son propre*: based on Charnavel (2012), Charnavel & Sportiche (2016) note that *son propre* exhibits different readings and only possessor *son propre*, i.e. *son propre* inducing a contrast with contextual possessors, behaves like an anaphor. Note that as explained in Charnavel (2012, chapter 1), the judgments of this kind of sentences were checked using a systematically controlled questionnaire administered to 86 native speakers of French.

³ The reflexive clitic *se* will not be investigated in this article because under closer scrutiny, it appears that *se* is not an anaphor by itself, but rather a marker of voice (see Sportiche 2014, Ahn 2015, a.o.). In fact, the clitic *se* does not only occur in reflexive constructions in French, but in other constructions as well such as middle, anticausative or passive constructions.

⁴ Throughout the paper, the English translations are meant as glosses of the French examples, so that the (absence of) stars indicated in the English reflect(s) the French judgments. I do not take any stand on the judgment of the corresponding English sentences.

(d). This means that *son propre* and *lui-même* are subject to locality conditions – Condition A to be defined more precisely – when they are inanimate.

Inanimacy is thus a criterion allowing us to draw a dividing line between plain and exempt anaphors (at least in French) independently of the precise definition of Condition A: the syntactic distribution of inanimate anaphors differs from that of animate anaphors, and the scope of this difference is a good basis for simultaneously determining a theory of locality (Condition A governing the behavior of plain anaphors) and a theory of exemption (other condition governing the behavior of exempt anaphors) for French. The present article concentrates on the latter (for the former, I will adopt a Chomskian-type, antecedent-based theory of locality, following Charnavel & Sportiche 2016).

Proposing inanimacy as a decisive criterion distinguishing between plain and exempt anaphors does not mean that the set of inanimate anaphors matches the set of plain anaphors and that of animate anaphors matches that of exempt anaphors: animate anaphors can have to obey Condition A (as will be discussed in section 4.6). In other words, inanimacy is a sufficient condition for being a plain anaphor (which is used by Charnavel & Sportiche 2016 to determine the scope of Condition A), but not a necessary one. Conversely, animacy is a necessary condition for exemption, but not a sufficient one. Thus animacy cannot directly be used to determine the scope of exemption. But given that inanimate anaphors can only occur in configurations obeying Condition A, we can adopt the following strategy to identify exempt anaphors:

- (4) An anaphor is exempt *when it is animate and appears in a configuration disallowing inanimate anaphors* (a configuration is crucially determined by the structural position of the antecedent with respect to the anaphor).

For instance, animate *son propre* is exempt in (2)d since it occurs in the same configuration as (2)c where the inanimate *son propre* is not acceptable; similarly, animate *elle-même* is exempt in (3)d since inanimate *elle-même* that appears in the structural equivalent (3)c is deviant. We therefore have a reliable way to empirically identify exempt anaphors in French without presupposing any particular theory for Condition A. This will be the basis of investigation in this article.

2.3. A caveat for *lui-même*

There is one caveat for the anaphor *lui-même*. We observe that unless it is heavily stressed, *lui-même* is not acceptable when it can be replaced by a weaker form such as the clitic reflexive *se* (subject oriented cliticizable argument) or the object clitics *le* and *lui*. This falls under a generalization discussed by Cardinaletti & Starke (1999): all else relevant equal, if a weaker form of the target element is available, it must be used, thus blocking the use of a stronger form. Importantly, this condition is independent of both Condition A and exemption (see more details in Charnavel & Sportiche 2016).

- (5) a. Romain_i s_i'examine.
'Romain_i is examining himself_i.'
b. *Romain_i examine lui_i-même. (unless heavily stressed)
'*Romain_i is examining himself_i.'
c. Romain_i pense que Lucie {l_i'/*s_i'} examinera.
'Romain_i thinks that Lucie will examine him_i.'
d. *Romain_i pense que Lucie examinera lui_i-même. (unless heavily stressed)
'*Romain_i thinks that Lucie will examine himself_i.'
- (6) a. *Romain_i se_i dépend.
'*Romain_i depends on himself_i.'
b. Romain_i dépend de lui_i-même.
'Romain_i depends on himself_i.'
c. *Romain_i pense que Lucie {se_i/le_i/lui_i} dépend.
'*Romain_i thinks that Lucie depends on him_i.'
d. Romain_i pense que Lucie dépend de lui_i-même.
'Romain_i thinks that Lucie depends on himself_i.'

Thus (5)a-b and (6)a-b show that *se* and *lui-même* are in complementary distribution when the antecedent is clausemate - unless there is heavy stress on *lui-même*. Similarly, *lui-même* and *le* are in competition in (5)c-d and (6)c-d when the antecedent is not in the same clause. In sum, *lui-même* is available only when none of the clitics *se/le/lui* are available to express the same meaning.

For our purposes, this means that to observe the behavior of exempt *lui-même* without any confound, we need to exclude cases where *lui-même* occurs in configurations licensing *se*, *le* or *lui*. This will be taken into consideration in the rest of the article.

3. Descriptive generalizations: logophoricity of exempt anaphors

As explained in the previous section 2, the present study targets animate anaphors in configurations disallowing inanimate anaphors (and some clitics in the case of *lui-même*), mainly in French. To account for their exempt behavior, our hypothesis will be that an exempt anaphor has to be anteceded by a logophoric center. After reviewing the notion of logophoricity in the literature and its problems in section 3.1, we will hypothesize that the logophoric centers anteceding exempt anaphors come in three flavors:

- (i) attitude holder: intellectual center of perspective in attitude contexts, i.e. author of discourse or thoughts;
- (ii) empathy locus: emotional center of perspective;
- (iii) deictic center: perceptual center of perspective, i.e. spatial reference point.

These three types of logophoric center will be examined in turn in sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4.

3.1. Logophoricity in the literature

The notion of logophoric center originated in the literature on West African languages forty years ago. Hagege (1974) coined the term of logophoricity: according to him, logophoric pronouns are specific pronominal forms in West African languages that appear in environments such as indirect discourse. More precisely, Clements (1975) defines the antecedent of logophors as the center of perspective, i.e. the one "whose speech, thoughts, feelings, or general state of consciousness are reported". This is illustrated below in the Kwa language Ewe.

- | | | |
|--|---|----------------------|
| (7) a. kofi be yè-dzo
Kofi say LOG-leave
'Kofi _i said that he _i left.' | b. kofi be e-dzo
Kofi say 3SG-leave
'Kofi _i said that he _k /she _k left.' | (Clements 1975: 142) |
|--|---|----------------------|

(7) involves an indirect discourse whose author is Kofi. In the embedded clause introduced by *be* 'say', the pronoun that must be used to refer to Kofi is the logophoric pronoun *yè* as in (7)a; the standard pronoun *e* as in (7)b cannot refer to the author of the indirect discourse.

Some variation has been reported in African logophors: depending on languages, logophoric pronouns are morphologically more or less specific (Von Roncador 1992, Culy 1994, Boyeldieu 2004, a.o.); they can take different combinations of *phi*-features and occupy different sets of positions (Hyman & Comrie 1981, Wieseman 1986, Culy 1994, a.o.); the logophoric licenser exhibits different properties (Frajzyngier 1985, Culy 1994, a.o.); and non-logophoric pronouns

may be in complementary distribution with logophoric ones or not (Adesola 1985, Pulleyblank 1986, Koopman & Sportiche 1989, a.o.). Despite this variation (which cannot be described in detail here, see Charnavel, Cole, Hermon & Huang, to appear, for more details), the main generalization emerging from the literature on African languages is the following: some pronouns require a center of perspective or subject of consciousness as antecedent.

Strikingly, it has been observed that anaphors exempt from Condition A exhibit the same kind of properties as exemplified below in Icelandic (8), Mandarin Chinese (9), and English (10).

- (8) a. Barnið_i lét ekki á ljós [að ?að hefði verið hugsað vel um sig_i]
 the-child put not in light that there had-subj been thought well about self
 ‘[The child]_i didn’t reveal that he_i had been taken good care of.’
 b. *Barnið_i bar ?ess ekki merki [að ?að hefði verið hugsað vel um sig_i]
 the-child bore it not signs that there had-subj been thought well about self
 ‘[The child]_i didn’t look as if he_i had been taken good care of.’ (Sells 1987: 451)
- (9) a. Zhangsan_i kuajiang-le [[changchang piping ziji_i de] naxie ren_j].
 Zhangsan praised-PERF often criticize self DE those persons
 ‘Zhangsan_i praised those people who criticize him_i a lot.’
 b. ??Zhangsan_i kuajiang-le [[houlai sha si ziji_i de] naxie ren_j].
 Zhangsan praised-PERF later kill die self DE those persons
 ‘Zhangsan_i praised those persons who later killed him_i.’ (Huang & Liu 2001: 20-21)
- (10) a. John_i said to Mary that physicists like himself_i were a godsend.
 b. *Mary said about John_i that physicists like himself_i were a godsend. (Kuno 1987: 123)

As shown by Thráinsson (1976), Maling (1984, 1986), Anderson (1986) and Sigurðsson (1990) among others, Icelandic reflexive *sig* appearing in a subjunctive clause can take a long distance antecedent if it is a center of perspective: the contrast between (8)a and (8)b comes from the fact that the child is the subject of consciousness in the former, but not in the latter. Similarly in Mandarin, the reflexive *ziji* can disobey Condition A when its antecedent is a perspective center as in (9)a, but not otherwise as in (9)b. Kuno (1987) provides parallel data in English where *himself* does not need a local antecedent if it is the author of a discourse as in (10)a vs. (10)b.

The problem that we face is that the definition of perspective center seems rather intuitive and variable in the African and syntactic literature: the notion of perspective center or subject of consciousness is not determined by specific tests; furthermore, ‘logophor’ in the syntactic literature sometimes just means exempt anaphor without implying any specific interpretation (Reinhart & Reuland 1993, a.o.).

Some precise definitions are proposed in the semantic literature (Schlenker 2003, Anand

2006, a.o.), but logophoricity does not correlate with exemption under such definitions: for instance, logophors are defined by Schlenker (2003) as obligatorily shifted indexicals, that is, indexicals that may only be evaluated with respect to a reported speech act; but exempt anaphors – which are not indexicals in the first place - do not necessarily occur in the scope of context-shifting operators like attitude verbs (e.g. in (9)a).

My aim is to reconcile and specify these approaches by dividing the notion of logophoric center into subtypes, drawing on Sells (1987), who distinguishes between Source ('the one who makes the report', i.e. the speaker), Self ('the one whose mind is being reported') and Pivot ('the one from whose point of view the report is made' - see Sells 1987: 455). As will be explained in the next sections based on specific tests, the subtypes I propose are however different from Sells': the logophoric centers here hypothesized to be relevant to exempting anaphors from Condition A will be attitude holders (merging Sells' Source and Self), empathy loci and deictic centers (splitting Sells' Pivot into two categories). In section 4, we will see how all types can be analyzed in a uniform way (as binding by a logophoric operator).

Also, note that in this paper, I do not *a priori* hypothesize any distinction between exempt anaphors and so-called long distance anaphors: I make the null hypothesis that both of them seem to disobey Condition A for the same reason, namely they are anteceded by a logophoric center. It is sometimes assumed (Reinhart & Reuland 1993, Cole *et al.* 2006, Reuland 2011, a.o.) that simplex anaphors such as Icelandic *sig*, Korean *caki*, Dutch *zich* or Mandarin *ziji* differ from complex anaphors such as Mandarin *ta-ziji*, Korean *caki-casin*, Dutch *zichzelf* or English *himself* in this respect: the former, which are argued to have specific properties such as monomorphemicity or subject orientation, can be long distance bound (which implies that the antecedent has to c-command the anaphor but does not necessarily have any specific - logophoric - interpretation), while the latter can be exempt from Condition A (which implies that there is no structural constraints on the antecedent, but only interpretive ones). However in view of the interpretive constraints in fact observed on the antecedent of *sig* or *ziji* above in (8)-(9), and the absence of structural constraints on their antecedent (in particular, they do not necessarily have to be subject, see Maling 1984, Huang & Liu 2001, a.o.), such a distinction is not clearly supported. That's why I here make the null hypothesis that all anaphors that are apparently not subject to Condition A behave the same (i.e. they are exempt anaphors), even if some additional

conditions (e.g. subject orientation) can constrain some anaphors. The argument does not hinge on this though, since it is based on the French complex anaphors *lui-même* and *son propre*; it is thus compatible with the hypothesis of a distinction between those and long distance anaphors. A precise investigation of the relation between (some) simplex anaphors and logophoricity would be required to decide the issue, which is beyond the scope of this paper.

3.2. First type of logophoric center: attitude holder

Attitude holders, i.e. intellectual centers of perspective in attitude contexts (author of discourse or thoughts), form the first category of logophoric center which, I hypothesize, can license exempt anaphors: as will be argued below, an anaphor occurring in an attitude context is exempted from Condition A if it is anteceded by the attitude holder of that context. Note that in this section, we only examine simple cases involving a single attitude holder; more complex cases involving several attitude holders in the same sentence will be studied in section 4.3.

3.2.1. Tests for attitude contexts

Several tests can diagnose attitude holders and attitude contexts, namely clauses expressing the content of the thoughts of the attitude holder. In most typical cases, the attitude holder is the subject of an intensional predicate like ‘think’ and the attitude context is the embedded clause complement of that predicate.

(i) Substitution Test

As already shown by Frege (1980/1892), substitution of coreferring terms within the scope of intensional predicates might change the truth value of the ascription. That’s why (11)a and (11)b are not contradictory even if *Superman* and *Clark Kent* corefer: they are in the scope of the attitude verb *believes* and Lois does not necessarily know that they refer to the same person. This shows that they occur in an attitude context, the attitude holder of which is Lois.

- (11) a. Lois believes that Superman is strong.
- b. Lois believes that Clark Kent is not strong.

(ii) Double Orientation Test

In attitude contexts, evaluative expressions (e.g. epithets, expressives, appositives) can be evaluated either by the speaker or by the attitude holder. Thus in (12), *a psychopath* in (a) is

more probably evaluated by the speaker, but *a sweetheart* in (b) is more probably the evaluation of the attitude holder *Sheila*.

- (12) a. Sheila believes that Chuck, a psychopath, is fit to watch the kids.
 b. Sheila believes that Chuck, a sweetheart if ever there was one, is fit to watch the kids. (Sæbø 2011: 79)

(iii) *Epithet Test*

Epithets occurring in an attitude context cannot refer to the attitude holder of that context (cf. Dubinsky & Hamilton [1998: 689]: an epithet must not be anteceded by an individual from whose perspective the attributive content of the epithet is evaluated⁵). For instance in (13)-(14), *the idiot* cannot refer to John in (a) because John is the relevant attitude holder (subject of *told*, complement of *d'après* 'according to'), but it can in (b) where John is not an attitude holder.

- (13) a. *John_i told us of a man who was trying to give [the idiot]_i directions.
 b. John_i ran over a man who was trying to give [the idiot]_i directions. (Dubinsky & Hamilton 1998: 688)
- (14) a. *D'après Jean_i, [cet idiot]_i est marié à un génie. 'According to John_i, [the idiot]_i is married to a genius.'
 b. A propos de Jean_i, [cet idiot]_i est marié à un génie. 'Speaking of John_i, [the idiot]_i is married to a genius.'
 (French equivalents to Dubinsky & Hamilton 1998: 688)

(iv) *French Pronoun Test*

Some French pronouns such as *en/y* are specifically sensitive to attitude contexts in that they cannot refer to the attitude holder of their clause (see Ruwet 1990):⁶ these elements are antilogophoric or more specifically anti-attitudinal.

- (15) a. Sophie_i en_k est amoureuse/est amoureuse de lui_k.⁷ 'Sophie_i is in love with him_k.'
 b. Emile_k pense que Sophie_i est amoureuse de lui_{k/m}. 'Emile_k thinks that Sophie_i is in love with him_{k/m}.'
 c. Emile_k pense que Sophie_i en_{*k/m} est amoureuse. 'Emile_k thinks that Sophie_i is in love with him_{*k/m}.'
 d. Emile_k mérite que Sophie_i en_{k/m} tombe amoureuse. 'Emile_k deserves the fact that Sophie_i falls in love with him_{k/m}.'

⁵ I have slightly modified Dubinsky & Hamilton's (1998) claim into "epithets occurring in an attitude context cannot refer to the attitude holder of that context", because for most speakers, even if the attributive content of the epithet is intended to be evaluated from the speaker's perspective, not from the attitude holder's, an epithet is still unacceptable when referring to the attitude holder: in (13)a and (14)a, *the idiot* is not acceptable whether it is intended to be evaluated by John or by the speaker (for the speakers who accept the epithet when evaluated from the speaker's perspective, this needs to be controlled for when using the Epithet Test).

Patel-Grosz (2012) proposes a similar principle, the Anti-Judge constraint: "an epithet cannot occur in a sentence *s* if (i) the sentence is interpreted with respect to a judge *j* that is identical to the epithet's antecedent, and (ii) the antecedent c-commands the epithet (Patel-Grosz 2012: 109). Point (ii) seems however too strong in view of examples like (14), where the antecedent does not have to c-command the epithet to make it ungrammatical.

⁶ The pronoun *ce* seems to be subject to similar constraints (see Coppieters 1982).

⁷ Certain French speakers cannot use *en* or *y* to refer to human beings. Since this dialect (which corresponds to the prescriptive norm) is irrelevant for antilogophoric *en* or *y*, I ignore it here.

