

# Obviā et Imperā!

## A case for ‘perspectival control’ in directive clauses

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(comments welcome)

**Abstract** The paper proposes a new type of control configuration: perspectival control. This involves control of a non-argument *PRO* that combines with a directive modal operator in the Mood domain. This *PRO* exists to encode the individual to whom the public commitments associated with the modal are anchored, and its presence can be detected in the syntax through a subject obviation effect. The empirical focus of the paper are Slovenian directive clauses (imperatives and subjunctives), but the analysis is shown to have implications for analyses of other languages as well as theories of directive clauses and the representation of discourse related information in the syntax.

**Keywords** control · directives · embedded imperatives · performative modals · perspective · *PRO* · Slovenian · speech reports · subject obviation · subjunctives

### 1 Introduction

The question of how much the semantics of modal expressions depends on representational factors has received much attention recently, like in the work of [Hacquard \(2006, 2010\)](#), where differences in modal “flavor” are derived from a modal’s relative position to (among other things) the syntactic loci of tense and aspect. Similar ideas are being explored in relation to discourse related properties of clauses, in particular the idea that information about speech act participants may be encoded in the syntax (see [Speas and Tenny 2003](#), [Speas 2004](#), [Zu 2018](#) i.a.).

The notions of modality and discourse intersect occasionally in the domain of public commitments of speech act participants. Consider the fact that a sentence with a modal expression like (1) cannot be felicitously followed up by (2).

- (1) Given the article in the Hampshire Gazette, Mary Clare Higgins **must** have been re-elected.
- (2) #...but I wouldn’t be surprised if she wasn’t. The Gazette is usually too quick to draw conclusions from projected election results. ([Kratzer 2012: 21](#))

(1) publicly commits the speaker to the truth of the proposition the modal scopes over, so (2) amounts to a contradiction. In a representational approach, one may want to link this to a syntactically encoded speaker interacting with the modal, thus combining

representational approaches to modals and to discourse information. But ideally, we want to posit such relations only when we can also identify them syntactically.

This paper explores a related phenomenon, which I argue shows that such relations between modals and individuals do exist and have consequences for both semantics and syntax. Directives, which include imperatives, show similar public commitment effects to those in (1,2). An imperative cannot be followed up with a distancing act:

- (3) Read the paper (#but I don't want you to / #but I know you won't)

In Slovenian, which is the language I focus on in this study, directives can be embedded in speech reports—this includes imperatives and (directive) subjunctives. Because of this possibility, it can be shown that the public commitments associated with an imperative are always tied to the attitude holder: the speaker in matrix directives and the original speaker (realized as the matrix subject) in embedded directives.

Interestingly, this pattern finds a parallel in the syntax of the construction, when considering subject obviation. This restriction can be described as a ban on coreference between the attitude holder and the subject. Countering much previous work, I show, based on Slovenian data, that obviation does not only operate in embedded clauses.

I propose that both phenomena can be attributed to the presence of a “perspectival” *PRO* in the Mood domain, which satisfies a semantic requirement of the directive modal operator. The pronoun serves as an anchor for public commitments associated with the modal, but it also acts as an antecedent for binding in syntax, which causes it to yield the subject obviation effect—in fact a result of Binding Condition B. Most importantly, the perspectival *PRO* (generally) refers to the speaker in matrix directives, while in embedded directives it receives its denotation the same way as subject *PRO* does in control infinitives. I refer to this configuration as *perspectival control*.

This paper first looks at the phenomenon of subject obviation (§2). I establish that it occurs in embedded directives in Slovenian (§2.1), that it has a matrix counterpart (§2.2), and that it conforms to Condition B violations (§2.3). After that, I draw attention to the parallelism between subject obviation and the speaker distancing ban (§2.4). I then proceed to lay out the analysis in terms of perspectival control (§3). Having established the analysis, I compare it to two possible alternatives, showing that they cannot capture the Slovenian data under consideration (§4). Finally, I explore some extensions of the proposed account, focusing on parameters of variation and implications for cross-linguistic studies (§5). I then offer some closing remarks (§6).

## 2 Obviation beyond subjunctives and embedded clauses

In a number of languages, including Spanish, when subjunctive verbs occur embedded under an attitude verb, as in (4),<sup>1</sup> there is a ban on coreference between the matrix subject and the embedded subject of the subjunctive clause.

- (4) Queremos<sub>i</sub> que { ganen<sub>k</sub> / \*ganemos<sub>i</sub> } Spanish  
 want.1PL that win.SUB.PRES.3PL / SUB.PRES.1PL  
 ‘We want them/\*us to win.’ (Quer 2006: 662)

<sup>1</sup> 1, 2, 3 with no added number information refers to first, second, and third person *singular*. Referential indexes of subjects in *pro*-prop languages are marked on the verb/auxiliary marked for person information.