- (16) a. Sophie_i y_k pense/pense à lui_k. ‘Sophie_i thinks about him_k.’
 b. Emile_k espère que Sophie_i pense à lui_{k/m}. ‘Emile_k hopes that Sophie_i thinks about him_{k/m}.’
 c. Emile_k pense que Sophie_i y_{*k/m} pense. ‘Emile_k thinks that Sophie_i thinks about him_{*k/m}.’
 d. Emile_k mérite que Sophie_i y_{k/m} pense. ‘Emile_k deserves the fact that Sophie_i thinks about him_{k/m}.’

In (15) and (16), *en* and *y* differ from regular animate clitics (e.g. *lui*) by being unable to refer to the attitude holder of the context as shown in (c) vs. (b). However, they are acceptable in non-attitude contexts as in (d) (the difference between the attitude verb *penser* ‘think’ and the non-attitude verb *mériter* ‘deserve’ was noticed by Ruwet 1990).

If we guarantee that we are in an attitude context using one of these tests, it turns out that exempt *son propre* is always acceptable when referring to the attitude holder of that context as illustrated below.⁸

- (17) Julie_i pense que Clark Kent préfère son_i propre hôtel et que Superman préfère celui de ses concurrents. [Substitution test]
 ‘Julie_i thinks that Clark Kent prefers her_i own hotel and that Superman prefers that of her competitors.’
- (18) Caroline_i croit que cet idiot de Nicolas a voté contre son_i propre projet. [Double orientation test]
 ‘Caroline_i believes that that idiot Nicolas voted against her_i own project.’
- (19) a. Robert_i imagine que son_{i/k} rival a voté pour son_i propre projet. [Epithet test]
 ‘Robert_i imagines that his_{i/k} rival voted for his_i own project.’
 b. Robert_i imagine que le rival de [cet idiot]_{*i/k} a voté pour son_i propre projet.
 ‘Robert_i imagines that the rival of [the idiot]_{*i/k} voted for his_i own project.’

Sentence (17) is not contradictory (provided that Julie does not know that Superman and Clark Kent refer to the same person) even if Superman and Clark Kent corefer (Substitution Test), and long distance *son propre* referring to the attitude holder *Julie* is acceptable. In (18), *cet idiot* ‘that idiot’ can be evaluated by the speaker or the attitude holder *Caroline* (Double Orientation Test), and *Caroline* can antecede *son propre*. In (19), *cet idiot* ‘the idiot’ in (b) cannot refer to the attitude holder Robert (Epithet Test) and *son propre* however can. In sum, all these sentences involve attitude contexts as guaranteed by the proposed tests, which licenses the use of exempt *son propre* referring to the attitude holder. Recall that we know that *son propre* is exempt in these cases because inanimate *son propre* is forbidden in such configurations (cf (2)c).

⁸ The tests are here applied in the clause containing the exempt anaphor (attitude context). The same result obtains if instead of inserting the test element (e.g. epithet for test (iii)) in that clause, we replace the anaphor by it as shown below for (19):

- 1) Robert_i imagine que son rival a voté pour le projet de [cet idiot]_{*i/k}.
 ‘Robert_i imagines that his rival voted for [the idiot]_{*i/k}’s project.’

The same holds for *lui-même* as exemplified by the following similar sentences. Note that the possible confound mentioned in subsection 2.3 was avoided by using only verbs incompatible with *se/le/lui*.

- (20) Sophie_i croit que le sort de Clark Kent dépend d'elle_i-même et que celui de Superman dépend de ses collègues. [Substitution test]
 'Sophie_i believes that Clark Kent's fate depends on herself_i and Superman's depends on her colleagues.'
- (21) a. Sonia_i craint que cet idiot de Julien ne soit amoureux d'elle_i-même au lieu de sa femme. [Double Orientation test]
 'Sonia_i is afraid that that idiot Julien is in love with herself_i instead of with his wife.'
 b. Sonia_i craint que Julien n'en*_{i/k} soit amoureux. [French pronoun test]
 'Sonia_i is afraid that Julien is in love with her*_{i/k}.'
- (22) a. Frédéric_i imagine que ses*_{i/k} rivaux ne dépendent que de lui_i-même.
 'Frédéric_i imagines that his*_{i/k} rivals only depend on himself_i.'
 b. Frédéric_i imagine que les rivaux de cet idiot*_{i/k} ne dépendent que de lui_i-même. [Epithet test]
 'Frédéric_i imagines that the idiot*_{i/k}'s rivals only depend on himself_i.'

Finally, note that *son propre* and *lui-même* behave similarly in Free Indirect Discourse: they can be exempt from locality requirements when referring to the attitude holder, i.e. the source of the free indirect discourse, as illustrated in (23). This is expected given that Free Indirect Discourse passes the tests mentioned above, for instance the epithet test as shown in (24): sentences (a)-(b) cannot be interpreted as free indirect discourses because they contain epithets referring to Mélanie, the author of discourse.⁹

- (23) a. Mélanie_i était inquiète. Ses_i propres enfants et ceux du voisin refusaient de l'écouter depuis hier.
 'Mélanie_i was worried. Her_i own children and the neighbor's had been refusing to listen to her since yesterday.'
 b. Mélanie_i était inquiète. Son voisin était amoureux d'elle_i-même et non de sa femme.
 'Mélanie_i was worried. Her neighbor was in love with herself_i, not with his wife.'
- (24) a. #Mélanie_i était inquiète. Ses_i propres enfants et ceux du voisin refusaient d'écouter [la pauvre femme]_i depuis hier.
 '#Mélanie_i was worried. Her_i own children and the neighbor's had been refusing to listen to [the poor woman]_i since yesterday.'
 b. #Mélanie_i était inquiète. Le voisin de [la pauvre femme]_i était amoureux d'elle_i-même et non de sa femme.
 '#Mélanie_i was worried. [The poor woman]_i's neighbor was in love with herself_i, not with his wife.'

3.2.2. Properties of exempt anaphors in attitude contexts

In such environments, exempt anaphors have the same properties as their antecedent, the attitude

⁹ These sentences remain acceptable though under the interpretation where they are not free indirect discourses, because the exempt anaphors do not occur in an attitude context in that case (see section 3.2.3).

holder. In particular, they do not only have to be animate – as already explained – but also sentient. Furthermore, French exempt anaphors have to be read *de se*. As discussed in Pearson (2015), it is not clear that African logophors need to be read *de se*, but pending further crosslinguistic investigation, it seems to be the case that exempt anaphors need to; this has for instance been observed for Mandarin *ziji* (see Huang & Liu 2001; Anand 2006). As will be discussed in section 4.6, this does not mean that all French anaphors need to be read *de se* in attitude contexts: they do not have to when locally bound, that is, plain anaphors differ from exempt ones in this respect.

- (25) [*At the beginning of the Marriage of Figaro, Marceline thinks that Figaro was born from unknown parents; at the end of the play, she learns that he is in fact her son.*]
- a. Au début de la pièce, Marceline_i dit que Suzanne va épouser son_i (#propre) fils.
‘At the beginning of the play, Marceline_i says that Suzanne will marry her_i (#own) son.’
 - b. A la fin de la pièce, Marceline_i dit que Suzanne va épouser son_i (propre) fils.
‘At the end of the play, Marceline_i says that Suzanne will marry her_i (own) son.’

In (25)a, the context forces a *de re non de se* reading of *son* since at the beginning of the play, Marceline thinks that Figaro was born from unknown parents; in such a context, *propre* is not acceptable, i.e. *son propre* has to be read *de se*.¹⁰ In fact, if we change the context so as to make the *de se* reading possible as in (25)b – at the end of the play, Marceline learns that Figaro is in fact her own son -, *propre* becomes acceptable.

Just like *son propre*, exempt *lui-même* has to be read *de se*.

- (26) [*Sabine and her father Michel are listening to songs that they recorded, and Sabine is in admiration of the male voice that they take to be her student’s. Unbeknowst to them, the male voice is actually Michel’s.*]
- Michel_i a dit que Sabine était fière de lui_i-(#même).
‘Michel_i said that Sabine was proud of him_i(#self).’

In (26), Michel thinks that Sabine is proud of her student, since they mistake Michel’s voice for her student’s. In that context, only the pronoun *lui* (read *de re*) can be used, not the anaphor *lui-même*, which has to be read *de se*.

In sum, a French exempt anaphor occurring in an attitude context refers to the attitude holder of that context and must be read *de se*.

¹⁰ If specific prosody is added on *propre* (stress and rising intonation), an anti *de se* reading can arise, that is, an ironic reading where the speaker emphasizes that Marceline is not aware that she is talking about her own son. This possible effect confirms that exempt *son propre* normally requires to be read *de se*, since it builds on this *de se* requirement: it is only because the *de se* reading is here required that the speaker distancing himself from it can trigger such an irony effect. The same holds in (26).

3.2.3. Attitude holder is not the only relevant type of logophoric center

By showing that French exempt anaphors behave similarly in all attitude contexts (they are anteceded by the attitude holder of the context), we have basically merged Sells's notions of Source and Self for the purposes of anaphora exemption. Indeed, the behavior of exempt anaphors in French and other languages that we have mentioned (e.g. English, Mandarin, Icelandic) does not justify the distinction between Self and Source as two different subtypes of logophoric centers exempting anaphors from Condition A: exempt anaphors exhibit the same properties under the scope of verbs of saying or other attitude verbs, i.e. they need to be anteceded by the attitude holder, whether it is a Source or a Self.

However, French exempt *son propre* and *lui-même* can also appear in non-attitude contexts. This is illustrated below (see more examples in the next section 3.3), where the Epithet Test diagnoses non-attitude contexts: the sentence is acceptable when the exempt anaphor is replaced by an epithet referring to the same individual, which cannot therefore be an attitude holder.

- (27) a. Le courage de Paul_i a sauvé sa_i propre maison des flammes ainsi que la maison de ses voisins.
'Paul_i's courage saved his_i own house from the fire and his neighbors' house as well.'
b. Le courage de Paul_i a sauvé des flammes la maison de [ce héros]_i ainsi que celle de ses voisins.
'Paul_i's courage saved from the fire [the hero]_i's house and his neighbors' house as well.'
- (28) a. Heureusement, l'avenir de Sylvie_i ne dépend pas seulement d'elle_i-même.
'Fortunately, Sylvie_i's future does not only depend on herself_i.'
b. Heureusement, l'avenir de Sylvie_i ne dépend pas seulement de [cette idiote]_i.
'Fortunately, Sylvie_i's future does not only depend on [the idiot]_i.'

Moreover, the Double Orientation Test also fails if it is applied to the sentence containing the exempt anaphor: *adorable* 'adorable' in (29) and *astucieux* 'clever' in (30) can only be evaluated by the speaker, not by Paul and Sylvie respectively.

- (29) Le courage de Paul_i a sauvé sa_i propre maison des flammes ainsi que la maison de ses adorables voisins.
'Paul_i's courage saved his_i own house from the fire and his adorable neighbors' house as well.'
- (30) Heureusement, l'avenir de Sylvie_i ne dépend pas que d'elle_i-même, mais aussi de ses astucieux parents.
'Fortunately, Sylvie_i's future does not only depend on herself_i, but also on her clever parents.'

This shows that French *son propre* and *lui-même* are not only exempted from Condition A when occurring in an attitude context and anteceded by the attitude holder of that context: since exempt *son propre* and *lui-même* can also appear in non-attitude contexts, another type of logophoric center licensing them should be hypothesized.

3.3. Second type of logophoric center: empathy locus

In this section, we will demonstrate that French exempt anaphors are also licensed by empathy loci, i.e. emotional centers of perspective.

3.3.1. Empathy in the literature

Empathy is defined by Kuno (see Kuno & Kaburaki 1977, Kuno 1987, Kuno 2004) as the speaker's identification, which may vary in degree, with a person that participates in the event or state that (s)he describes in a sentence. According to him, the degree of the speaker's empathy with a participant varies depending on different parameters such as the choice of descriptor (e.g. *John's sister* vs. *Mary*), surface structure, topic, speech act or humanness. Kuno determines empathy hierarchies for all these criteria: for instance, he assumes that it is more difficult for the speaker to empathize with a non-human animate object than with a human, or that given descriptor *x* (e.g. *John*) and another descriptor *f(x)* that is dependent upon *x* (e.g. *John's brother*), the speaker's empathy with *x* is greater than that with *f(x)*. Furthermore, Kuno proposes that a reflexive that is not a direct object of a verb needs to refer to the highest participant on the empathy hierarchy.

While the effect of empathy is presumably present in all languages (Kuno & Kaburaki 1977: 670),¹¹ how and in what domains it manifests itself varies from language to language. Japanese, for example, is argued to have a more extensive inventory of syntactic/morphological devices that reflect the empathy relation than English. Thus as demonstrated by Kuno (op. cit.) and Oshima (2006), verbs of giving in Japanese contrast with respect to the empathy locus: both verbs *yaru* and *kureru* share the same core meaning ('give') and case frame (nominative – dative), but *yaru* is used when the action is looked at from the point of view of the referent of the subject or the neutral point of view, whereas *kureru* is used when the event is described from the point of view of the referent of the dative object. The possibilities of reference for long distance reflexive *zibun* correlate with the choice of verb, that is, exempt *zibun* has to refer to the empathy locus.

- (31) a. Taroo_i-wa Hanako-ga zibun_i-ni kasite kureta hon-o nakusite simatta.
Taroo-TOP Hanako-NOM self-DAT lending gave book-ACC losing ended up
'Taroo_i has lost a book that Hanako lent himself_i.'

¹¹ Oshima (2006) considers syntactic phenomena known as the syntactic direction (the direct/inverse opposition) and nominal obviation, which are attested in language groups such as Algonquian (e.g. Cree), Athabaskan (e.g. Navajo), and Tibeto-Burman (e.g. Jinghpaw) as devices to encode restrictions on the empathy relation.

- b. *Taroo_i-wa Hanako-ga zibun_i ni kasite yatta hon-o nakusite simatta.
 Taroo-TOP Hanako-NOM self-DAT lending gave book-ACC losing ended up
 ‘*Taroo_i has lost a book that Hanako lent himself_i.’

In (31)a, the use of *kureru* makes the dative reflexive *zibun* an empathy locus, which allows it to take non-local Taroo as antecedent. However, the other ‘give’ verb *yaru* is used in (31)b so that the dative *zibun* does not correspond to the empathy locus and cannot therefore refer to Taroo.

In Sells’s (1987) categorization, the notion of empathy roughly corresponds to that of Pivot (Sells 1987: 455, footnote 14), which represents ‘the one from whose point of view the report is made’ (Sells 1987: 455). Nevertheless, Sells understands Pivot in a more physical sense, as the center of deixis, which means that Sells’s notion of Pivot is in fact broader than that of empathy: it encompasses Oshima’s notions of empathy and spatio-temporal perspectives. We will come back to this when discussing deictic centers in section 3.4.

In sum, it has been suggested by different authors that the speaker may adopt the perspective of an event participant (s)he empathizes with, and that this choice of point of view interacts with the behavior of reflexives. However, the way to identify empathy loci remains quite vague: it is considered as a gradual rather than categorical notion (cf. Kuno’s empathy hierarchies) and does not manifest itself in the same fashion in different languages; English in particular does not seem to have any clear device that allows us to clearly identify empathy loci.

3.3.2. Test for empathy contexts

Based on examples such as (27) or (28) repeated below, I hypothesize that empathy is a relevant notion for French reflexives: exempt anaphors can be anteceded by empathy loci (e.g. *Paul* and *Sylvie* below).

- (32) [= (27)a] Le courage de Paul_i a sauvé sa_i propre maison des flammes ainsi que la maison des voisins.
 ‘Paul_i’s courage saved his_i own house from the fire and the neighbors’ house as well.’

- (33) [= (28)a] Heureusement, l’avenir de Sylvie_i ne dépend pas seulement d’elle_i-même.
 ‘Fortunately, Sylvie_i’s future does not only depend on herself_i.’

Following Kuno (1987), I define empathy locus as the event participant that the speaker identifies with, or empathizes with, that is, takes the emotional perspective of. Note that the notion of empathy is a technical term that is not to be confused with informal notions such as ‘have sympathy for’ or ‘pity’; in particular, even an event participant towards whom the speaker

has a negative attitude can be an empathy locus, as, for example, could be the case in (33). Empathy loci are thus emotional centers of perspective: as opposed to attitude holders (intellectual centers of perspective), they are not triggered by intensional expressions, but can occur in non-attitude contexts.

French does not seem to have verbs like Japanese *yaru/kureru* that lexically encode empathy. Moreover, Kuno's empathy hierarchies are not suited to categorically determine whether an element is an empathy locus or not (see also footnote 13). I instead propose to use the expression *son cher* 'his/her dear' as a diagnostic to identify empathy loci for both empirical and conceptual reasons: empirically, we will see below that French exempt anaphors that do not occur in attitude contexts are licensed if and only if they are compatible with *son cher*; conceptually, *son cher* intrinsically requires empathy. This is so because its meaning makes *son cher* necessarily evaluative and first-personal, in the sense that the fact that someone or something is *cher à* (dear to) someone is subject to evaluation, but this can only be directly evaluated by the person experiencing the feeling (only I know whether someone is dear to me or not, nobody else can unless I tell him/her). Thus, this directly reveals the individual that the speaker identifies or empathizes with: if the speaker uses *son cher*, it means that (s)he empathizes with its referent, i.e. (s)he adopts her/his emotional perspective.¹² Note moreover that as illustrated below, *son cher* can combine with an animate or inanimate noun but is necessarily anteceded by a human (e.g. *Jérôme* below), which correctly predicts that empathy loci, which can license exempt anaphors, are animate.

- (34) a. Jérôme_i va aller rendre visite à sa_i chère cousine. 'Jérôme_i will visit his_i dear cousin.'
 b. Jérôme_i va prendre sa_i chère moto pour aller au travail.
 'Jérôme_i will take his_i dear motorbike to go to work.'
 c. [Cette moto]_i plaît à son_i (*cher) propriétaire. '[This motorbike]_i pleases its_i (*dear) owner.'

Note that *son cher* is frequently used ironically, which supports the hypothesis that *son cher* expresses the internal point of view of its referent, as irony arises when two points of view are

¹² In principle, it is to some extent possible to deduce (vs. know) that someone/something is dear to someone based on their behavior, i.e. by adopting an external perspective. In fact, *cher* 'dear' can be used in combination with markers of evidentiality like *apparemment* 'apparently'.

2) Apparemment, Marie est chère à Jean.
 'Apparently, Mary is dear to John.'

However, this is impossible when *cher* is attributive as in possessive DPs, probably because it corresponds to a presupposition: *son cher* 'his dear' can only express an internal (cf. logophoricity) vs. external (cf. evidentiality) perspective.

confronted. In the case of *son cher*, the irony effect comes from the discrepancy between the speaker's and the relevant event participant's perspectives: the speaker surimposes his/her perspective by showing that the referent of *son cher*'s perspective is absurd as in (35). Note that this is different from double orientation expressions examined in section 3.2.1: in (18) for instance, Nicolas can be evaluated as idiot by the speaker or the attitude holder (Caroline) irrespective of Nicolas's judgment; in (35) however, the speaker has to take Jérôme's emotional perspective to evaluate his cousin as dear to him: he cannot deny this since it is Jérôme's internal feeling; but (s)he builds on it to add another layer of judgment, i.e. that Jérôme's feeling is unjustified, thus creating an irony effect.

(35) Jérôme_i va aller rendre visite à sa_i chère cousine (qui profite de lui).
 'Jérôme_i will visit his_i dear cousin (who takes advantage of him).'

Because the referent of *son cher* is intrinsically an empathy locus, *son cher* can diagnose empathy contexts and identify possible referents for exempt anaphors: replacing an exempt anaphor with *son cher* (+noun) yields grammatical sentences, because the antecedent is an empathy locus.

(36) cf. (32) Le courage de Paul_i a sauvé sa_i chère maison des flammes ainsi que la maison des voisins.
 'Paul_i's courage saved his_i dear house from the fire and the neighbors' house as well.'

(37) cf. (33) Heureusement, l'avenir de Sylvie_i ne dépend pas seulement de ses_i chers parents.
 'Fortunately, Sylvie_i's future does not only depend on her_i dear parents.'

(38) a. [Le fils de Claire]_i est parti avant que son_i propre fils n'arrive.
 '[Claire's son]_i left before his_i own son arrives.'
 b. [Le fils de Claire]_i est parti avant que son_i cher fils n'arrive.
 '[Claire's son]_i left before his_i dear son arrives.'

(39) a. Après ce qui s'est passé, Josiane_i mérite qu'on s'occupe d'elle_i-même et de son mari.
 'After what happened, Josiane_i deserves the fact that people take care of herself_i and her husband.'
 b. Après ce qui s'est passé, Josiane_i mérite qu'on s'occupe de ses_i chers enfants et de son mari.
 'After what happened, Josiane_i deserves the fact that people take care of her_i dear children and her husband.'

Conversely, *son cher* cannot be substituted for an exempt anaphor that is not acceptable.

(40) a. *La soeur de Michel_i gronde ses_i propres enfants, qui sont dans sa classe.
 '*Michel_i's sister scolds his_i own children, who are in her class.'
 b. *La soeur de Michel_i gronde ses_i chers enfants, qui sont dans sa classe.
 '*Michel_i's sister scolds his_i dear children, who are in her class.'

(41) a. [= (2)c] *[Cette auberge]_i bénéficie du fait que les touristes préfèrent son_i propre jardin à ceux des auberges voisines.

*[This inn]_i benefits from the fact that the tourists prefer its_i own garden to that of the neighboring inns.’

- b. *[Cette auberge]_i bénéficie du fait que les touristes préfèrent son_i cher jardin à ceux des auberges voisines.

*[This inn]_i benefits from the fact that the tourists prefer its_i dear garden to that of the neighboring inns.’

In (40), the unavailability of both *son propre* and *son cher* show, I argue, that Michel is not an empathy locus: Michel’s sister is.¹³ In (41), neither *son propre* nor *son cher* can be anteceded by the non-local inanimate *cette auberge* ‘this inn’. In general, it is impossible to empathize with inanimates, or with deceased animates: the speaker cannot adopt the emotional perspective of someone who is not living at the time of the event as shown below.

- (42) a. Comme l’avait demandé [le pharaon]_i de son vivant, les embaumeurs prennent soin de son_i (*propre) corps et du corps de son épouse.

‘As was asked by [the Pharaoh]_i when he was alive, the embalmers are taking care of his_i (*own) body and that of his wife.’

- b. Comme [le pharaon]_i le demande, les embaumeurs prendront soin de son_i propre corps et du corps de son épouse une fois qu’ils seront morts.

‘As asked by [the Pharaoh]_i, the embalmers will take care of his_i own body and that of his wife when they die.’

In (42)a, the present tense of the matrix clause gains precedence, so that *son propre* is evaluated with respect to the utterance time, when the referent of the antecedent, the pharaon, is dead.

Correlatively, the presence of exempt *son propre* is not acceptable. However, the tense system is different in (42)b: the future time depends on the present, so the present is the time with respect to which *son propre* is evaluated. The Pharaoh, the attitude holder, is alive at that time, which makes it a proper antecedent for the exempt anaphor.

Finally, we can check that *son cher* indeed diagnoses empathy loci, not attitude holders, because it can co-occur with an epithet referring to its antecedent (Epithet Test).¹⁴

¹³ This example, as well as example (38), goes against Kuno’s empathy hierarchy about descriptors, which predicts that Michel (resp. Claire) is a stronger empathy locus than Michel’s sister (resp. Claire’s son). This is one of the motivations for not using this kind of hierarchy here. However, note that Michel can in principle (in the right context) be construed as an empathy locus, thus making *son cher* and *son propre* acceptable: this is the case if the sentence is enriched as follows:

- 3) Comme la soeur de Michel_i a préféré gronder ses_i {chers/propres} enfants plutôt que ceux de ses amis, il_i lui a fait toute une scène.

‘Given that Michel’s sister chose to scold his {dear/own} kids rather than her friends’, he made a scene.’

¹⁴ This does not mean that *son cher* cannot refer to an attitude holder; in fact, it can, as exemplified below:

- 4) Julie_i pense que les touristes préfèrent son_i cher hôtel à ceux de ses concurrents.

‘Julie_i thinks that the tourists prefer her_i dear hotel to those of her competitors.’

Note that this is compatible with Sells’s idea that there is an implicational relation between the different logophoric roles, Source, Self and Pivot: similarly, we can hypothesize that an attitude holder is necessarily an empathy locus,

- (43) a. Le courage de Paul_i a sauvé des flammes la chère maison de [ce héros]_i, ainsi que celle des voisins.
 ‘Paul_i’s courage saved from the fire [the hero]_i’s dear house and the neighbors’ house as well.’
 b. Le courage de Paul_i a sauvé des flammes sa_i chère maison ainsi que celle des voisins de [ce héros]_i.
 ‘Paul_i’s courage saved from the fire his_i dear house and [the hero]_i’s neighbors’ house as well.’
- (44) a. Heureusement, l’avenir de Sylvie_i dépend des chers parents de [cette idiote]_i.
 ‘Fortunately, Sylvie_i’s future depends on [the idiot_i]’s dear parents.’
 b. Heureusement, l’avenir de Sylvie_i dépend de ses_i chers parents, et pas seulement des études de [cette idiote]_i.
 ‘Fortunately, Sylvie_i’s future depends on her_i dear parents, and not only on [the idiot_i]’s studies.’

Thus *son cher* indeed diagnoses perspective centers that can occur in non-attitude contexts, that is, empathy loci.

3.4. Third type of logophoric center: deictic center

A third type of perspective center can license exempt anaphors, namely deictic centers. Conceptually, they correspond to perceptual centers of perspective, i.e. animate spatial reference points. Most authors include this concept under the notion of empathy (Kuno 1987) or Pivot (Sells 1987), but partly following Oshima (2006), I will argue that deictic centers should be distinguished from empathy loci, both for conceptual and empirical reasons. In particular, I will show that while English or Japanese exempt anaphors seem to be licensed by deictic centers, French ones are not, even if they can be anteceded by empathy loci.

3.4.1. Deictic perspective in the literature

As we have seen, empathy according to Kuno (1987, 2004) is the speaker’s identification with an event participant and thus corresponds to the camera angle adopted by the speaker when (s)he places the camera on that event participant. In that sense, Kuno’s empathy locus encompasses the

but the reverse does not hold. This predicts that a given exempt anaphor, such as *son propre* or *lui-même*, that is licensed by empathy loci can also be anteceded by attitude holders, but a given exempt anaphor licensed by attitude holders is not necessarily acceptable in empathy contexts. French does not have exempt anaphors specifically sensitive to attitude contexts, but as shown in section 3.2.1, it has antilogophoric pronouns such as *en/y* that cannot refer to attitude holders specifically. The hypothesized implicational relation is confirmed as they can however refer to empathy loci: as illustrated below, the fact that *en* cannot refer to the attitude holder in (a) does not entail that *en* cannot refer to the empathy locus in (b) diagnosed by *son cher* in (c).

- 5) a. Emile_k pense que Sophie en_{*k} est fière.
 ‘Emile_k thinks that Sophie is proud of him_{*k}.’
 b. Emile_k mérite que Sophie en_k soit fière.
 ‘Emile_k deserves the fact that Sophie is proud of him_k.’
 c. Emile_k mérite que Sophie soit fière de ses_k chers enfants.
 ‘Emile_k deserves the fact that Sophie is proud of his_k dear children.’

notion of deictic center even if this is not made explicit. Even more clearly, Sells's concept of Pivot includes the notion of a physical center of perspective: according to him, the pivot is 'the person from whose point of view the report is made, one with respect to whose (space-time) location the content of the proposition is evaluated' (Sells 1987: 457), i.e. the center of deixis; thus 'if someone makes a report with Mary as the pivot, that person is understood as (literally) standing in Mary's shoes' (Sells 1987: 455).

Moreover, Sells suggests that reflexives are sensitive to deictic centers: he provides the following example where English *his own* can be anteceded by the long distance antecedent *he* only when it is the pivot, i.e. in (45)a (vs. b), assuming that the locative prepositional complement of *come* corresponds to the deictic center while that of *go* does not.

- (45) a. He_i was happy when his_i own mother came to visit him_i in the hospital.
b. ??He_i was happy when his_i own mother went to visit him_i in the hospital.¹⁵ (Sells 1987: 465)

In the same vein, Cantrall (1974, mentioned by Zribi-Hertz 1989: 704) gives examples involving English reflexives that are sensitive to the deictic center.

- (46) a. [The women]_i were standing in the background, with the children behind them_i.
b. [The women]_i were standing in the background, with the children behind themselves_i.

Let's suppose, as does Cantrall, that (46) describes a photograph in which the standing women have their backs turned to the camera. In that situation, the use of the reflexive *himself* as in (46)b forces the reading where the children are located behind the women from the point of view of the women - that is, behind the women's backs, and consequently in the foreground of the picture; by contrast, the children in (46)a may be located behind the women from the speaker's point of view, therefore in the background of the picture. This suggests that *himself* is licensed by the deictic center, i.e. the women in that case.

Furthermore, deictic centers are not simply spatial reference points, but need to have mental properties: an oriented inanimate like a house as in (47) below cannot license an exempt anaphor.

- (47) [The house]_i in the picture is facing away from us, with an elm tree behind it_i(*self). (Cantrall 1974:146-147)

The anaphor *itself* cannot be anteceded by the non-local antecedent *the house*, even if we intend to use the house as reference point by saying that the elm tree is located behind the house. That's

¹⁵ A possible confound comes from the fact that *be happy* is a psychological verb, which could make *he* an attitude holder, or at least an empathy locus.

why deictic centers should be considered as perceptual centers of perspective: both orientation and perception are crucial.

Oshima (2006) gives a more specific content to the notion of deictic center. According to him, the deictic center can be determined by three main classes of expressions: indexicals (e.g. *I, this*), deictic motion verbs (e.g. *come*) and deictic angular expressions (e.g. *to the right of*). He argues that there is no unitary notion of deictic center (in particular, we need reference point(s), i.e. a set of individuals rather than a specific entity) and there is some interaction between deixis and reflexivity only in the following way: an empathy locus (licensing exempt anaphors) tends to be a reference point as shown in (48) and tends to be interpreted as the origin for a relative angular expressions as illustrated in (49).

- (48) a. Taro_i-wa Hanako-ga kare_i-o tazunete-{it/ki}-ta noni, irusu-o tukat-ta
 Taro-TOP Hanako-NOM he-ACC visit-{go/come}-PAST though pretended.absence-ACC use-PAST
 ‘Although Hanako {went/came} to visit him_i, Taro_i pretended not to be home.’
 b. Taro_i-wa, Hanako-ga zibun_i-o tazunete-{??it/ki}-ta noni, irusu-o tukat-ta
 Taro-TOP Hanako-NOM self-ACC visit-{go/come}-PAST though pretended.absence-ACC use-PAST
 ‘Although Hanako {??went/came} to visit himself_i, Taro_i pretended not to be home.’ (Oshima 2007: 28)
- (49) a. Taro-wa Hanako-ni teeburu-no migigawa-no otoko-o syookai-si-ta
 Taro-TOP Hanako-DAT table-GEN right-GEN man-ACC introduce-PAST
 ‘Taro introduced to Hanako the man to the right of the table from his/?her/my/your viewpoint.’
 b. Taro-wa Hanako-ni teeburu-no migigawa-no otoko-o syookai-site-yat-ta
 Taro-TOP Hanako-DAT table-GEN right-GEN man-ACC introduce-BEN-PAST
 ‘Taro introduced to Hanako the man to the right of the table from his/?*her/(?)my/(?)your viewpoint, for her sake.’
 c. Taro-wa Hanako-ni teeburu-no migigawa-no otoko-o syookai-site-kure-ta
 Taro-TOP Hanako-DAT table-GEN right-GEN man-ACC introduce-BEN-PAST
 ‘Taro introduced to Hanako the man to the right of the table from *?his/ her/ ?my/ ?your viewpoint, for her sake.’ (Oshima 2007: 29)

In (48)b, the reflexive *zibun* can be anteceded by the non-local antecedent *Taro*, which is hypothesized by Oshima to be the empathy locus, only if it is the complement of *come*, i.e. the deictic center. In (49)b (respectively c), *yaru* (respectively *kureru*) indicates that the speaker empathizes with Taro (respectively Hanako) and it is most natural to choose him as the origin of *migigawa* ‘to the right’.

Iida (1996) however argues that long-distance *zibun* is bound by the deictic center as in (48)b. Oshima (2007) objects that the deictic center can differ from the referent of *zibun*, in particular when it is the speaker. Thus Iida’s formulation must predict that matching between the referent of *zibun* and the deictic center is strictly enforced only in a case like (50)b.¹⁶

¹⁶ It is not clear however if *zibun* is really a long distance anaphor in both (49) and (50).

- (50) (adapted by Oshima 2007: 29 from Iida 1996: 162)
- a. Taro_i-wa Taro_i/kare_i-no migigawa-ni hon-o oi-ta.
 Taro-TOP Taro/he-GEN right-DAT book-ACC put-PAST
 ‘Taro_i put the book on his_i right.’
 ‘Taro_i put the book on the right of him_i (from the speaker’s perspective).’
- b. Taro_i-wa zibun_i-no migigawa-ni hon-o oi-ta.
 Taro-TOP self-GEN right-DAT book-ACC put-PAST
 ‘Taro_i put the book on his_i right.’
 ‘*Taro_i put the book on the right of him_i (from the speaker’s perspective).’

As for Rooryck and Wyngaerd (2011, chapter 7), they also build on Cantrall’s (1974) and Kuno (1987)’s observations to account for differences between observer-centred (i.e. speaker’s perspective in (46)) and object-centred (i.e. women’s perspective in (46)) interpretations in so-called *snake-sentences* (*Tony saw a snake near him/himself*). According to them, this difference in interpretation does not depend on the syntactic status of anaphors (plain vs. exempt), but on the nature of the pronominal element (anaphor vs. pronoun): only anaphors can trigger object-centred interpretations because *-self* contributes grammatical axial dimensions to the pronominal form it attaches to, while pronouns lack grammatical axial dimensions.

In sum, the notion of deictic center seems to be relevant for exempt anaphora, but how exactly is not clear and would require more work. Based on the data mentioned above, I suppose for now that deictic centers can license exempt anaphors in English and possibly in Japanese, but the exact conditions for that need further investigation.

3.4.2. Tests for deictic contexts in French

Using the same tools as Oshima (motion verbs and deictic angular expressions), we can show that French exempt anaphors are however not sensitive to deictic centers.

First of all, French *venir* ‘come’, just like English and Japanese motion verbs, requires that the reference point be at the goal, while French *aller* ‘go’ requires that it be not. The behavior of these verbs is illustrated by the following examples involving the first person, which has to be the reference point when used with such verbs.