We call this effect *subject obviation*;<sup>2</sup> a ban on coreference between subjects. Coreference between matrix objects and the embedded subject is possible, as in (5). However, since I do not discuss other kinds of obviation effects in this paper, I will use *obviation* to describe the restriction illustrated in (4) for convenience sake.

- (5) Les<sub>i</sub> pidió<sub>k</sub> que se callaran<sub>i</sub> Spanish  
 to.them ask.PST.3 that REFL be.quiet.SUB.PAST.3PL  
 ‘S/he asked them to be quiet.’ (Quer 2006: 662)

Obviation has been researched extensively in the syntactic literature (see Bouchard 1982, Picallo 1985, Kempchinsky 1986, 2009, Rizzi 1990, Farkas 1992b, Progovac 1993 i.a.), where it is usually tied to some inherent property of subjunctive verbs and limited to embedded contexts. As a point of departure, I show that obviation is not limited to subjunctive verbs, as it also occurs with imperatives in Slovenian, and that a counterpart of the restriction is observed in matrix clauses as well.

## 2.1 Embedded imperatives and obviation

The existence of obviation in imperatives has been overlooked largely because imperatives are typologically rare in embedded contexts. Crucially, embedded imperatives are banned in Romance, the language group most often associated with obviation. This is illustrated for Spanish by the examples in (6): an imperative cannot be embedded in a speech report (cf. (6a)), so a subjunctive verb must be used in its place (cf. (6b)).

- (6) a. \*Pido que dad-me el libro. Spanish  
 ask.1 that give.IMP.(2)-1.(DAT) the book  
 b. Pido que me deis el libro.  
 ask.1 that 1.(DAT) give.SUB.PRES.2 the book  
 ‘I ask that you give me the book.’ (Han 1998: 39)

Such subjunctive verbs are thus *surrogate imperatives* in the terminology of Zanuttini (1997): they surface in contexts where imperatives cannot appear (in this case embedded clauses) to serve the same function as the imperative would have.

Because of their rarity, embedded imperatives have even been claimed to be universally unavailable (Sadock and Zwicky 1985, Han 1998). But recent empirical evidence from languages like Korean (Portner 2007, Pak et al. 2008), Japanese (Oshima 2006, Schwager 2006), Old Scandinavian (Rögnvaldsson 1998), Colloquial German (Schwager 2006, Kaufmann and Poschmann 2013), Ancient Greek (Medeiros 2013), Mbyá (Thomas 2012), and (although controversial) even English (Crnič and Trinh 2009a,b), has helped establish a new consensus where, while imperative embedding is not nearly as liberal as embedding of other clause types, it exists as an option in many languages (see also Kaufmann 2016a for a brief overview).

In this context, Slovenian is often considered a case where imperatives can appear as complements with seemingly no restrictions. This aspect of Slovenian has been discussed by Sheppard and Golden (2002), Dvořák (2005), Rus (2005) and Dvořák and

<sup>2</sup> Sometimes also referred to as the *disjoint reference* effect.

Zimmermann (2008).<sup>3</sup> Sheppard and Golden show that imperatives can be embedded in Slovenian at least in: *restrictive relative clauses*, as in (7a), *speech reports*, as in (7b), as well as *argument clauses*, and *adnominal complement clauses*.

- (7) a. To je film, ki si ga ogle-j čimprej. Slovenian  
 this AUX.3 film which REFL.DAT 3.M.ACC watch-IMP.(2) a.s.a.p  
 ‘This is a/the film which you should see as soon as possible.’  
 b. Rekel je, da dela-j bolje.  
 said.M AUX.3 that work-IMP.(2) better  
 ‘He said that you must work better.’ (Sheppard and Golden 2002: 251)

Speech reports like (7b) resemble the obviation contexts from before (cf. (4–6)) in that they can relay attitudes that someone other than the speaker held at times other than the utterance time—here, commands and related speech acts.<sup>4</sup> But more importantly, imperatives embedded in speech reports also give rise to obviation, as shown in (8).<sup>5</sup>

- (8) \*Rekel si, da si pomaga-j.  
 said.M AUX.2 that REFL.DAT help-IMP.(2)  
 int.: ‘You said you should help yourself.’

Because the embedded imperative has a 2<sup>nd</sup> person (2P) singular subject and the matrix subject is also 2P singular, the two are coreferential and violate the obviation requirement. This contrasts minimally with the grammatical (7b), where the matrix subject is 3<sup>rd</sup> person (3P) singular. Like in the Spanish cases, the coreference restriction holds only between subjects, as shown by (9)—the matrix indirect object can be coreferential with the imperative subject.