- (51) a. Luc va venir me voir. ‘Luc will come see me.’
 b. ??Je vais venir voir Luc. ‘??I will come see Luc.’
- (52) a. ??Luc va aller me voir. ‘??Luc will go see me.’
 b. Je vais aller voir Luc. ‘I will go see Luc.’

If French anaphors were sensitive to deictic centers, this would predict that exempt *son propre* and *lui-même* can be anteceded by the reference point, that is by the locative prepositional phrase in the case of *venir* ‘come’ and by the subject in the case of *aller* ‘go’, but cannot be anteceded by the other argument in each case. This is not borne out:

(53) Ma chère mère ainsi que sa_i (*propre) mère sont venues voir Paul_i à l’hôpital.
‘My dear mother as well as his_i (*own) mother came to see Paul_i in the hospital.’

(54) Ma chère mère ainsi que sa_i (*propre) mère sont allées voir Paul_i à l’hôpital.
‘My dear mother as well as his_i (*own) mother went to see Paul_i in the hospital.’

(55) La jeune fille éprise de lui_i-(*même) est venue voir Paul_i à l’hôpital.
‘The girl in love with him_i(*self) came to see Paul_i in the hospital.’

(56) La jeune fille éprise de lui_i-(*même) est allée voir Paul_i à l’hôpital.
‘The girl in love with him_i(*self) went to see Paul_i in the hospital.’

Crucially, there is no contrast between (53) and (54) or between (55) and (56): all the sentences are deviant with the anaphors, which shows that reference points are not specific antecedents for exempt anaphors.¹⁷ Note that the presence of *ma chère* ‘my dear’ in (53)-(54) guarantees that Paul is not construed as an empathy locus.

The same holds with deictic angular expressions. A set of these expressions behaves like motion verbs in constraining the reference point lexically. In particular, *à la gauche/droite de* ‘to the left/right of’ contrasts with *à gauche/droite de* ‘lit. to left/right of, on the left/right of’ in this respect: the former (with a definite article) has to be used when the referent of the argument’s perspective is adopted, while the latter (without definite article) expresses the speaker’s perspective. This is illustrated by (57), which describes Figure 1.

¹⁷ In the absence of *propre* and *même*, the two pairs of sentences are acceptable and differ in interpretation with respect to the location of the speaker (at the hospital in sentences with *come*, elsewhere in sentences with *go*).



Figure 1. Johannes Vermeer - Lady at the Virginal with a Gentleman, 'The Music Lesson'¹⁸

- (57) a. La jeune femme est à la droite du professeur de musique.
 'The young woman is to the right of the music teacher.' (from the teacher's perspective)
 b. La jeune femme est à gauche du professeur de musique.
 'The young woman is on the left of the music teacher.' (from the speaker's perspective)

If deictic centers are possible antecedents for exempt anaphors, we expect exempt *son propre* and *lui-même* to be licensed by the argument of *à la droite/gauche de* 'to the right of/left of' used in (57)a, but not by the argument of *à droite/gauche de* 'on the right of/left of' used in (57)b. Again, this is not borne out: in both (58) and (59), there is no contrast between (a) and (b), but all sentences are deviant with the anaphors.

- (58) a. A la droite du professeur_i, sa_i (*propre) élève joue de l'épinette..
 'To the right of the teacher_i, his_i (*own) student plays the virginal.'
 b. A gauche du professeur_i, sa_i (*propre) élève joue de l'épinette.
 'On the left of the teacher_i, his_i (*own) student plays the virginal.'
- (59) a. A la droite du professeur_i un portrait de lui_i(*-même) est accroché au-dessus de l'épinette.
 'To the right of the teacher_i a portrait of him_i(*self) hangs above the virginals.'
 b. A gauche du professeur_i, un portrait de lui_i(*-même) est accroché au-dessus de l'épinette.
 'On the left of the teacher_i a portrait of him_i(*self) hangs above the virginals.'

Another set of deictic angular expressions behaves differently: expressions such as *derrière/devant* 'behind/before' or *dessus/dessous* 'above/below' do not lexically constrain the reference point, but give rise to ambiguities as illustrated by (60)-(61) below, still based on Figure 1.

¹⁸ From Google Art Project. Retrieved July 9th 2015 from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Johannes_Vermeer_-_Lady_at_the_Virginal_with_a_Gentleman,_The_Music_Lesson_-_Google_Art_Project.jpg

- (60) a. L'épinette est derrière la jeune femme.
 'The virginal is behind the young woman.'
 (from the speaker's perspective)
- b. L'épinette est devant la jeune femme.
 'The virginal is before the young woman.'
 (from the woman's perspective)
- (61) a. La viole de gambe est devant la jeune femme.
 'The viola da gamba is before the young woman.'
 (from the speaker's perspective)
- b. La viole de gambe est derrière la jeune femme.
 'The viola da gamba is behind the young woman.'
 (from the woman's perspective)

Since the young woman has her back turned to us on the painting, the virginal (the keyed musical instrument) stands before her from her perspective, but behind her from our perspective; conversely, the viola da gamba (the stringed instrument) lies behind the woman from her point of view, but before her from our point of view. Both *derrière* 'behind' and *devant* 'before' can be used in either case.

The hypothesis that deictic centers are possible antecedents for exempt anaphors predicts disambiguation: exempt *son propre* and *lui-même* should only be licensed by the reference point, that is, only the event participant's perspective should be available when the argument of *derrière/devant* 'behind/before' antecedes them, contrary to fact as shown below: in (62) and (63), exempt *son propre* and *lui-même* cannot be anteceded by *la jeune femme* 'the young woman', whether she is the reference point or not.

- (62) a. [La jeune femme]_i est à l'arrière-plan, avec une viole de gambe derrière elle(*-même).
 '[The young woman]_i is in the background, with a viola da gamba behind her_i(*self).'
- b. [La jeune femme]_i est à l'arrière-plan, avec une viole de gambe devant elle(*-même).
 '[The young woman]_i is in the background, with a viola da gamba before her_i(*self).'
- (63) a. Devant [la jeune femme]_i est accroché un miroir où apparaît son_i (*propre) reflet.
 'Before [the young woman]_i hangs a mirror where her_i (*own) reflection appears.'
- b. Derrière [la jeune femme]_i est accroché un miroir où apparaît son_i (*propre) reflet.
 'Behind [the young woman]_i hangs a mirror where her_i (*own) reflection appears.'

In sum, French exempt anaphors cannot be licensed by deictic centers. I nevertheless consider deictic centers to form a subtype of logophoric centers able to license exempt anaphors in principle, because exempt anaphors in English and Japanese, it seems, can be anteceded by them. Moreover, because French exempt anaphors can be licensed by empathy loci, I distinguish between empathy loci and deictic centers as opposed to Kuno (1987) or Sells (1987) who encompasses them into the notion of Pivot. This distinction based on empirical data corresponds

to a conceptual difference between emotional and perceptual points of view.¹⁹

3.5. Interim conclusion

The present section has established that anaphors can be exempt from Condition A if they are anteceded by perspective centers falling into three types (intellectual, emotional or perceptual), which can be identified using specific tests summarized in Table 1 below. In metaphorical words, the speaker can adopt different camera angles by placing the camera into the mind, the heart or the body of an event participant, and this crucially affects the use of anaphors. The possibility of being sensitive to different types of logophoric centers allows for crosslinguistic variation.²⁰

Type of logophoric center	Tests diagnosing logophoric center in French	Expressions creating logophoric context	French exempt anaphors licensed by logophoric center
Attitude Holder	(i) Substitution Test (ii) Double Orientation Test (iii) Epithet Test (iv) French pronouns Test	Intensional expressions	<i>son propre</i> <i>lui-même</i>
Empathy locus	<i>Son cher</i> ('his/her dear') Test	Japanese verbs 'give' <i>yaru</i> vs. <i>kureru</i>	<i>son propre</i> <i>lui-même</i>
Deictic center	Reference point for deictic expressions	Deictic motion verbs Angular expressions	None

Table 1. The different types of logophoric centers and their interaction with exempt anaphors in French

¹⁹ Furthermore, the French facts as compared to the English and Japanese facts suggest that there is an implicational relation between empathy loci and deictic centers (cf. footnote 14) in the following sense: exempt anaphors that are licensed by deictic centers can also be in principle anteceded by empathy loci (e.g. English and possibly Japanese), but the reverse is not true (e.g. French).

²⁰ In footnotes 19 and 14, an implicational relation has been hypothesized between the logophoric centers (deictic \Rightarrow empathic \Rightarrow attitude) in the sense that exempt anaphors that are licensed by deictic centers (resp. empathy loci) are also licensed by empathy loci and attitude holders (resp. attitude holders), but not *vice versa*. Crosslinguistic variation is predicted to be constrained by this implicational relation, which needs to be checked in a further range of languages. In French, *son propre* and *lui-même* can be exempt if anteceded by attitude holders or empathy loci, but not by deictic centers.

4. Analysis: binding of exempt anaphors by logophoric operators

4.1. A unified analysis for plain and exempt anaphors

The previous sections have shown that there is a systematic difference between plain and exempt anaphors in French (and in many other languages with morphologically identical plain and exempt anaphors like English, Mandarin or Japanese, a.o.):


- a- plain anaphors have structural constraints (they must be locally bound); exempt anaphors do not.
- b- exempt anaphors have interpretive constraints (they must be anteceded by a perspective center); plain anaphors do not.

To these two properties, we can add the following ones, which have also been claimed to distinguish between plain and exempt anaphors (see Charnavel & Sportiche 2016 for references and discussion):

- c- plain anaphors must be exhaustively bound; exempt anaphors do not have to (they can have partial or split antecedents).
- d- plain anaphors only exhibit sloppy readings in ellipsis; exempt anaphors can also exhibit strict readings.

Given that the form of plain anaphors is not different from the form of exempt anaphors in these languages, we must assume that plain and exempt anaphors do not correspond to two different lexical entries; otherwise, this would mean postulating massive homonymy contrary to requirements of scientific parsimony. The relation between anaphoricity (property a) and logophoricity (property b) is thus puzzling: why do exempt anaphors obligatorily receive a perspectival interpretation? why does this interpretation exempt them from structural constraints? And how do properties (c) and (d) follow?

To solve the problem, I assume the presence of silent, syntactically represented logophoric operators, which due to their pronominal nature can be coreferent with the logophoric antecedent, and which bind the anaphor as schematized in (64).



On the one hand, this explains why exempt anaphors display a perspectival interpretation despite having no intrinsic properties to impose it: their interpretation is wholly derived from their binder. On the other hand, this accounts for why such perspectival anaphors seem to be exempt: they are in fact not exempt, but locally bound by silent logophoric operators, thereby obeying Condition A; the apparent absence of structural constraints on the relation between the antecedent and the anaphor derives from the nature of the relation between the antecedent and the operator (which does not have to be binding, but can be coreference). This is illustrated below for a simple case.

(65) [cf. (17)] Julie_i pense que [OpLOG_i les touristes préfèrent son_i propre hôtel à ceux de ses concurrents].
'Julie_i thinks that [OpLOG_i the tourists prefer her_i own hotel to those of her competitors].'

Here, the silent logophoric operator OpLOG is in a relation of coreference with the antecedent *Julie*. It is however in a relation of local syntactic binding with the anaphor *son propre*, which thereby complies with Condition A.

Note that this hypothesis does not imply that there are logophoric operators that can bind anaphors in all languages: some anaphors in some languages may well be more specified so as to be unbindable by perspectival elements (such anaphors would only be plain; a potential candidate could be Dutch *zichzelf*) or conversely, some anaphors in some languages may be more specified so as to be necessarily perspectival (such anaphors would be logophors; potential candidates are Dutch *hemzelf*²¹ or Tamil *taan*, cf. Sundaresan 2012). What is proposed here is that massive homonymy does not have to be postulated in the many cases where plain and exempt anaphors are identical in form: hypothesizing the presence of a silent logophoric operator solves this problem; assuming that these anaphors are unspecified with respect to perspective, they can be bound by such an operator (and thus be exempt), but do not have to (and thus be plain). Furthermore, this does not mean either that such anaphors all behave similarly crosslinguistically: it can be the case that in some languages, anaphors have additional specific requirements that further complexify their behavior (for instance, English *himself* is subject to an

²¹ Establishing this on solid grounds would require a very precise and careful examination of these potential candidates, which cannot be done here for obvious reasons of space.

additional condition preventing exempt *himself* to appear in certain positions such as direct object for prosodic reasons explained in Ahn 2015, see Charnavel & Zlogar, to appear).

The core of the proposal is thus based on the presence of a silent intermediate element - a logophoric operator -between exempt anaphors and their antecedent. This hypothesis allows us to understand why plain and exempt anaphors have the same form in so many languages and to reduce them to the same lexical entry in these languages: both plain and exempt anaphors are subject to Condition A, but while plain anaphors have overt antecedents (which makes their structural constraints directly visible), exempt anaphors have covert antecedents, that is, logophoric operators (which only makes their interpretive constraints directly detectable).

Some aspects of this proposal are not new: logophoric operators have already been proposed by Koopman & Sportiche (1989), Anand (2006) and Sundaresan (2012), among others, to account for the distribution of logophoric pronouns (in Ewe, Yoruba and English) and long distance anaphors (in Mandarin, Japanese, Icelandic and Tamil). Also, the idea of a mediation between the antecedent and the anaphor is present in Huang & Liu (2001) and Tenny (2006), who assume that the anaphor (Mandarin *ziji* and Japanese *zibun*, respectively) moves to an intermediate position, and in Sundaresan (2012) and Nishigaushi (2014), who suppose that anaphors (Tamil *taan* and Japanese *zibun* respectively) are bound by a *pro* in their perspectival phrase.

Nevertheless, these previous analyses are ultimately different from the present proposal. First, according to Huang & Liu (2001) and Tenny (2006), the mediation between the antecedent and the anaphor is effected by movement: in particular, Huang & Liu (2001) suppose that logophoric *ziji* LF-raises into the Specifier of a CP-type functional category (SourceP, SelfP or PivotP, based on Sells's (1987) classification). This can explain properties (a) and (b), but not properties (c) and (d). Furthermore, this predicts that exempt anaphors cannot occur in islands since they could not move out of it at LF; this is not borne out as illustrated below for French *son propre* and *lui-même*:²² even if *son propre* is within a coordinate structure island in (66) and *lui-même* occurs in an adjunct island in (67), both anaphors can be anteceded by the long distance antecedent *Claire*.

(66) Claire, espère que les voisins vont s'occuper [de son, propre fils et de celui de Paul].
'Claire, hopes that the neighbors will take care [of her, own son and of Paul's].'

²² Charnavel *et al.* (to appear) discuss the same problem posed by islands for Mandarin *ziji*.

(67) Claire_i espère que les voisins seront là [quand des lettres adressées à elle_i-même ou à son mari arriveront].
'Claire_i hopes that the neighbors will be there [when letters addressed to herself_i or her husband arrive].'

Second, Sundaesan (2012) and Nishigaushi (2014), who hypothesize the presence of a base-generated intermediate element *pro* in the specifier of a perspectival phrase, do not run into this problem; but their analysis crucially differs from the present one in reducing Condition A to such binding: under their accounts, all instances of anaphors (at least in Tamil and Japanese) are bound by a silent perspectival element in their local domain. According to Sundaesan (2012), this is motivated by the definition of linguistic perspective according to which an individual may not hold a perspective toward a predication that it is wholly embedded within. Furthermore, the two authors respectively argue that Tamil *taan* and Japanese *zibun* must be sentient. Although the conceptual motivation about the definition of linguistic perspective seems stipulative, the empirical argument about the obligatoriness of sentient antecedents may well support their account. It cannot however extend to French (or English), because there are inanimate anaphors and non-perspectival animate anaphors in these languages (see section 4.6). Given that Tamil *taan* and Japanese *zibun* are standardly considered as simplex anaphors, note that this may suggest that simplex and complex anaphors should not be treated alike; but as mentioned in section 3.1, this would require further investigation.

In sum, the present analysis, which will be detailed below, is new in accounting for the distribution of morphologically identical plain and exempt anaphors in a unified way by assuming the presence of silent logophoric operators, even if the idea of a mediating element between the antecedent and the anaphor has already been proposed. Both the motivation and the exact implementation of this idea (esp. the position of logophoric operators and the definition of local domains as will be made clear below) are different; furthermore, properties (c) and (d), which I will account for in sections 4.4 and 4.5, have never been explained so far to my knowledge. Before this, I will account for properties (a) and (b) by examining the relation between the logophoric operator and the anaphor, which is a relation of local binding (section 4.2), and then the relation between the antecedent and the logophoric operator, which can be one of coreference (section 4.3).

4.2. The binding relation between the logophoric operator and the exempt anaphor

The logophoric operator hypothesis, which unifies plain and exempt anaphors, implies that the logophoric operator must occur in the binding domain of exempt anaphors: since exempt anaphors are in fact not exempt from Condition A, but obey it by being anteceded by a silent logophoric operator, this operator must fulfill the conditions of locality. According to Charnavel & Sportiche's (2016) formulation of Condition A stated in (68), which I adopt here, this specifically means that the logophoric operator must appear within the spellout domain containing exempt anaphors: based on the distribution of inanimate (thus plain) anaphors in French described in (69), Charnavel & Sportiche (2016) propose to reduce the locality imposed by Condition A to Phase Theory.

(68) Condition A (theoretical formulation): an anaphor must be bound within the spellout domain containing it.
(Charnavel & Sportiche 2016)

(69) Condition A (descriptive formulation): a plain anaphor and its binder must be in the smallest XP containing both without an intervening subject and no larger than a tensed TP.²³

Note that this means explaining locality requirements by Phase Theory instead of Agree (e.g. Hicks 2009, Reuland 2011, Rooryck & vanden Wyngaerd 2011); the reasons for this are explained in Charnavel & Sportiche (2016). We can however remain neutral here regarding the binding mechanism for anaphors, that is, how to derive Condition A from more primitive constructs (see Charnavel & Sportiche 2016 for a comparison between an Agree approach and a movement approach). The point of the paper is indeed not to derive Condition A, but to explain how exempt anaphors can fall under the same theory of Condition A as plain anaphors despite their different distribution and interpretation (namely by hypothesizing the existence of logophoric operators).

²³ Descriptively, this formulation of Condition A is very close to Chomsky's (1986) theory, except that the domain is restricted to the smallest tensed TP containing the anaphor: a tensed TP boundary is opaque to the search for antecedent. This difference is justified by the fact that, contrary to what is predicted by the Chomskian theory, an inanimate anaphor occurring within the subject of an embedded tensed clause cannot be anteceded by a DP in the matrix clause (see Charnavel & Sportiche 2016 for more detail): anaphors contained within the subject of tensed TP are not plain, but exempt as illustrated below.

6) [Cette auberge]_i bénéficie du fait que [_{TP} son_i (*propre) jardin est plus spacieux que celui des auberges voisines].
'[This inn]_i benefits from the fact that [_{TP} its_i (*own) garden is more spacious than that of the neighboring inns].'

- (73) [= (27)] a. OpLOG_i Le courage de Paul_i a sauvé sa_i propre maison des flammes ainsi que la maison des voisins.
 ‘OpLOG_i Paul_i’s courage saved his_i own house from the fire and the neighbors’ house as well.’
 b. Le courage de Paul_i OpLOG_i a sauvé sa_i propre maison des flammes ainsi que la maison des voisins.
 ‘Paul_i’s courage OpLOG_i saved his_i own house from the fire and the neighbors’ house as well.’

In both (73)a and (73)b, the logophoric operator is in a position to bind the anaphor within the tensed TP containing it. However, (73)a, where the operator occupies the highest position of the TP just like in (65), raises an issue of Condition C since the antecedent *Paul* is coreferent with the c-commanding operator. This suggests that, as argued by Charnavel & Mateu (2015) based on clitic coreference restrictions, the logophoric operator should here occur below the nominative position as in (73)b, so that it does not violate Condition C by binding *Paul*. In fact, all examples mentioned so far involving logophoric antecedents in the same clause as the anaphor exhibit these antecedents in the subject position:²⁴ this hypothesis therefore solves the Condition C issue in all these cases.

²⁴ *Psych*-verbs raise further questions: in such cases, the antecedent is lower than the subject position:

- 7) Tous ces détestables commentaires sur elle-même affectent la confiance de Lucie_i.
 ‘All these foul comments about herself_i affect Lucy_i’s confidence.’

It should first be mentioned that even if we adopt Belletti & Rizzi’s (1988) proposal about the structure of *psych*-verbs (where the object c-commands the subject at some level of representation, i.e. before movement of the subject when it is in the theme position), the anaphor *elle-même* is not plain here, since *Lucie* is embedded within the object and thus cannot c-command *elle-même* at any level of representation. A logophoric operator should therefore be present to bind the anaphor. But if it occurs just below the subject as in (73)b, Condition C will be violated since the antecedent is even lower. The issue can however be solved precisely if we adopt Belletti & Rizzi’s (1988) proposal as illustrated in Figure 2: since the anaphor starts off within the VP, we can assume that the logophoric operator is in a position within the VP that c-commands the subject (to be raised), but does not c-command the object; this is possible since the object is argued to c-command the subject (to be raised) in this analysis.




Figure 2. The structure of *psych*-verbs under Belletti & Rizzi’s and the logophoric hypotheses

Interestingly, note that this could be compatible with an analysis where the logophoric operator is in fact within the spellout domain of the vP phase. For space reasons, I will however not elaborate on the possible occurrence of logophoric operators in spellout domains of vP phases (see Charnavel & Sportiche 2016 for issues raised by the vP phase hypothesis).

This does not mean, however, that the logophoric operator should always occur below the nominative position: this cannot be the case when the exempt anaphor is itself within the subject of the TP as illustrated below.

- (74) Les voisins_i disent que OpLOG_i leur_i propre fils est plus adroit que le fils de Luc.
'The neighbors_i say that OpLOG_i their_i own son is more skillful than Luke's son.'

In that case, the operator must be above the nominative projection so as to bind the anaphor. This implies that the logophoric operator does not occupy a unique fixed position within the spellout domain TP, but can appear either above or below the subject so that it can bind the anaphor without triggering a Condition C with respect to the antecedent.

This reasoning relies on the hypothesis that the logophoric operator does not occupy an A-bar position, but an A position since under the classical theory of an A/A-bar distinction, anaphors are required to be A-bound so that only A-movement can feed Condition A. This could seem counterintuitive, given that operators are usually assumed to occupy A-bar positions. But first, recall that by logophoric operator, I here simply mean a silent logophoric pronoun in a high position: the pronominal nature of the operator allows it to occupy an A-position. Furthermore, the classical A/A-bar distinction, which defines A-positions in terms of potential theta positions, has been rendered unavailable since the introduction of the Predicate Internal Subject Hypothesis, which makes the subject of TP a non-theta position. In view of these new developments of the theory, it thus appears to be more suitable to redefine the A/A-bar distinction not in terms of differences between landing positions, but in terms of movement span, as proposed in Charnavel & Sportiche (2016): A-bar movement is movement to the edge of a phase; A-movement is movement within the spellout domain of a phase head. Under this view, the logophoric operator is in effect an A binder since it occurs within the spellout domain of the anaphor.

We have thus established that when exempt anaphors occur within the spellout domain of a CP phase, logophoric operators, whether attitudinal as in (65) or empathic as in (73), appear within TP, more specifically low enough within TP so as to not bind the antecedent. Let us now show that, as already proposed by Koopman & Sportiche (1989) and Sundaresan (2012), there is at most one logophoric operator in the domain of a given anaphor. This is supported by the

observation that two anaphors occurring within the same tensed TP cannot refer to two different perspective centers as illustrated below in (75). Note that the same perspective conflicts are documented in Mandarin Chinese: according to Huang & Liu (2001), two clausemate *ziji* that are not locally bound have to corefer.

- (75) D'après Luc_k, les voisins_i disent que leur_i (propre) fils est plus adroit que son_k (propre) fils.
 'According to Luc_k, the neighbors_i say that their_i (own) son is more skillful than his_k (own) son.'

If both instances of *propre* are present, this example is unacceptable. In such a case, both anaphors *leur propre* and *son propre* are seemingly exempt (there is no overt local antecedent), but they are both anteceded by logophoric centers, the attitude holder *les voisins* 'the neighbors', subject of *disent* 'say', and the attitude holder *Luc*, object of *d'après* 'according to', respectively. The deviance is explained if we assume that there is only one logophoric operator within that TP. The sentence becomes acceptable if we replace either of the anaphors (*son propre*, *leur propre*) by a pronoun (*son*, *leur*) or if both exempt anaphors refer to the same attitude holder as exemplified below.

- (76) D'après Luc_k, les voisins_i disent que la photo compromettante d'eux_i-mêmes n'a pas été prise par leur_i (propre) fils, mais par le sien_k.
 'According to Luc_k, the neighbors_i say that the compromising picture of themselves_i has not been taken by their_i (own) son, but by his_k.'

The same holds if the two intended logophoric centers are of different types (one attitudinal, the other one empathic): the following sentence is deviant if both instances of *propre* are present.

- (77) Les voisins_k disent que le courage de Paul_i a sauvé sa_i (propre) maison des flammes ainsi que leur_k (propre) maison.
 'The neighbors_k say that Paul_i's courage saved his_i (own) house from the fire and their_k (own) house as well.'

In sum, when an exempt anaphor occurs within a tensed TP, spellout domain of a C phase, it is bound by the single logophoric operator present in that domain. This operator is in a position that does not bind the antecedent, that is, it can be at the left periphery of TP as in (78)a if the antecedent is outside TP, but has to be below the nominative position if the antecedent is within the subject of the TP as in (78)b; and it can have two possible flavors (in French): attitudinal or empathic.

- (78) a. antecedent_i ... [spellout:TP OpLOG_i ... anaphor_i ...]
 b. ... [spellout:TP ... antecedent_i ... OpLOG_i ... anaphor_i ...]

4.2.2. DP phase

DPs are argued to form phases when they have a subject (Charnavel & Sportiche 2016, a.o; see Svenonius 2004 for similar ideas). Given our hypotheses about Condition A and apparent exemption from it, this implies that a logophoric operator occurs within the spellout domain of a DP with subject when an exempt anaphor appears there. Independent arguments for this specific hypothesis are more complex than in the case of CP phases. Because they will be based on split antecedence, we will come back to them in subsection 4.4.2 after having examined non-exhaustive binding in section 4.4.

In sum, a seemingly exempt anaphor does not intrinsically differ from a plain anaphor, but it is in fact bound by the logophoric operator occurring within the spellout domain containing the anaphor. The non-binding relation between the antecedent and the anaphor is mediated by a local binding relation between the operator and the anaphor.

4.3. The relation between the logophoric operator and the antecedent

The absence of structural constraints (binding or locality) on exempt anaphors implies that the relation between the antecedent and the logophoric operator is not subject to structural requirements: since the logophoric operator binds the anaphor, if the antecedent had to bind the operator, there should be structural constraints between the antecedent and the anaphor by transitivity. But this is in fact not the case: the antecedent neither has to c-command the anaphor (e.g. (73) above) or to be local (e.g. (65) above). I thus assume that the silent logophoric operator OpLOG can be in a relation of coreference with the antecedent.²⁵

This does not mean that the operator is necessarily coreferent with the antecedent: in the case of quantifiers, it has to be bound by the antecedent since a quantifier does not refer: OpLOG is bound by *chaque enfant* ‘each child’ below.

(79)[Chaque enfant]_i pense qu'on OpLOG_i prendra soin de lui_i-même et de ses frères et soeurs.
‘[Each child]_i thinks that one OpLOG_i will take care of himself_i/herself_i and his/her siblings.’

²⁵ Sundaesan (2012) and Nishigaushi (2014) argue that it can be a relation of non-obligatory control. Nothing hinges on this since in both cases, the crucial consequence is that it correctly predicts that there is no structural requirement between the antecedent and the operator, thus between the antecedent and the anaphor.

This implies that by transitivity, there must be structural constraints, namely binding, between a quantifier antecedent and the exempt anaphor. This is illustrated below (the presence of *chère* ‘dear’ in (80)b ensures that the antecedent is an empathy locus).

- (80) a. ?? La personne qui s’occupe de lui_i a habillé [chaque enfant]_i.
 ‘??The person who takes care of him_i has dressed [each child]_i.’
 b. ?? La chère personne qui OpLOG_i s’occupe de lui_i-même et de ses frères et soeurs a habillé [chaque enfant]_i.
 ‘??The dear person who OpLOG_i takes care of himself_i and his siblings has dressed [each child]_i.’

The exempt anaphor *lui-même* in (80)b is just as degraded as the pronoun *lui* in (80)a when it is intended to be bound by the quantifier *chaque enfant* ‘each child’. This is so because the quantifier does not c-command the anaphor/pronoun at surface structure, and if it undergoes Quantifier Raising, this triggers a Weak Crossover Effect with respect to the pronoun/logophoric operator. The sentences are however acceptable if the quantifier is replaced by a referential DP, as shown in (81): in that case, both the pronoun in (81)a and the logophoric operator in (81)b refer to Antonin; they do not need to be bound by it.

- (81) a. La personne qui s’occupe de lui_i a habillé [Antonin]_i.
 ‘The person who takes care of him_i has dressed [Antonin]_i.’
 b. La chère personne qui OpLOG_i s’occupe de lui_i-même et de ses frères et soeurs a habillé [Antonin]_i.
 ‘The dear person who OpLOG_i takes care of himself_i and his siblings has dressed [Antonin]_i.’

Is the relation between the antecedent and the logophoric operator constrained in other respects? In particular, in the presence of several perspective centers as possible antecedents, which one should the logophoric operator (and thus the anaphor) refer to?

Example (82) below demonstrates that there is no constraint on the choice of attitude holder. This is so even if the two antecedents match in *phi*-features.

- (82) Christel_i pense qu’Agnès_k a dit que [TP l’avenir de Constant OpLOG_{i/k} ne dépend que d’elle_{i/k}-même].
 ‘Christel_i thinks that Agnès_k said that [TP Constant’s future OpLOG_{i/k} only depends on herself_{i/k}].’

In (82), the exempt anaphor *elle-même* morphologically matches the two possible antecedents *Christel* and *Agnès*, which are both attitude holders. In that case, both can antecede *elle-même*, and the choice between them depends on the context. This means that the logophoric operator within the TP phase that binds the anaphor can refer to either Christel or Agnès.

The same holds if there is a choice between two possible empathy loci: in (83), both *Christel* and *Ninon* can be empathy loci, and the exempt anaphor *ses propres* can refer to either.

- (83) Christel_i mérite que [_{TP} le futur métier de Ninon_k OpLOG_{i/k} corresponde à ses_{i/k} propres aspirations plutôt qu’aux contraintes de la société].
‘Christel_i deserves the fact that [_{TP} Ninon_k’s future job OpLOG_{i/k} corresponds to her_{i/k} own aspirations rather than to the constraints of society].’

Finally, what happens if the two possible logophoric centers are of different types?

- (84) Le voisin_k a dit que le courage de Paul_i OpLOG_{k/?i} a sauvé sa_{k/?i} propre maison des flammes ainsi que celle du maire.
‘The neighbor_k said that Paul_i’s courage OpLOG_{k/?i} saved his_{k/?i} own house from the fire and the mayor’s too.’
- (85) Selon Christel_k, l’avenir de Ninon_i OpLOG_{k/?i} dépend d’elle_{k/?i}-même.
‘According to Christel_k, Ninon_i’s future OpLOG_{k/?i} depends on herself_{k/?i}.’

Both (84) and (85) contain an attitude holder, that is, *le voisin* ‘the neighbor’ and *Christel* respectively, and a potential empathy locus, that is, *Paul* and *Ninon* respectively. In both cases, the exempt anaphor (*sa propre* and *elle-même* respectively) preferably refers to the attitude holder: the sentence is degraded when it refers to the empathy locus. Based on such facts, I hypothesize that there is a hierarchy between the two types of logophoric centers as stated in (86) and the logophoric operator prefers to refer to the highest one on that hierarchy:

- (86) *Referential preference of logophoric operators*: Attitude holder > Empathy locus

This constraint is not structurally encoded since it concerns the relation between the antecedent and the logophoric operator, which can be a relation of coreference; that’s why it is not a strict constraint. We must assume that attitude holders are somehow more salient to the logophoric operator than empathy loci.

4.4. Split and partial antecedents: non-exhaustive binding

4.4.1. Analysis

It has been claimed (Charnavel & Sportiche 2016, a.o.) that the possibility of non-exhaustive binding characterizes exempt anaphors as opposed to plain anaphors: only exempt anaphors can

have split antecedents or be partially bound. To my knowledge, this has never been explained.²⁶ The logophoric operator hypothesis however gives us a way to understand this property.

Given the hypothesis adopted here that plain and exempt anaphors are in fact one and the same type of element (when they are identical in form), it follows that the apparent possibility of non-exhaustive binding comes from the pronominal nature of the logophoric operator. As shown by the behavior of plain anaphors, non-exhaustive *binding* is not permitted, but what is allowed is non-exhaustive *coreference* between the operator and the antecedent(s): just like a pronoun, a logophoric operator can refer to the sum of two antecedents or to part of an antecedent.

Split antecedence, abstractly schematized in (87), is illustrated in (88)-(91).

(87) antecedent-1_i ... antecedent-2_k ... [TP ... OpLOG_{i+k} ... anaphor_{i+k}...]

(88) Le voisin_i a persuadé Joël_k que [TP OpLOG_{i+k} personne d'autre qu'eux_{i+k}-mêmes ne devrait prendre la tête du comité].
 'The neighbor_i persuaded Joël_k that [TP OpLOG_{i+k} no one but themselves_{i+k} should become the head of the committee].'

(89) Christel_i a convaincu Ninon_k que [TP OpLOG_{i+k} l'avenir dépendra de leurs_{i+k} propres efforts (à toutes les deux)].
 'Christel_i convinced Ninon_k that [TP OpLOG_{i+k} the future will depend on their_{i+k} own efforts (of both of them)].'

(90) Christel_i pense que [TP l'avenir de Ninon_k OpLOG_{i+k} dépendra de leurs_{i+k} propres efforts (à toutes les deux)].
 'Christel_i thinks that [TP Ninon_k's future OpLOG_{i+k} will depend on their_{i+k} own efforts (of both of them)].'

(91) Le voisin_i a persuadé Joël_k qu'ils_{i+k} devraient prendre la tête du comité.
 'The neighbor_i persuaded Joël_k that they_{i+k} should become the head of the committee.'