- (9) Rekel (ti<sub>i</sub>) je<sub>k</sub>, da mu<sub>k,l</sub> pomaga-j.  
 said.M (2.DAT) AUX.3 that 3.M.DAT help-IMP.(2)  
 ‘He<sub>k</sub> said (to you<sub>i</sub>) you<sub>i</sub> should help him<sub>k,l</sub>.’

These examples do not yet conclusively show that we are dealing with obviation, since the imperative paradigm is limited to 2P and 1<sup>st</sup> person (1P) inclusive. The full pattern emerges once we extend the focus beyond imperative forms and include data from surrogate imperatives. With commands (or related speech acts) concerning an individual or group that excludes the addressee, Slovenian employs a subjunctive construction.<sup>6</sup> The latter consists of the particle ‘*naj*’ and an inflected verb in present tense, and is in complementary distribution with imperatives based on the subject—directive ‘*naj*’ subjunctives are limited to 1P exclusive and 3P subjects (see Table 1).

<sup>3</sup> I direct the reader to these sources also for evidence that the relevant cases do not involve direct quotation and that the clausal complements are true imperatives.

<sup>4</sup> The embedding complementizer ‘*da*’ guarantees that this sentence cannot be interpreted as involving a direct quotation—like in English, the complementizer is incompatible with direct quotations.

<sup>5</sup> This was first noted in Stegovec and Kaufmann (2015), although not yet identified as obviation.

<sup>6</sup> It must be noted that the construction is not traditionally identified as subjunctive; it is sometimes called the *optative construction* or even the *analytic imperative* (see Roeder and Hansen 2006 for discussion and references). However, due to its distribution and canonical function—it occurs in a subset of cases where subjunctives occur, I refer to it as subjunctive. Subjunctives typically occur with volitional and other attitude predicates, and sometimes in special matrix contexts (see Schlenker 2005a, Quer 2006, Kempchinsky 2009, Costantini 2014). I leave open whether or not the infinitive/indicative/imperative/subjunctive mood distinction is sufficient for all the variation in clause types observed cross-linguistically.

'pomagati' (to help)	singular	dual	plural
1P (= exclusive)	<b>naj</b> pomaga-m	<b>naj</b> pomaga-va	<b>naj</b> pomaga-mo
1+2P (= inclusive)	IMPOSSIBLE	pomaga-j-va	pomaga-j-mo
2P	pomaga-j	pomaga-j-ta	pomaga-j-te
3P	<b>naj</b> pomaga	<b>naj</b> pomaga-ta	<b>naj</b> pomaga-jo

**Table 1** Complementary distribution of imperatives (white) and surrogate subjunctive forms (gray)

When a subjunctive is embedded in the same manner as the imperatives in (7b), (8), and (9), it shows the same coreference restriction between subjects, as illustrated in (10). The restriction is exactly the same for 1P and 3P subjects.

- (10) a. *Rekla* { *je<sub>i</sub>* / \**sem<sub>i</sub>* }, *da naj si pomaga-m<sub>k</sub>*.  
 said.F AUX.3 / AUX.1 that SUB REFL.DAT help-1  
 'She/\*I said I should help myself.'
- b. *Rekel je<sub>i</sub>, da naj si pomaga<sub>k,\*i</sub>*.  
 said.M AUX.3 that SUB REFL.DAT help.3  
 'He<sub>i</sub> said he<sub>k,\*i</sub> should help himself.'

An objection one could raise here is that the coreference ban is not a grammatical effect—it is merely odd in most cases to tell or remind oneself what to do, so reporting such cases should likewise be odd. This objection does not hold up mainly because scenarios of this kind can be reported felicitously—just not using embedded imperatives or subjunctives. Consider the context in (11).

- (11) CONTEXT: *I proclaim 'I should exercise more!' Later you remind me:*
- a. \**Rekel si<sub>i</sub>, da več telovadi<sub>i</sub>*. (obviation)  
 said.M AUX.2 that more exercise.IMP.(2)
- a' *Rekel si<sub>i</sub>, da mora-š<sub>i</sub> več telovadit*. (no obviation)  
 said.M AUX.2 that should-2 more exercise.INF  
 'You<sub>i</sub> said you<sub>i</sub> should exercise more.'

Informally, the intended meaning of the proclamation in (11) can be thought of as: the best course of action for me is to start exercising more. Much like how '*Exercise more!*' can be thought of as telling the addressee that exercising more is the best course of action for them in the given situation. Crucially, the former cannot be reported to the original speaker using an embedded imperative (cf. (11a)), but it can be reported to them with an embedded *modal+infinitive* construction (cf. (11a')).

Similarly, we can construct a scenario where a similar self-imposition is later reported by the speaker to someone else, like in the scenario in (12).