In (88) and (89), the exempt anaphor (*eux-mêmes* and *leurs propres*, respectively) refers to the sum of the two attitude holders (*le voisin* 'the neighbor' and *Joël* in (88), *Christel* and *Ninon* in (89)); note that the object of verbs like *persuader* 'persuade' or *convaincre* 'convince' behave like attitude holders when attitude tests are applied²⁷). This means that the logophoric operator refers to that sum; it thus behaves like pronouns, which can refer to the sum of two elements, as

²⁶ The fact that exempt anaphors can be non-exhaustively bound as opposed to plain anaphors is a consequence of predicate-based theories (Reinhart & Reuland 1993, a.o.) even if they do not explicitly mention it. However, this type of theory makes wrong predictions for (French) anaphors investigated in this paper and does not use an independent criterion to distinguish between plain and exempt anaphors (see Charnavel & Sportiche 2016 for details), so it cannot be adopted here.

²⁷ For instance, the object of *persuader* 'persuade' cannot be referred to by an epithet in the complement clause (Epithet Test):

8) *Joël a persuadé [le voisin]_i que tout le monde voterait pour [cet idiot]_i.
 '*Joël persuaded [the neighbor]_i that everybody would vote for [the idiot]_i.'

illustrated in (91). Furthermore, the split antecedents can be of different types as shown in (90) where *Christel* is an attitude holder and *Ninon* is an empathy locus.

A parallel pattern holds for partial antecedence as shown below.

(92) [antecedent_i and x]_k ... [TP ... OpLOG_i ... anaphor_i ...]

(93) [Joël_i et ses voisins]_k ont annoncé que [TP OpLOG_i personne d'autre que lui_i-même ne devrait prendre la tête du comité].

'[Joël_i and his neighbors]_k announced that [TP OpLOG_i no one but himself_i should become the head of the committee].'

(94) [Christel_i et ses enfants]_k croient que [TP OpLOG_i l'avenir ne dépendra que de ses_i propres efforts].

'[Christel_i and her children]_k believe that [TP OpLOG_i the future will only depend on her_i own efforts].'

(95) [Joël_i et ses voisins]_k ont annoncé qu'il_i devrait prendre la tête du comité.

'[Joël_i and his neighbors]_k announced that he_i should become the head of the committee.'

In sum, an exempt anaphor can take split or partial antecedents because the relation between the antecedent and the logophoric operator has the properties of coreference. This means that split or partial binding does not have to be postulated (it is in fact only split or partial *reference*).

Given that there is at most one logophoric operator in the domain of an exempt anaphor as shown above in section 4.2.1, this predicts that as schematized in (96), a tensed TP cannot contain two exempt anaphors, one split, i.e. anteceded by two antecedents, and the other one referring to one of the two antecedents ((96)a), or one partially bound and the other one referring to the DP containing the partial antecedent ((96)b).

(96) a. *antecedent-1_i ... antecedent-2_k ... [TP ... OpLOG_{??} ... anaphor_{i+k} ... anaphor_{i/k} ...]

b. *[antecedent_i and x]_k ... [TP ... OpLOG_{??} ... anaphor_i ... anaphor_k ...]

This is borne out as illustrated below: both (97) and (98) are degraded if the two instances of *propre* are present.

(97) Christel_i a convaincu Ninon_k que [TP OpLOG_{k/i+k} son_k (propre) avenir et celui de ses frères dépendra de leurs_{i+k} (propres) efforts (à toutes les deux)].

'Christel_i convinced Ninon_k that [TP OpLOG_{k/i+k} her_k (own) future and her brothers's will depend on their_{i+k} (own) efforts (of both of them)].'

(98) [Christel_i et ses enfants]_k croient que [TP OpLOG_{k/i} leur_k (propre) avenir ne dépendra que de ses_i (propres) efforts].

'[Christel_i and her children]_k believe that [TP OpLOG_{k/i} their_k (own) future will only depend on her_i (own) efforts].'

4.4.2. Back to the DP phase issue

Furthermore, the possibility of split antecedents for exempt anaphors provides a way to independently motivate the hypothesis mentioned in subsection 4.2.2 that each DP with subject (a phase, presumably) contains a logophoric operator binding an exempt anaphor if this anaphor occurs within the spellout domain of that DP. Consider the following examples:

- (99) a. Julie_i dit que [_{TP} cette réunion OpLOG_i a autant confronté Simon_k qu'elle_i-même à [_{DP} tes OpLOG_{i+k} critiques de leurs_{i+k} propres scénarios et de ceux de leurs collègues]].
 'Julie_i says that [_{TP} this meeting OpLOG_i confronted Simon_k as well as herself_i to [_{DP} your OpLOG_{i+k} criticisms of their_{i+k} own scripts and those of their colleagues]].'
- b. Julie_i dit que [_{TP} cette réunion OpLOG_{i+k} a confronté [chacun de ses_i collègues]_k à [_{DP} tes OpLOG_{i+k} critiques de leurs_{i+k} propres scénarios et de ceux de leurs partenaires]].
 'Julie_i says that [_{TP} this meeting OpLOG_{i+k} confronted [each of her_i colleagues]_k to [_{DP} your OpLOG_{i+k} criticisms of their_{i+k} own scripts and those of their partners]].'

Here, the exempt anaphor *leurs propres* is contained in a DP that contains the subject *tes* (thus a phase, presumably), and has a split antecedent (*Julie + Simon* in (a), *Julie + chacun de ses collègues* 'each of her colleagues' in (b)). Sentences (99)a and (99)b provide two different arguments that the logophoric operator occurs in that DP, and not higher in the TP. In (99)a, exempt *elle-même* within the TP must be bound by the operator OpLOG_i referring to Julie; thus the operator OpLOG_{i+k} referring to both Julie and Simon cannot appear there (cf. (97)-(98): recall that split binding is not possible, only split reference is), but below; this is corroborated by the fact that Condition C would be violated if OpLOG_{i+k} appeared higher than *Simon*. In (99)b, the second antecedent *chacun de ses collègues* 'each of her colleagues' is a quantifier and must therefore bind the logophoric operator: OpLOG_{i+k} cannot c-command the quantifier, otherwise this would trigger a Weak Crossover effect (see Sportiche 1985 for arguments that WCO effects are also triggered in the case of partial binding). We must thus assume in both cases that the logophoric operator referring to the split antecedent is lower than the two antecedents. This directly follows if we suppose that there is an operator in the spellout domain of the DP phase, as implied by our hypotheses.²⁸

²⁸ Sentence (99) remains acceptable in the absence of a DP subject, which is presumably not a phase (even if it could be argued that nouns like *critique* 'criticism' always contain a (silent) subject):

- 9) Julie_i dit que [_{TP} cette réunion OpLOG_i a autant confronté Simon_k qu'elle_i-même à [_{DP} OpLOG_{i+k} plusieurs critiques de leurs_{i+k} propres scénarios et de ceux de leurs collègues]].
 'Julie_i says that [_{TP} this meeting OpLOG_i confronted Simon_k as well as herself_i to [_{DP} OpLOG_{i+k} several criticisms of their_{i+k} own scripts and those of their colleagues]].'

The same holds with the exempt anaphor *eux-mêmes*:

- (100) Julie_i pense que [_{TP} l'événement inattendu OpLOG_i a autant protégé Simon_k qu'elle_i-même de [_{DP} tes OpLOG_{i+k} vilaines remarques sur eux_{i+k}-mêmes et leurs enfants]].
'Julie_i thinks that [_{TP} the unexpected event OpLOG_i protected Simon_k as well as herself_i from [_{DP} your OpLOG_{i+k} mean comments about themselves_{i+k} and their children]].'

We thus have clear evidence that logophoric operators have to be present in the spellout domain of DP phases to bind exempt anaphors there. This can be generalized to all cases of DPs with subject, even those like (101) that cannot directly support this hypothesis.

- (101) A propos des journalistes, Anne_i a dit que [_{DP} leurs OpLOG_i multiples attaques contre elle_i-même et son mari] n'étaient pas justifiées.
'Speaking of the journalists, Anne_i said that [_{DP} their OpLOG_i numerous criticisms against herself_i and her husband] were unfounded.'

(101) could in principle be explained in two different ways: the exempt anaphor *elle-même* could be bound by a logophoric operator occurring within the spellout domain of either the CP or the DP phase; nothing in the sentence excludes either case. But given the point made by (99) and (100), we can safely assume that the logophoric operator occurs within the DP here: the cases involving DPs are compatible with the hypothesis that exempt anaphors are bound within the spellout domain containing them, just like plain anaphors.

There is however a complication. This hypothesis makes a further prediction: each DP with subject should be able to contain a different logophoric operator; in other words, an example

This does not affect the argument: what matters to unify the analysis of plain and exempt anaphors is that an exempt anaphor should be bound within the spellout domain of the phase containing it, that is, a logophoric operator must appear in that domain. Thus if an exempt anaphor occurs within a DP with a subject distinct from it, a logophoric operator must too. But the reverse does not hold: it does not necessarily mean that a DP without subject (presumably not a phase) cannot contain any operator.

Nevertheless, given the contrast between (97)-(98) (degraded in the presence of two overlapping exempt anaphors in the same TP) and (9), we must specify the hypothesis argued for in subsection 4.2.1 that there is at most one logophoric operator in the domain of an exempt anaphor. In view of example (9), it would be too strong (if we ignore vP phases mentioned in footnote 24) to claim that there is at most one logophoric operator in the spellout domain containing an exempt anaphor (in (9), there are two operators in the same TP, the only relevant spellout domain since it does not contain any DP with subject). In view of examples (97)-(98), it would be too weak to suppose that we can freely (as long as principle (108) is respected) have several logophoric operators in the same spellout domain. This leads to the conclusion that we need to specify the notion of domain and distinguish spellout domains and domains formed by certain constituents like TPs or DPs: the former can contain several logophoric operators under certain conditions, but the latter only have one position for logophoric operators. Thus in (9) there are two exempt anaphors in the same spellout domain (TP), thus two logophoric operators there, because one of them is within a DP (and the other one in the TP). In (97)-(98) there can however only be one exempt anaphor in the TP, because there is only one position for a logophoric operator in a TP and the exempt anaphors are too high in their DP to be bound by a logophoric operator within their DP (they are at the edge of the DP, while the operator must be in the spellout domain of the DP, see fn 29).

similar to (75) (with two non-coreferring exempt anaphors in the same TP) should become acceptable if the DPs containing the anaphors have subjects (distinct from the anaphors²⁹). Consider (102) involving DPs without subjects and (103) containing DPs with (underlined) subjects.

(102) D'après les journalistes_k, Anne_i a dit que [TP OpLOG_{i/k} les attaques contre elle_i(-même) et son mari étaient bien plus fréquentes que les commentaires sur eux_k(-mêmes) et leurs confrères].
 'According to the journalists_k, Anne_i said that [TP OpLOG_{i/k} criticisms against her_i(self) and her husband were much more common than comments about them_k(selves) and their fellow members].'

(103) D'après les journalistes_k, Anne_i a dit que [TP [DP leurs OpLOG_i multiples attaques contre elle_i(-même) et son mari] étaient bien plus fréquentes que [DP ses OpLOG_k commentaires sur eux_k(-mêmes) et leurs confrères]].
 'According to the journalists_k, Anne_i said that [TP [DP their OpLOG_i numerous criticisms against her_i(self) and her husband] were much more common than [DP her OpLOG_k comments about them_k(selves) and their fellow members]].'

Given that the DPs containing *elle(-même)* and *eux(-mêmes)* do not have a subject in (102), this example is correctly predicted to be deviant if both instances of *même* are present (i.e., if there are two exempt anaphors anteceded by attitude holders, *les journalistes* 'the journalists' and *Anne* respectively): only one operator can appear in the relevant spellout domain, that is, the tensed TP here. But (103) is predicted to be acceptable with both instances of *même* since the DPs containing *elle(-même)* and *eux(-mêmes)* do have a subject in this example: given our hypotheses so far, we could assume that the spellout domain of each DP contains a logophoric operator, and these two operators could be different. This is however not borne out: just like (102), (103) is deviant if both instances of *même* are present.

The unacceptability of (103) with *elle-même* and *eux-mêmes* derives, I propose, from an additional constraint, namely a semantic constraint on perspective: a TP clause cannot be evaluated by different perspective holders.³⁰ In the presence of two attitude holders, the

²⁹ If the anaphor is (within) the subject of the DP, it is not contained within the spellout domain of this DP and thus does not have to be bound within it (see Charnavel & Sportiche 2016 for more detail).

³⁰ Anaphors that occur in different TPs can however refer to different perspective centers.

10) a. Anne_i a dit que [TP₁ [les journalistes]_k en colère contre elle_i-même et son mari affirment que [TP₂ le gouvernement ne prendra en compte que leurs_k propres affirmations]].
 'Anne_i said that [TP₁ [the journalists]_k angry at herself_i and her husband claim that [TP₂ the government will only take into account their_k own assertions]].'

b. antecedent₁ V_{ATT1} [TP₁ antecedent₂ ... anaphor₁ ... V_{ATT2} [TP₂ ... anaphor₂ ...]]

In (10a), *elle-même* and *leurs propres* appear in two different tensed complement clauses as schematized in (10b), and in this configuration, they can be disjoint.

Whether an anaphor in a complement clause and another anaphor in an adjunct clause can also be disjoint as exemplified below will be examined in future work: the judgments are subtle and the perspective possibilities of adjunct clauses in general need to be studied.

perspective of the embedded TP can be from either as shown in section 4.3 (and (102) and (103) are indeed fine if either instance of *même* – but only one - is present), but not mixed. In other words, once the attitude operator of the embedded TP is fixed, the logophoric operators occurring in the DPs within that TP have to corefer as illustrated in (105). Note that this could seem to be sufficient to explain why disjoint exempt anaphors cannot co-occur in the same TP as shown in subsection 4.2.1, even if we supposed that several logophoric operators can be present in that domain (see footnote 28 for discussion on that point); overlapping exempt anaphors will however show below that the uniqueness of operator in a given domain should be maintained.

(104) *Do not mix perspective within TP* (first version): a TP cannot have a mixed perspective, that is, it has to be evaluated by the same perspective holder.³¹ Consequently, all logophoric operators present within a TP must match.

- (105)a. D'après les journalistes_k, [TP OpLOG_k Anne_i a dit que leurs multiples attaques contre elle_i étaient bien plus fréquentes que [DP ses OpLOG_k commentaires sur eux_k-mêmes]].
 'According to the journalists_k, [TP OpLOG_k Anne_i said that their numerous criticisms against her_i were much more common than [DP her OpLOG_k comments about themselves_k]].'
- b. D'après les journalistes_k, Anne_i a dit que [TP OpLOG_i [DP leurs OpLOG_i multiples attaques contre elle_i-même] étaient bien plus fréquentes que ses commentaires sur eux_k]].
 'According to the journalists_k, Anne_i said that [TP OpLOG_i [DP their OpLOG_i numerous criticisms against herself_i] were much more common than her comments about them_k]].'

Furthermore, the type of perspective holder does not matter: an empathic logophoric operator within an attitude context must also match the TP logophoric attitude operator.

- (106)*Anne_i a dit à propos [des journalistes de France 24]_k que [TP OpLOG-ATT_i [DP leurs OpLOG-ATT_i multiples attaques contre elle_i-même et son mari] étaient dues à [DP son OpLOG-EMP_k attitude envers eux_k-mêmes et leurs_k chers confrères]].
 '*Anne_i said about [the France 24 journalists]_k that [TP OpLOG-ATT_i [DP their OpLOG-ATT_i numerous criticisms against herself_i and her husband] were due to [DP her OpLOG-EMP_k behavior towards themselves_k and their_k dear fellow members]].'

In (106), *elle-même* is an exempt anaphor intended to refer to the attitude holder *Anne*, while *eux-mêmes* is an exempt anaphor intended to refer to the empathy locus *les journalistes de France 24* 'the France 24 journalists' (the empathy status is guaranteed by the presence of *leurs chers* 'their dear'). Both are within DPs with subject, so the hypothesis that exempt anaphors

11) D'après Christel_i, Sébastien_k a dit que [TP₁ l'avenir des enfants dépend de lui_k-même bien que [TP₂ la plupart des problèmes doivent toujours être réglés par elle_i-même]].
 'According to Christel_i, Sébastien_k said that [TP₁ the children's future depends on himself_k even if [TP₂ most problems must always be dealt with by herself_i]].'

³¹ This does not always include the speaker, since as is well known, the speaker's perspective can interfere, for instance in *de re non de dicto* readings. The status of the speaker's perspective will be discussed in section 4.7.

should be bound within their spellout domain implies that the logophoric operator binding them occurs within the DP containing them. But because of principle (104), the empathic operator appearing in a DP within the TP evaluated from Anne’s perspective cannot introduce a perspective different from Anne’s. That’s why sentence (106) is degraded.

Principle (104) is however too strong: all logophoric operators do not have to be identical, as long as they do not conflict; in other words, overlap in perspective is possible as shown in (99)a and further illustrated by the following example:

- (107) Sébastien_i a convaincu Ninon_k que [_{TP} OpLOG_k son_k propre avenir et celui de ses frères dépendra davantage de [_{DP} ton OpLOG_{i+k} avis sur eux_{i+k}-mêmes] que sur son travail].
 ‘Sébastien_i convinced Ninon_k that [_{TP} OpLOG_k her_k own future and her siblings’ will depend more on [_{DP} your OpLOG_{i+k} opinion about themselves_{i+k}] than on her work].’