- (12) CONTEXT: *I say 'Exercise more!' to myself in the mirror. Later I can report:*
- a. \**Rekel sem<sub>i</sub>, da naj več telovadi-m<sub>i</sub>*. (obviation)  
 said.M AUX.1 that SUB more exercise-1
- a' *Rekel sem<sub>i</sub>, da mora-m<sub>i</sub> več telovadit*. (no obviation)  
 said.M AUX.1 that should-1 more exercise.INF  
 'I<sub>i</sub> said I<sub>i</sub> should exercise more.'

The subjunctive cannot be used to report the original imperative (cf. (12a)) whereas the modal+infinitive version can (cf. (12a')). This falls in line with obviation in Romance, where modal+infinitive constructions behave the same (Quer 2006, Kempchinsky 2009). More importantly, (11) and (12) show that obviation is a grammatical effect tied to specific constructions, not a result of the oddness of the reported scenarios.

By comparing imperatives and subjunctives side by side, we see that the ban holds across the board, not only for specific person values. This indicates that the restriction is truly obviation, but also that the two constructions form a natural class. I propose, in fact, that subjunctive surrogate imperatives are directives in the same sense “true” imperatives are, which goes against traditional definitions like Searle’s (1976: 11):

- (13) *Directives. The illocutionary point of these consists in the fact that they are attempts [...] by the speaker to get the hearer to do something.*

According to (13), only 2P imperatives can have a canonical directive function. However, it is not at all clear that limiting ourselves to 2P is useful either to describe a class of morpho-syntactic expressions or a class of speech acts. In relation to the former, (13) does pick out imperatives as directives in English, where the imperative paradigm is limited to 2P, but not in Slovenian, where the paradigm extends to inclusive 1P. More radical departures are found in Hungarian, where the paradigm encompasses all three persons (Tóth 2007), and Rapanui, which has no dedicated imperative forms (du Feu 1996: 36–40) (essentially making all directives in the language surrogate imperatives). At the very least, this should make one concede that cross-linguistically imperatives are not necessarily directives (when imperatives extend beyond 2P) nor are directives necessarily imperatives (when a language lacks imperatives). But is keeping (13) as a measure for directives worth the price of this weakened position?

The guiding intuition behind (13) seems to be that the hearer/addressee is in a privileged position because they are the only individual that can simultaneously receive the direction and act upon it. But the relevance of this dual role is diminished when we consider imperatives embedded in speech reports. Consider the sequence in (14).<sup>7</sup>

- (14) a. Pero<sub>i</sub> ⇒ Marko<sub>j</sub>: Naj te<sub>j</sub> on<sub>k</sub> pobere!  
SUB 2.ACC he.NOM pick.up.3  
 ‘He should pick you up!’
- b. Marko<sub>j</sub> ⇒ Luka<sub>k</sub>: Pero<sub>i</sub> je rekel, da me<sub>j</sub> ti<sub>k</sub> poberi.  
Pero AUX.3 said.M that 1.ACC you.NOM pick.up.IMP.(2)  
 ‘Pero said that you (= Luka) should pick me up.’

Ultimately, the subjunctive in (14a) is an attempt by Pero to get Luka to pick up Marko, even though Luka is not the addressee. He is the addressee in (14b) though—where a 2P imperative is used and Pero is not the speaker. Is the addition of a middleman in the speech act in (14a) sufficient for it to not be a directive speech act?<sup>8</sup> Should

<sup>7</sup> The arrow (⇒) identifies the speaker (left of arrow) and addressee (right of arrow) of the utterance.

<sup>8</sup> Zanuttini et al. (2012) suggest that seemingly 3P directing speech acts like ‘Let the table be clean!’ really mean ‘See to it that the table is clean!’ and are thus still directing the addressee. However, when the addressee is completely removed and we have a scenario where the speaker does not require a mediator to accomplish the desired action, the addressee dependence goes away. Consider (i) ‘Let there be light!’ and (ii) ‘See to it that there is light!’ It is infelicitous (or blasphemous) to consider (ii) a paraphrase of (i).

it matter that (14a) can be felicitously reported as an imperative in (14b)? Perhaps matrix 2P imperatives should be considered a special class, but that would not help us understand the parallel behavior of true and surrogate imperatives with respect to obviation and a number of other phenomena I discuss below. To the extent that what unifies these constructions on the pragmatic side is their use to direct individuals either directly or indirectly, I introduce the definition of directive speech acts in (15).

- (15) **Directive Speech Act.** *The speaker attempts to make an individual or group of individuals ensure that the non-modal content of the utterance is realized.*

I assume *directives* to be clauses whose canonical function is that of a directive speech act.<sup>9</sup> This includes imperatives and surrogate imperatives regardless of their subject. Following this definition, directives can be either matrix or embedded clauses, but in languages like Spanish imperatives specifically are limited only to matrix contexts (cf. (6)). In Slovenian though, imperatives exist in both, and their person-based complementary distribution with subjunctives holds throughout. As we see next, this will allow us to establish a previously unnoticed aspect of obviation.