Here, the exempt anaphor *son propre* refers to the attitude holder *Ninon* while the exempt anaphor *eux-mêmes* refers to the sum of both attitude holders *Sébastien* and *Ninon*. This means that the two logophoric operators present in the embedded TP (one high in TP, the other one within the DP with subject) do not exactly match but simply overlap. Principle (104) must thus be weakened:

- (108) *Avoid perspective conflicts within TP* (final version): a TP cannot involve a conflict in perspective, that is, it cannot be evaluated by distinct perspective holders. Consequently, all logophoric operators present within a TP must match or at least overlap in reference.

Thus, the case of exempt anaphors occurring within DPs with subject is trickier because it involves two constraints: first, given the hypotheses that exempt anaphors are bound within their spellout domain and that DPs with subject form phases, the logophoric operator must occur within the DP with subject containing them; second, because there cannot be any conflict in perspective within a TP as stated in principle (104), logophoric operators appearing within DPs must match ((109)a)– or at least overlap with ((109)b) - the logophoric operator occurring within the TP containing these DPs.

- (109)a. antecedent_i...[_{spelloutTP} OpLOG_i [_{spelloutDP} OpLOG_i anaphor_i]...[_{spelloutDP} OpLOG_i anaphor_i]...]
 b. antecedent_i...[_{spelloutTP} OpLOG_i [_{spelloutDP} OpLOG_i anaphor_i]... antecedent_k [_{spelloutDP} OpLOG_{i+k} anaphor_{i+k}]...]

4.5. Strict and sloppy readings

Another property that has been claimed to distinguish plain and exempt anaphors is the availability of sloppy and strict readings in ellipsis and focus constructions: since Lebeaux (1984), it is standard to assume that plain anaphors only give rise to sloppy readings, while exempt anaphors can also trigger strict readings. For instance, Reinhart & Reuland (1993: 674) contrast the following two examples involving *only*:

- (110) a. Only $Lucie_i$ praised herself $_i$. (Reinhart & Reuland 1993: (28d))
b. Only $Lucie_i$ buys pictures of herself $_i$. (Reinhart & Reuland 1993: footnote 18)

They claim that *herself* is necessarily interpreted as a bound variable in (110)a (sloppy reading: nobody else praised herself/himself), but (110)b is ambiguous between a sloppy reading (nobody else buys pictures of herself/himself) and a strict reading (nobody else buys pictures of Lucie). According to them, this correlates with the status of the anaphor, plain in (110)a under their theory³² since it has a coargument *Lucie*, but exempt in (110)b where it does not have a coargument. Similarly, they claim that non-exempt *herself* only has a sloppy reading in VP/TP ellipsis:

- (111) $Lucie_i$ praised herself $_i$, and Lili (did) too (praise {herself/* $Lucie_i$ }). (Reinhart & Reuland 1993: (28c))

As discussed in Charnavel & Sportiche (2016), these claims are however problematic. It is unclear whether what Reinhart and Reuland (1993) characterize as plain anaphors (anaphors in coargumental positions) must indeed be interpreted as bound variables: the English sentences below allow both strict and sloppy readings, readily for the first one (see e.g. Hestvik 1995, Kehler 2002, who show that ellipsis in subordination behaves differently in this respect from ellipsis in coordination), for many speakers for the second (see Büring 2005: 141, a.o.):

- (112) $John_i$ defended himself $_i$ before Bill did. = ... before Bill defended himself (sloppy)
= ... before Bill defended him (strict)
- (113) Only $John_i$ finds himself $_i$ intelligent. = Only $John \lambda x$ (x finds x intelligent) (sloppy)
= Only $John \lambda x$ (x finds John intelligent) (strict)

The problem is that we do not know whether animate anaphors bound in a configuration obeying Condition A are indeed plain, or are exempt “accidentally” obeying Condition A. We can

³² Predicate-based theories basically propose that an anaphor must be bound by its coargument if it has one as in (110)a, but is exempt from Condition A if it does not have any coargument as in (110)b.

reevaluate these claims (at least for French) in view of the new finding that inanimate anaphors have to be plain anaphors.

Let us reexamine examples such as (112) - that is, examples that contain an ellipsis in a subordinate clause rather than in a coordination - with inanimate anaphors. This is illustrated below for French (where only TP ellipsis, not VP ellipsis, is possible).

- (114) [Ta page internet]_i contient plus de liens vers elle_i-même que [la mienne]_k (ne contient de liens vers {elle_k-même/*ta page}).
'[Your webpage]_i contains more links towards itself_i than mine_k (contains links towards {itself_k/*your webpage}).'

Here, inanimate *elle-même* is a plain anaphor, and crucially, it only gives rise to a sloppy reading in the ellipsis site (a comparative clause). This contrasts with animate *elle-même* in (115), which can trigger both sloppy and strict readings in the same configuration.

- (115) Coralie_i possède plus de photos d'elle_i-même que [sa soeur]_k (ne possède de photos de {elle_k-même/elle_i}).
'Coralie_i owns more pictures of herself_i than [her sister]_k (owns pictures of {herself_k/her_i}).'

This confirms that the availability of strict and sloppy readings does indeed distinguish plain and exempt anaphors - as previously assumed albeit based on problematic arguments: inanimate (thus plain) anaphors only exhibit sloppy readings, while animate anaphors can give rise to both sloppy and strict readings, that is, exempt anaphors license strict readings. Note that the availability of strict readings in (112) suggests that animate anaphors can always (i.e. whether in coargumental positions or not) be exempt; we will return to the question whether they can ever be plain in section 4.6.

The logophoric operator hypothesis can account for these results, assuming that the ellipsis site itself always contains a copy of the anaphor (unlike what analyses in terms of vehicle change assume). In the case of inanimates, the elided anaphor has to be locally bound by its antecedent as represented in (116), so that only a sloppy reading is available. But in the case of animates, the elided anaphor can be exempt and thus be anteceded by a logophoric operator as represented in (117)b, which can give rise to a strict reading.

- (116) [Ta page internet]_i contient plus de liens vers elle_i-même que [_{TP} la mienne]_k (~~ne contient de liens vers elle_k-même~~). (sloppy)
'[Your webpage]_i contains more links towards itself_i than [_{TP} mine]_k (~~contains links towards itself_k~~).'

- (117) a. Coralie_i possède plus de photos d'elle-même que [_{TP} sa soeur_k (~~ne possède de photos d'elle-même~~)].
 'Coralie_i owns more pictures of herself_i than [_{TP} her sister_k (~~owns pictures of herself_k~~)].' (sloppy)
- b. Coralie_i possède plus de photos d'elle-même que [_{TP} sa_i (chère) soeur OpLOG_i (~~ne possède de photos d'elle-même~~)]. (strict)
 'Coralie_i owns more pictures of herself_i than [_{TP} her_i (dear) sister OpLOG_i (~~owns pictures of herself_i~~)].'

Given that an exempt anaphor is not directly bound by its visible antecedent, but by a logophoric operator, animate *elle-même* in (117)b can give rise to a strict reading as long as Coralie is a logophoric center (presumably an empathy locus here, as shown by the availability of *chère* 'dear'). The elided animate *elle-même* can also be directly bound by the local antecedent *sa soeur* 'her sister' and thus give rise to a sloppy reading as in (117)a: it is construed as a plain anaphor here.

In sum, a plain anaphor only gives rise to sloppy readings because the elided anaphor has to be bound by the local antecedent in its clause, but an exempt anaphor can in addition give rise to strict readings because it is bound by a logophoric operator, which can refer to the antecedent of the matrix clause under the right conditions.

The same holds for focus constructions:

- (118) a. Seul Simon_i (OpLOG_i) aime les photos de lui-même.
 'Only Simon_i (OpLOG_i) likes pictures of himself_i.'
 Focus alternatives: i. x likes pictures of x (sloppy)
 ii. x OpLOG_i likes pictures of himself_i (strict)
- b. Seule [ta page internet]_i contient des liens vers elle-même.
 'Only [your webpage]_i contains links towards itself_i.'
 Focus alternatives: i. x contains links towards x (sloppy)
 ii. *x OpLOG_i contains links towards itself_i (*strict)

Depending on the presence of a logophoric operator or not, either the anaphor is directly bound by the alternatives to the antecedent, thus giving rise to a sloppy reading, or by the logophoric operator referring to the antecedent, thus giving rise to a strict reading.³³ For example, (118)a exhibits both sloppy and strict readings because the anaphor can be bound either by the alternatives to Simon x in (i) or by the logophoric operator referring to Simon in (ii); (118)b does not have a strict reading however because an inanimate cannot antecede a logophoric operator.

³³ This implies that the difference between (110)a and (110)b observed by Reinhart & Reuland (1993) (if the judgment can be confirmed) must be reduced to a difference in the possibility of construing Lucie as a logophoric center in the two sentences (it should be easier in (110)b than in (110)a).

Thus the availability of strict readings depends on the possibility of construing the first antecedent as a logophoric center. This explains, I argue, the contrast between subordination and coordination observed by Hestvik (1995) and Kehler (2002). Consider (112) again and its coordinated counterpart.

(119) [= (112)] John_i defended himself_i before Bill did. (sloppy, strict)

(120) John_i defended himself_i and Bill did too. (sloppy, *strict)

When the elided anaphor occurs in a subordinate clause as in (119), it can give rise to a strict reading, unlike an anaphor that appears in a coordinated clause as in (120). This follows if we suppose that the subordinate structure and the coordinate structure differ in the licensing of the interpretation of John as a logophoric center in the ellipsis site. In fact in (119), John, as main subject of the sentence, can easily be construed as an empathy locus in the subordinate clause; in (120) however, it is much harder to interpret John as an empathy locus in the second conjunct because of the parallelism imposed by the coordinated structure: only the subject of the second conjunct Bill can easily be construed as an empathy locus in the ellipsis site.

However, explicitly breaking the parallelism between the two conjuncts can make the subject in the first conjunct an empathy locus in the whole sentence as illustrated by the contrast below.

(121) Coralie_i a de nombreuses photos d'elle_i-même dans son bureau et Suzanne aussi.
'Coralie_i has many pictures of herself_i in her office and Suzanne (does) too.' (sloppy, *strict)

(122) a. Coralie_i a de nombreuses photos d'elle_i-même dans son bureau et sa chère soeur aussi.
'Coralie_i has many pictures of herself_i in her office and her dear sister (does) too.' (sloppy, strict)
b. Coralie_i a de nombreuses photos d'elle_i-même dans son bureau et [_{TP} [sa_i chère soeur]_k OpLOG_i ~~a de nombreuses photos d'elle_i-même dans son bureau~~ aussi].
'Coralie_i has many pictures of herself_i in her office and [_{TP} [her_i dear sister]_k OpLOG_i (does) have many pictures of herself_i in his office] too.' (strict)

(121) is a French structural equivalent of (120); the coordinated structure similarly forces a sloppy reading, it seems. But (122)a exhibits a strict reading as well even if it also involves a coordination. This is so, I argue, because the second conjunct contains *sa chère soeur* 'her dear sister', which contributes to construing Coralie as an empathy locus in the ellipsis site; a logophoric operator can thus bind the elided anaphor as represented in (122)b.

The same holds if the antecedent of the anaphor is an attitude holder: a strict reading can arise even in a structure with coordination.

(123) D'après Thomas_i, la police fait souvent appel à lui-même et ses informateurs, et [_{TP} les services secrets OpLOG_i font souvent appel à lui-même et ses informateurs aussi].
 'According to Thomas_i, the police often calls on himself_i and his informants and [_{TP} the secret service OpLOG_i (does) often call on himself_i and his informants too].' (strict)

In sum, I have shown that the availability of strict and sloppy readings in ellipsis and focus constructions indeed distinguishes plain and exempt anaphors when the inanimacy criterion is taken into account. This supports the logophoric operator hypothesis, which can account for it: both plain and exempt anaphors are locally bound in the ellipsis site, but binding by a logophoric operator can give rise to strict readings; thus the so-called *referential* interpretation is due to the fact that the logophoric operator, not the anaphor, *refers* to the antecedent, while in the so-called bound interpretation, the anaphor is directly bound by the antecedent.

4.6. Can animate anaphors be plain?

So far, I have argued that inanimate anaphors are necessarily plain, while animate anaphors can always be exempt (if an appropriate antecedent is available), and all arguments have aimed at showing that the exempt behavior of animate anaphors comes from the presence of an intermediate logophoric operator referring to the antecedent and binding them. However, since the presence of a logophoric operator seems to be always an option with animates, we do not yet know whether animate anaphors can ever be plain. As a matter of fact, recall that Sundaresan (2012) and Nishigaushi (2014) do argue that the anaphors *zibun* in Japanese and *taan* in Tamil, which are always animate, are always bound by a perspectival *pro*. It is thus legitimate to wonder whether French (or English) animate anaphors can ever be plain (not bound by a logophoric operator).³⁴

A central difficulty comes from the fact that unlike attitude holders, empathy loci are not necessarily created by the use of specific expressions (e.g., they are also available in the absence of *son cher* 'his dear'), and it seems that the only strict and easily detectable condition for being an empathy locus is to be animate. At first glance, there is therefore no simple evidence against the hypothesis that an animate anaphor is always bound by an empathic OpLOG operator. Property (c) ((non)-exhaustive binding) does not help: the possibility of non-exhaustive binding shows that anaphors can be exempt, but the reverse is not true: the possibility of exhaustive

³⁴ Note that supposing that animate anaphors are marked by a logophoric feature forcing binding by a logophoric operator is not an option, as the unification between plain and exempt anaphors would be lost.

binding for animate anaphors is compatible with the presence as intermediate binder of a logophoric operator referring to the relevant antecedent as represented in (124) and (125).³⁵

(124) Maud_i (OpLOG_i) pense à elle_i-même.
 ‘Maud_i (OpLOG_i) thinks about herself_i.’

(125) Maud_i (OpLOG_i) compare son_i propre fils au mien.
 ‘Maud_i (OpLOG_i) compares her_i own son to mine.’

Similarly, while the possibility of strict readings shows that animate anaphors can be exempt, the availability of sloppy readings does not necessarily demonstrate that they can be plain. Thus property (d) (sloppy/strict readings) does not help either. Recall (121), which only exhibits a sloppy reading:

(126) [= (121)] Coralie_i (OpLOG_i) a de nombreuses photos d’elle_i-même dans son bureau et [_{TP} Suzanne_k (OpLOG_k) a de nombreuses photos d’elle_k-même dans son bureau aussi].
 ‘Coralie_i (OpLOG_i) has many pictures of herself_i in her office and [_{TP} Suzanne_k (OpLOG_k) ~~(does) have many pictures of herself_k in his office~~ too.’

Just like in (124) and (125), the elided anaphor in (126) could either be directly bound by Suzanne or by a logophoric (empathic) operator referring to Suzanne: a sloppy reading would arise in both cases, and there is no easy way to preclude Suzanne from being an empathy locus (note that I have argued in the previous section that in coordination structures, it is hard to construct the first subject, i.e. *Coralie*, as an empathy locus in the second conjunct, not the second one *Suzanne*).

The structural constraint on plain anaphors (property a) is not helpful either, since the question is to know whether an animate anaphor has to be bound by a logophoric operator even when it could be locally bound by its antecedent.

We are left with property (b): can we force an animate to be non-logophoric? We have seen that it is hard given the weak conditions for empathy. But there are (at least) three ways to achieve this. First, we can guarantee that the antecedent of the animate anaphor is not the logophoric center, by making another entity the salient logophoric center.

(127) a. Laure s’étonnait. Bizarrement, Eric_i tournait sur lui_i-même dans son sommeil.
 ‘Laure was surprised. Weirdly, Eric_i was spinning on himself_i during his sleep.’

³⁵ These representations however suppose that the condition C issue discussed in section 4.2.1 can be circumvented. If not, this is an argument for the existence of plain animate anaphors.

b. Laure s'étonnait. Eric_i bougeait tant dans son sommeil que les chiens tournaient autour de lui_i(*même).

'Laure was surprised. Eric_i was moving so much during his sleep that the dogs were turning around him_i(*self).'

(127) is a free indirect discourse representing Laure's thoughts. Given that attitude holders prevail over empathy loci as seen in (86), this implies that any other animate in the discourse will not be construed as an empathy locus; furthermore, Eric is asleep, which makes him harder to empathize with. All these clues imply that Eric is not a logophoric center here despite being animate. In fact, the anaphor is not acceptable in (127)b when it is not locally bound by Eric, which implies that it is not bound by a logophoric operator. Nevertheless, *Eric* binds the anaphor *lui-même* in (127)a, which shows that animate *lui-même* can be plain.

A second argument can be made using intensional verbs. We have seen in section 2.3 that exempt anaphors can be anteceded by attitude holders in French only if they are read *de se*. Usually, anaphors anteceded by attitude verbs cannot be locally bound by their antecedents and have thus to be exempt because attitude verbs select an embedded clause. But verbs taking non-propositional complements can also be intensional. For instance, Grodzinsky (2007) demonstrates that verbs like *adore*, *hate*, *dream about*, *praise* or *expect* are intensional using the classical Substitution Test described in subsection 3.2.1:

- (128) a. Mary adores Bob Parr.
b. Mary adores Mr. Incredible.

Let's imagine a context where Mary is a manager in an insurance company where Bob Parr works. She may not be aware that Bob is in fact Mr. Incredible, who assumed a new identity as part of the Federal Witness Protection Program. In such a context, (128)a and (128)b do not have the same truth conditions.

Using such verbs, we can test whether an animate anaphor anteceded by the subject has to be read *de se*: if not, we can conclude that it has to be plain.