## 2.2 Matrix obviation

In Slovenian, imperatives exist for all 2P subjects: singular (cf. (16a)), plural (cf. (16a)), and dual. 1P imperatives also exist, but they are limited to inclusive 1P—that is, referring to groups including both the speaker and the addressee, which automatically restricts 1P imperatives to plural (cf. (16c)) and dual forms.

There is no addressee (or anything else) in existence in the relevant context to be directed, so (i) could not be considered a directive speech act unless we change the definition in (13). Slovenian translations of (i) are also very telling. The official (and archaic) one in (iii) is an imperative, despite the lack of an addressee.

- (iii) Bodi svetloba!  
be.IMP.(2) light  
'Let there be light!'

The more natural sounding equivalent of (i) is found in the song 'Osmi dan' [*The Eight Day*] by the band *Pankrti*, as given in (iv) (unfortunately, 'Let there be light' is not used in the song, so a close equivalent is used). Note that it is a subjunctive with a 3P subject and to paraphrase it like (ii) is impossible.

- (iv) Prvi dan je reku nej bo nebo in nej bo zemlja ...  
first day AUX.2 said.M SUB AUX.FUT.3 sky and SUB AUX.FUT.3 ground ...  
'On the first day he said, 'Let there be sky and let there be ground!' ...'

This issue relates to the behavior of another class of performatives: 'F\*\*k you!' vs. 'Go f\*\*k yourself!' (see Dong 1992). The former would yield a Condition B violation with the 2P object if the null imperative subject were also 2P, indicating that the speaker actually commands some other entity to f\*\*k the addressee. This in turn makes such speech acts the inverse of what Zanuttini et al. (2012) propose for 3P directives, suggesting that even the imperative subject in English need not be 2P (see also Potsdam 1998).

<sup>9</sup> Note that I do not claim that directives can only have the interpretations of commands and directions. In fact, both imperatives and subjunctives (in Slovenian) can have the full range of meanings that imperatives have been claimed to have: permission, advice, wish, etc. (see Kaufmann 2012 for a more exhaustive list). However, for ease of exposition, I will limit the discussion in this paper mainly to commands.

- (16) a. Pomaga-j!  
help-IMP.2  
'Help!'
- b. Pomaga-j-te!  
help-IMP-2PL  
'Help(pl.)!'
- c. Pomaga-j-mo!  
help-IMP-1PL  
'Let's help!'

As noted previously, a subjunctive is used in all other cases; e.g. 3P subjects (cf. (17)). Importantly, a subjunctive can not be used directly with subjects for which an imperative is available—the two directive forms are in complementary distribution.

- (17) a. Naj pomaga!  
SUB help.3  
'(S)he should help!'
- b. Naj pomaga-jo!  
SUB help-3PL  
'They should help!'

But the complementary distribution is only total in embedded contexts, where the paradigm resulting from combining imperatives and subjunctives has no gaps. In matrix contexts, 1P subjunctives are ungrammatical. This is shown in (18a) for a 1P singular subject and in (18b) for 1P plural exclusive subject (dual patterns the same).<sup>10</sup>

- (18) a. \*Naj pomaga-m!  
SUB help.1  
int.: 'I should help!'
- b. \*Naj pomaga-mo!  
SUB help-1PL  
int.: 'We(excl.) should help!'

Exclusive 1P subjects are absent in matrix directives (exclusive 1P is used from here on to cover both 1P singular and plural/dual exclusive), and this is not just an idiosyncrasy of Slovenian. The same pattern emerges with the French matrix directives in (19–21). Like in Slovenian, imperative forms exist for 2P (cf. (19)) and 1P inclusive subjects (cf. (20a)), and subjunctives function as complementary surrogate imperatives (cf. (21)). Neither directive can occur with 1P exclusive subjects (cf. (20)).

- (19) a. { Sois / Soyez } prudent(-s)! French  
{ be.IMP.2 / be.IMP.2PL } cautious(-PL)  
'Be(sg./pl.) cautious!'
- b. \*Que { tu / vous } { sois / soyez } prudent(-s)!  
that { you / you.PL } { be.SUB.2 / be.SUB.2PL } cautious(-PL)  
int.: 'You(sg./pl.) should be cautious!'
- (20) a. Soyons prudent-s!  
be.IMP.1PL cautious-PL  
'Let's be cautious!' (obligatorily *inclusive*)
- b. \*Que nous soyons prudent-s!  
that we be.SUB.1PL cautious-PL  
int.: 'We should be cautious!'
- (21) Que votre Altesse soit prudente!  
that your Highness be.SUB.3 cautious  
'Let her majesty be cautious!' (Schlenker 2005a: 280)

<sup>10</sup> This holds in Slovenian only for directives. 1P singular and exclusive subjunctives are possible as "offers"; e.g. 'Naj vam pomagam(o)' (roughly 'Let me/us help you'). But this function is limited to matrix clauses and requires the 2P ethical dative clitic (*ti/vam(a)*). Due to these differences, I assume that non-directive subjunctives are syntactically and semantically distinct from their directive counterparts.



Since embedded imperatives are absent in French, the person-based complementary distribution is limited to matrix contexts. Because of this, one might conclude (as does [Schlenker 2005a](#)) that the existence of 1P imperatives is sufficient to block the use of subjunctives for all 1P subjects. Imperatives are limited to inclusive 1P, so an exclusive 1P subject would never occur. This would not work for Slovenian though. Both 1P imperatives and 1P subjunctives are possible as embedded directives. The construction in (22a) involves a 1P plural imperative and (22b) a 1P plural subjunctive; having a 1P imperative form does not block the use of 1P subjunctives, hence attributing the exclusive 1P subject gap to blocking, as suggested above, cannot work.

- (22) a. Rekel je, da plava-j-mo.                      b. Rekel je, da naj plava-mo.  
           said.M AUX.3 that swim-IMP-1PL            said.M AUX.3 that SUB swim-1PL  
           ‘He said we(incl.) should swim.’        ‘He said we(excl.) should swim.’

The two directives are distinct: the former has an inclusive 1P subject and the latter an exclusive 1P one.<sup>11</sup> This fine grained pattern thus shows that the gap in matrix subjects cannot be attributed to a blocking effect between the two directive forms (the full combined directive paradigm is shown in Table 2 with the gap shaded in gray).

<i>‘pomagati’</i> (to help)	singular	dual	plural
1P (= exclusive)	* <b>naj</b> pomag-a-m	* <b>naj</b> pomag-a-va	* <b>naj</b> pomag-a-mo
1+2P (= inclusive)	IMPOSSIBLE	pomaga-j-va	pomaga-j-mo
2P	pomaga-j	pomaga-j-ta	pomaga-j-te
3P	<b>naj</b> pomag-a	<b>naj</b> pomag-a-ta	<b>naj</b> pomag-a-jo

**Table 2** The combined paradigm of matrix directives in Slovenian

But what does this gap tell us? I argue that it shows the existence of a matrix equivalent of obviation. In an abstract way, both restrictions can be seen as precluding a singular subject from referring to the speaker: (i) the original speaker (the matrix subject) in embedded directives, and (ii) the actual speaker in matrix directives (the pattern is more complex for non-singular subjects, but still parallel for (i) and (ii); see Section 2.3). In the next section, I propose that this is not just a superficial similarity and that the two restrictions are in fact one and the same—essentially a Condition B effect.

The matrix obviation effect can be clearly teased apart from a mere paradigmatic gap in Slovenian. Although the same cannot be conclusively shown for French, notice that a simple blocking analysis of the competing two constructions in (19–21) does leave unexplained the fact that 1P exclusive subjects are absent in both. The analysis of obviation I propose below, although based on and presented using Slovenian data, is meant to extend to cases like French, which crucially also exhibits obviation with embedded subjunctives.

<sup>11</sup> I return in Section 5.3 to the issue of what exactly the inclusive vs. exclusive distinction can mean in embedded contexts in Slovenian. We will also see in Section 2.3 that the inclusive vs. exclusive contrast is also relevant for the correct analysis of obviation.

### 2.3 Generalized obviation and obviation as Condition B

Obviation constrains the use of directives so that their subjects cannot have a free range of referents. More precisely, their subjects cannot refer to the speaker (attitude holder) of the directive. In the “standard” embedded case (represented in (23a)) the embedded subject cannot refer to the individual(s) denoted by the matrix subject—the speaker in the original context. Likewise, in the case of matrix obviation (represented in (23b)) the matrix subject cannot refer to the speaker in the actual context (*c*).

- (23) a.  $[_{CP} [ SU_i [ V_{ATT} [_{CP} [ SU_{k,*i} [ V_{SUB/IMP} ] ] ] ] ] ] ]$  (embedded) obviation  
 b.  $[[x_i]^c = \text{speaker}(c); [_{CP} [ SU_{k,*i} [ V_{SUB/IMP} ] ] ] ]$  (matrix) obviation

The restrictions are thus comparable on an abstract level. I argue that they are the same restriction also practically: *generalized* obviation, itself a result of *Binding Condition B* (cf. (24)), with the subject of the directive (typically *pro*) as the relevant pronoun.

- (24) **Condition B.** *A pronoun must be free in its binding domain.*<sup>12</sup>

Whether a pronoun is “free” is determined syntactically: not c-commanded by a *coindexed* referential element in the binding domain. Coindexation is crucially a more specific notion than coreference (two elements with distinct indices may corefer), but I will use coreference as a cover term for both unless disambiguation is necessary.