- (129) [*Liliane Martin and her daughter Lise have entered a poetry competition. Liliane has not done so seriously, but simply to encourage her daughter to do it with her. Thus when looking at the results, Liliane does not imagine one second that she could have won a prize: when she sees 'L. Martin' in the list, she immediately thinks that her daughter has won and she is very proud of her. In fact, it is Liliane, not Lise, who has won a prize.*]

Liliane_i est très fière d'elle_i-même.

'Liliane_i is very proud of herself.'

(130) [*Liliane and her daughter Lise have a walk with Suzanne, the daughter of Liliane's best friend, who looks a lot like Lise and happens to be dressed similarly. Suddenly, they pass in front of a mirror, and stealing a glance at it, Liliane thinks that she has seen Suzanne and finds her truly beautiful. In fact, unbeknownst to her, it is her daughter Lise that she has seen.*]

Liliane_i admire sa_i propre fille.

'Liliane_i admires her_i own daughter.'

Both (129) and (130) are natural in such contexts even though the animate anaphors *elle-même* and *sa propre* are not read *de se* since Liliane is mistaken about the identity of the relevant person. This means that they cannot be anteceded by an attitudinal logophoric operator, but are plain anaphors, directly bound by the local antecedent *Liliane*.

A third argument can be made based on the observation explained in subsections 4.2.1 and 4.4.2 that two exempt anaphors cannot be disjoint in the same TP:

(131) Solange_i pense que [_{TP} Cyril_k OpLOG_i est aussi fier d'elle_i-même que de sa_k propre fille].

'Solange_i thinks that [_{TP} Cyril_k OpLOG_i is as proud of herself_i as of his_k own daughter].'

Recall that because of principle (108), two exempt anaphors can never refer to conflicting logophoric centers in the same TP. *Elle-même* referring to Solange and *sa propre* anteceded by Cyril cannot therefore be both exempt. Since the sentence is perfectly acceptable, we must conclude that *sa propre* is directly bound by the local *Cyril* and is thus plain.

In sum, we can prove in specific conditions that animate anaphors can be plain³⁶ and are thus not necessarily bound by logophoric operators.

4.7. Further issue: the speaker's perspective

In this study, I have only investigated third person exempt anaphors. What about first and second person anaphors? This issue is glaring since the speaker is the primary perspective center of a sentence and the addressee has a specific perspectival status too; furthermore, logophors have been identified to shifted indexicals in several cases (Schlenker 2003, Anand 2006, a.o.). I will not examine this issue in detail here (partly for space reasons, partly because French does not have shifted indexicals); a few remarks about first (and second) person anaphors are nevertheless in order.

³⁶ It would be interesting to use the same tests for Japanese *zibun* and Tamil *taan* to further evaluate Sundaresan (2012)'s and Nishigaushi (2014)'s proposals.

By definition, first and second person pronouns cannot be inanimate and as discourse participants, they are intrinsically perspective centers. As is expected, this licenses *mon/ton/nos/vos propre(s)* ‘my/your/our own’ and *moi/toi/nous/vous-même(s)* ‘myself/yourself/ourselves/yourselves’ as exempt anaphors: the following examples do not include any overt antecedent for *moi-même/toi-même* ‘myself/yourself’ in (132) or *mes propres/tes propres* ‘my own/your own’ in (133).³⁷ This suggests that logophoric operators can also refer to discourse participants.

(132) Carole OpLOG_i a pris une photo de {moi_i/toi_i}-même.
 ‘Carole OpLOG_i took a picture of {myself_i/yourself_i}.’

(133) Carole OpLOG_i a invité les enfants du voisin et {mes_i/tes_i} propres enfants.
 ‘Carole OpLOG_i invited the neighbor’s children and {my_i/your_i} own children.’

Given that discourse participants are perspective centers, the following questions arise: what type of logophoric centers do they correspond to? What kind of perspectival interaction do they give rise to? The rest of the section will show that discourse participants do not have a specific status as far as exempt anaphora is concerned, but they behave like attitude holders or empathy loci.

First, we have observed and stated in principle (104) that several logophoric operators cannot be disjoint when they co-occur within the same TP. Accordingly, logophoric operators binding first and second person anaphors cannot be disjoint from other logophoric operators in the same TP as shown below: both instances of *même* cannot be present in (134), just like in (103).

(134) Anne_i a dit que [TP [DP mes (OpLOG_i) multiples attaques contre elle_i(-même) et son mari] étaient bien plus fréquentes que [DP ses (OpLOG_k) méchants commentaires sur moi_k(-même) et ma femme]].
 ‘Anne_i said that [TP [DP my (OpLOG_i) numerous criticisms against her_i(self) and her husband] were much more common than [DP her (OpLOG_k) mean comments about my_k(self) and my wife]].’

However, overlap is possible, just like in (99)a or (107):

(135) [TP [DP Mes OpLOG_{i+k} critiques de nous_{i+k}-mêmes et de nos partisans] étaient bien moins graves que [DP tes OpLOG_k méchants commentaires sur moi_k-même]].
 ‘[TP [DP My OpLOG_{i+k} numerous criticisms of ourselves_{i+k} and our supporters] were much less serious than [DP your OpLOG_k mean comments about myself_k]].’

³⁷ In this article I cannot treat the case of *soi* (≈ oneself), which would deserve its own paper and would require a deeper investigation of first and second person anaphors as I suspect *soi* to be a first person generic (cf. Moltmann (2006)’s analysis of *one*).

Second, we have shown that a logophoric operator can refer to attitude holders or empathy loci in French. Discourse participants do not affect this categorization or yield any specific interaction effect: even in the explicit presence of a discourse participant in the sentence, a logophoric operator binding a third person exempt anaphor can still refer to an attitude holder or an empathy locus as illustrated in (136)-(137) and (138)-(139) respectively; conversely, even in the presence of an attitude holder or an empathy locus, an exempt first or second person anaphor can occur as exemplified in (140).

- (136) Julie_i a raconté à tout le monde que {je/tu} va(i)s épouser son_i propre cousin.
 ‘Julie_i told everybody that {I/you} would marry her_i own cousin.’
- (137) Lucien_i affirme que tout le monde est au courant de {mes/tes} critiques contre lui_i-même et sa femme.
 ‘Lucien_i claims that everyone knows about {my/your} criticisms against himself_i and his wife.’
- (138) Quant à Paul_i, {je/tu} étais en train de l’interroger quand sa_i propre maison et celle de son voisin ont été cambriolées.
 ‘As for Paul_i, {I/you} was/were questioning him when his_i own house and his neighbor’s got burglarized.’
- (139) La tristesse de Paul_i est due à {mes/tes} critiques contre lui_i-même et sa femme.
 ‘Paul_i’s sadness is due to {my/your} criticisms against himself_i and his wife.’
- (140) Julie a raconté à tout le monde que Paul va épouser {mon/ton} propre cousin.
 ‘Julie told everybody that Paul would marry {my/your} own cousin.’

What these observations entail is that French does not exhibit blocking effects such as those observed with Mandarin Chinese *ziji*: in Mandarin, first and second persons are interveners for exempt *ziji* (Huang & Liu 2001, Anand 2006, a.o.). For instance below, *ziji* can only refer to the first person *wo* or the second person *ni* but cannot have the subject of the attitude verb *Zhangsan* as antecedent:

- (141) Zhangsan_i danxin {wo/ni} hui piping ziji_{*i/j}.
 Zhangsan worry I/you will criticize self
 ‘Zhangsan_i is worried that {I/you} might criticize {*him_i/myself/yourself}.’ (Huang & Liu 2001: (11a))

Note that this is not due to the fact that the speaker is a potential binder for *ziji* (which is not marked in person and could thus be bound by a first or second person pronoun) since the same holds if the first/second person occurs in a position where it could not bind *ziji*:

- (142) Zhangsan_i zhidao Mali_j gen ziji_{*i/j} shuo-guo ni_j xiang qu Taiwan
 Zhangsan know Mary with self say-EXP you want go Taiwan
 ‘Zhangsan_i knows that Mary_j told {*him_i/herself_j} that you want to go to Taiwan.’ (Cole *et al.* 2001)

This means that the absence of such blocking effects in French cannot be simply explained by the fact that French anaphors are marked for person, unlike Mandarin anaphors.

Since discourse participants do not yield any blocking effect in French, they can simply be considered as either of the two relevant types of logophoric centers (attitude holders or empathy loci depending on the cases). In fact, indexicals behave like attitude holders when explicitly construed as such as in (143)-(145) containing intensional expressions, and they behave like empathy loci otherwise as in (146): they do not prevent a third person exempt anaphor from being anteceded by another attitude holder as in (143) or another empathy locus as in (144)-(146). Note that as opposed to cases involving several third person logophoric centers, there is no possible ambiguity here due to the marking in person of exempt anaphors; this explains why the hierarchy *attitude* > *empathy* defined in (86) does not have to be respected in (145) (the empathic exempt anaphor *elle-même* is acceptable even in the presence of the attitude holder *moi* ‘me’).

- (143) Je pense qu’Agnès_k a dit que l’avenir de Constant ne dépend que de {moi-même/elle_k-même}.
‘I think that Agnès_k said that Constant’s future only depends on {myself/herself_k}.’
- (144) J’ai expliqué que le courage de Paul_i avait sauvé {ma/sa_i} propre maison des flammes ainsi que celle du maire.
‘I explained that Paul_i’s courage saved {my/his_i} own house from the fire and the mayor’s as well.’
- (145) Selon moi, l’avenir de Ninon_i dépend de {moi-même/elle_i-même}.
‘According to me, Ninon_i’s future depends on {myself/herself_i}.’
- (146) Je mérite que le futur métier de Ninon_i corresponde à {mes/ses_i} propres aspirations plutôt qu’aux contraintes de la société.
‘I deserve the fact that Ninon_i’s future job corresponds to {my/her_i} own aspirations rather than to the constraints of society.’

Thus the speaker and the addressee do not have a specific status as compared to third person logophoric centers for the reference of logophoric operators binding exempt anaphors.

Furthermore, manifestations of the speaker’s perspective in the absence of first person exempt anaphors do not affect binding of exempt anaphors by logophoric centers. Recall example (18) repeated below involving *son propre* and (148) containing *elle-même*.

- (147) [= (18)] Caroline_i croit que [_{TP} cet idiot de Nicolas OpLOG_i a voté contre son_i propre projet].
‘Caroline_i believes that [_{TP} Nicolas the idiot OpLOG_i voted against her_i own project].’

- (148) Anne_i pense que [_{TP} [_{DP} mes OpLOG_i {méchants/gentils} commentaires sur elle_i-même et son mari] sont inacceptables.
 ‘Anne_i thinks that [_{TP} [_{DP} my OpLOG_i {mean/nice} comments about herself_i and her husband] are unacceptable.’

In (147), Nicolas can be evaluated as idiot by either Caroline or the speaker: this is the result of the Double Orientation Test explained in subsection 3.2.1 showing that the embedded TP is an attitude context. In both cases, *son propre* is nevertheless an exempt anaphor referring to the attitude holder *Caroline*. Similarly in (148), *elle-même* can refer to the attitude holder *Anne*, whether the adjective within the same DP is evaluated by Anne (say, *méchants* ‘mean’) or by the speaker (say, *gentils* ‘nice’).

This suggests that the speaker’s perspective expressed by the evaluative expressions is not represented by a logophoric operator here; that’s why it does not give rise to a violation of principle (104) against conflicting perspectives in TP. Principle (104) should thus be reduced to apply for logophoric operators syntactically present in the same TP: such logophoric operators should not be disjoint, but they are compatible with the presence of the speaker’s perspective if it is coded in a different way, as in the case of evaluative expressions. Note that this possibility makes sense conceptually, given that the speaker’s perspective is necessarily present as source of the discourse, as opposed to other perspectives, which the speaker may choose to integrate in his/her own discourse or not.

The only intervention effect caused by the speaker’s perspective (thus because of the presence of an OpLOG coreferential with the speaker) in the absence of a first person anaphor is revealed in *de se* readings (cf. Chierchia 1989, Anand 2006). As shown by Anand (2006) for English pronouns in dream reports and Yoruba logophors, a *de se* anaphor cannot be bound by a *de re* pronoun. This *de re* blocking effect is also observed for French anaphors.

- (149) [*Marie is listening to recordings of songs performed by members of her family. She recognizes the voice of her brother but mistakes her own voice for someone else’s.*]
 *Marie pense qu’elle_{de re} chante mieux que son_{de se} propre frère et le frère de son mari.
 ‘*Mary thinks she_{de re} sings better than her_{de se} own brother and her husband’s.’

Here, the anaphor *son propre* ‘her own’ refers to the attitude holder *Marie* and must be read *de se*, while *elle* ‘she’, which also refers to *Marie*, is intended to be read only *de re* in this context, not *de se*, that is, it reflects the speaker’s perspective. This reading is unavailable. Anand (2006) derives this blocking effect from the combination of Rule H and logophoric binding: Rule H

enforces local binding (by the *de re* pronoun) but this violates the syntactic binding condition that [log] elements must be bound by a logophoric operator. This explanation is however not compatible with the hypothesis adopted here that all anaphors are of the same type: exempt anaphors cannot be marked by a [log] feature since they do not differ from plain anaphors. Instead, I suspect that what is going on descriptively is that the speaker's perspective reflected by the interpretation of the *de re* pronoun interferes with the attitude holder's perspective: this happens when the attitude holder herself is evaluated by the speaker, as in (149) and unlike (147); similarly recall from subsection 3.2.1 that an epithet in an attitude context cannot refer to the attitude holder of that context even when it is intended to be the result of the speaker's evaluation. This means that the speaker and the attitude holder's perspectives can be mixed in the same TP in the absence of disjoint exempt anaphors, *unless the speaker evaluates the attitude holder*. The exact understanding of why this is so³⁸ is left for future work, but what we can already assume is that such pronouns read *de re* and not *de se* require the presence of a logophoric operator referring to the speaker and presumably binding them (roughly, *she_{de re}* means *she according to me*).

In sum, the array of facts we have just presented leads us to the following conclusions:

- a- first and second person exempt anaphors must be bound by logophoric operators just like exempt third person anaphors; epithets and pronouns read *de re* but not *de se* also seem to require logophoric operators referring to the speaker.
- b- discourse participants do not have a specific status as compared to third person logophoric centers as antecedents of logophoric operators: they can also be attitude holders or empathy loci.
- c- but the speaker's perspective is not always coded by logophoric operators; when it is not (as in the case of evaluative expressions), it can be mixed with third person attitudinal or empathic operators in the same TP without violating principle (108).³⁹

³⁸ This is probably related to the fact that in these cases (*de re* non *de se* pronouns, epithets referring to the attitude holder), there is no possible double orientation: the evaluation has to be made by the speaker, not by the attitude holder. This may force the presence of a logophoric operator referring to the speaker (some obligatory 'according to me').

³⁹ The hypothesis that perspective is not always encoded by logophoric operators is also necessary to explain why Condition B is not affected by the logophoric operator hypothesis. Recall (65)a and consider its counterpart involving a pronoun instead of an exempt anaphor:

5. Conclusion

In this paper, I have shown that in languages like French with identical plain and exempt anaphors, there is only one type of anaphor: anaphors that seem to be exempt from Condition A are in fact not exempt; they are locally bound, just like plain anaphors. But because their binders - that is, logophoric operators - are silent and are coreferent with - not bound by - their antecedent, the structural constraints on exempt anaphors are not directly visible; only their interpretive requirements are: they have to be anteceded by perspective centers.

This hypothesis implies that perspective can be implicitly coded in language: silent logophoric operators referring to perspective centers can be present in certain constituents, in particular in the spellout domain of phases to bind anaphors. But this coding varies across languages. Specifically, a series of tests demonstrates that exempt anaphors – thus logophoric operators – can in principle be anteceded by three types of logophoric centers: intellectual (attitude holder), emotional (empathy locus), and perceptual (deictic center); the availability of these types is subject to crosslinguistic variation.

In particular, logophoric operators can only refer to the first two types in French, the main language of investigation in this paper. I have indeed documented that French anaphors *son propre* and *lui-même* can lack an overt, local c-commanding antecedent, if and only if they refer to attitude holders or empathy loci. They contrast with English or Japanese anaphors that appear to be sensitive to all three types of perspective centers. It is further predicted that in some languages, exempt anaphors can only be anteceded by attitude holders. Detailed crosslinguistic work is needed to test this hypothesis and more generally to shed further light on the implicit coding of perspective in language and its interaction with anaphora.

12) a. [= (65)a] Julie_i pense que les touristes OpLOG_i préfèrent son_i propre hôtel à ceux de ses concurrents.

‘Julie_i thinks that the tourists OpLOG_i prefer her_i own hotel to those of her competitors.’

b. Julie_i pense que les touristes préfèrent son_i hôtel à ceux de ses concurrents.

‘Julie_i thinks that the tourists prefer her_i hotel to those of her competitors.’

In (12)a, the exempt anaphor *son propre* is bound by an attitudinal operator referring to Julie, subject of the attitude verb *pense* ‘thinks’. The same sentence is also acceptable in the absence of *propre*: the pronoun *son* in (12)b can also appear in the attitude context and refer to the attitude holder Julie. Even if *son* refers to a logophoric center, we must however assume that there is no logophoric operator here; otherwise, Condition B would be violated. This means that perspective is not always coded by logophoric operators.

Furthermore, this predicts that an exempt anaphor and a pronoun cannot co-occur in the same domain: if a logophoric operator is present to bind the anaphor, Condition B is violated, but if a logophoric operator is absent to leave the pronoun free, Condition A is violated. Given that we have seen that a domain can be as small as a DP, it is however very hard to test this prediction.

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