There is a long line of research that treats obviation as a syntactic binding restriction (Picallo 1985, Kempchinsky 1986, 2009, Rizzi 1990, Progovac 1993, Bianchi 2001 i.a.), but these almost exclusively deal with embedded clauses. What I am proposing is a full extension of this view to matrix clauses. In relation to the embedded case (cf. (23a)), the burden of a binding approach is to explain how and why the two subjects count as being in the same binding domain. An extension to the matrix case (cf. (23b)) must, along with the binding domain question, also explain how and why the speaker—not a syntactic entity—can count as an antecedent for binding. In the analysis proposed in Section 3 both these issues are avoided. Pending that discussion, I show that both the embedded and matrix versions of obviation fit the profile of Condition B by examining contexts where the restriction can be relaxed.

Condition B can be lifted under a number of circumstances (see Lakoff 1972, Evans 1980, Reinhart 1983, Grodzinsky and Reinhart 1993, Heim 1998, 2007, Schlenker 2005b for discussion). Here, I examine specifically cases where Condition B is lifted in constellations of partial referential overlap, as these are particularly useful for comparisons between canonical Condition B examples and obviation.

As noted by Lasnik (1989), in examples like (25a), where the referent of the object ‘me/myself’ is a subset of the referents of the subject ‘we’, neither Condition A nor B can be satisfied. However, such partial overlap configurations improve with a collective reading of ‘we’ (see, among others, Reinhart and Reuland 1993: 676-677). Thus, (25b) is grammatical despite having a pronoun configuration excluded in (25a).

<sup>12</sup> The literature on Condition B is full of competing accounts, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss them or compare them (see Lasnik 1989, Reinhart and Reuland 1993, Safir 2004, Schlenker 2005b for some influential examples of post-Chomsky (1981) treatments of Condition B). As the reader will see, the exact nature of Condition B is not crucial for my account of generalized obviation. What matters is the nature of its domain of application, the elements it pertains to, and cases in which it appears to be relaxed.

- (25) a. \*We like { me. / myself. }                      b. We elected me.

Ungrammaticality arises crucially also with obviation analogues to (25a) in Slovenian embedded directives. This is illustrated in (26), where the 2P subject of the embedded imperative cannot be interpreted as coreferential with any of the individuals in the group of people encompassed by the plural 1P inclusive subject.

- (26) \*Rekli smo<sub>i+k</sub>, da vpraša-j<sub>i</sub> Markota.  
 said.PL.M AUX.1PL that ask-IMP.(2) Marko.ACC  
 int.: ‘We<sub>i+k</sub> said that you<sub>i</sub> should ask Marko.’

However, just as with the canonical Condition B examples in (25), where overlap is disallowed only with distributed interpretations of plural pronouns (Safir 2004: 94–96), obviation is lifted if plural subjects are interpreted as collective. If we interpret (27b) (an analogue of (26)) with respect to context (27a), the matrix subject is interpreted collectively, and the partial coreference restriction is voided.

- (27) a. CONTEXT: *A group of coworkers voted on how to get a piece of information, and it was decided that the addressee (who also voted) should ask their boss for the information. But the addressee immediately forgot what the decision was, so another member of the group reminds him:*  
 b. Rekli smo<sub>i+k</sub>, da vpraša-j<sub>i</sub> šefa.  
 said.PL.M AUX.1PL that ask-IMP.(2) BOSS.ACC  
 ‘We<sub>i+k</sub> said (= decided by vote) that you<sub>i</sub> should ask the boss.’

Referential overlap is, for unknown reasons, tolerated more with 1P bound pronouns (Schlenker 2005b: 49–50) and collective readings are more salient when the overlap configuration is reversed—with the referent of the antecedent as the subset. Given this, speakers accept examples like (28) (cf. (25a)) without much additional context; in which case they also strongly prefer an inclusive 1P reading for the object.

- (28) I like us (as a couple).

The same can be observed with obviation in Slovenian directives. As seen in (29), when the referent of the matrix subject is a subset of the group referenced by an embedded 1P inclusive subject, referential overlap between the two is permitted.

- (29) Rekel sem<sub>i</sub>, da vpraša-j-mo<sub>i+k</sub> Markota.  
 said.M AUX.1 that ask-IMP-1PL Marko.ACC  
 ‘I<sub>i</sub> said that we<sub>i+k</sub> should ask Marko.’

Embedded obviation thus patterns with Condition B. What about matrix obviation? Since the role of the antecedent in the latter is taken up by the speaker—a singular entity—we can not construct examples that parallel (25–27). Fortunately, equivalents of (28) and (29) can be constructed. Recall that Slovenian has inclusive 1P imperatives, where the speaker is a subset of the individuals denoted by the subject. Assuming that the subject plays the role of the bound pronoun, the overlap configuration then parallels that in (28) and (29). Crucially, such imperatives are only grammatical with a collective reading of the plural subject. For example, the inclusive 1P imperative in (30a) only gets a collective reading. In fact, in order to express a distributive reading in a matrix directive, a 3P subject subjunctive like (30b) must be used in Slovenian.

- (30) a. Vpraša-j-mo<sub>i+k</sub> Markota!  
 ask-IMP-1PL Marko.ACC  
 ‘Let’s ask Marko!’ (#‘Each of us should ask independently.’)
- b. Naj vsak<sub>i</sub> zase vpraša<sub>i</sub> Markota!  
 SUB each for.self ask.3 Marko.ACC  
 ‘Let’s each individually ask Marko!’

Note that overlap is tolerated only with inclusive 1P subjects. While it is unclear why inclusive 1P allows a collective reading and exclusive 1P does not,<sup>13</sup> the reading correlates to the tolerance for referential overlap—consistent with Condition B effects.<sup>14</sup> What remains open is what the binding domain is in the case of obviation. Since obviation is found only in a limited set of constructions, a wholesale redefinition of what counts as a binding domain will not do. Instead I argue, based on the semantic behavior of directives, that the solution lies in identifying the relevant antecedent.

#### 2.4 Who and where is the culprit?

The key idea put forth above is that the two manifestations of generalized obviation differ only in terms of which individual appears to play the role of the antecedent when obviation is characterized in terms of Condition B: (i) the actual speaker, or (ii) the original speaker (realized by the matrix subject). In a sense, the antecedent “shifts” in embedded directives to the original context. A parallel to the antecedent shifting is also observed with the impossibility of speaker distancing in imperatives.

When an imperative is uttered, its speaker cannot follow it up by explicitly stating a preference for the negation of the prejacent; the speaker cannot distance him or herself from the imperative (Kaufmann 2012, Condoravdi and Lauer 2012). This impossibility of speaker distancing is illustrated for Slovenian in (31).

- (31) #Pojdi stran! Ampak noče-m, da greš.  
 go.IMP away but not.want-1 that go.2  
 ‘Go away! But I don’t want you to go.’

As discussed in Stegovec and Kaufmann (2015), the distancing facts are different in Slovenian for embedded imperatives in speech reports. It is infelicitous to use an embedded imperative and to simultaneously report that the original speaker distanced him or herself from the imperative, as shown in (32a). In contrast, distancing by the actual speaker does not result in infelicity, as shown in (32b).

- (32) a. #Rekel je<sub>i</sub>, da pojdi stran in dodal da noče<sub>i</sub>, da greš.  
 said.M AUX.3 that go.IMP away and added that not.want.3 that go.2  
 ‘He said that you should go away and added that he doesn’t want you to.’

<sup>13</sup> Consider though that the function of plurality/duality is inherently different in inclusive and exclusive persons: inclusivity alone entails more than one individual, while exclusivity does not. Adding plural/dual number on top of inclusivity is thus essentially superfluous. I leave exploring the possible connection between this asymmetry and the differences in the availability of collective readings for future work.

<sup>14</sup> This is far from the only parallelism though. As an anonymous reviewer notes, Condition B effects ameliorate with focus: ‘*We don’t like John. But we (do) like [me]<sub>F</sub>*’ Focus also ameliorates obviation effects (Quer 2006), and this is seen in Slovenian as well, even for the matrix cases, e.g.: ‘*Naj ne poje Janez. Naj ne poje Mojca. Naj pojem [jaz]<sub>F</sub>!*’ (‘Janez shouldn’t sing. Mojca shouldn’t sing. [I]<sub>F</sub> should sing!’).

- b. Rekel je<sub>i</sub>, da pojdi stran ampak noče-m<sub>i</sub>, da greš.  
 said.M AUX.3 that go.IMP away but not.want-1 that go.2  
 ‘He said that you should go away, but I don’t want you to go.’

As shown by the examples in (33), the same pattern of speaker distancing asymmetries also arises with directive subjunctives. The two constructions therefore show parallel behavior beyond their common speech act function and the presence of obviation, which further justifies their treatment as a natural class of clauses.

- (33) a. #Naj grejo stran! Ampak noče-m, da grejo.  
 SUB go.3PL away but not.want-1 that go.3PL  
 ‘They should go away! But I don’t want them to go.’  
 b. #Rekel je<sub>i</sub>, da naj grejo stran in da noče<sub>i</sub>, da grejo.  
 said.M AUX.3 that SUB go.3PL away and that not.want.3 that go.3PL  
 ‘He said that they should go away and that he doesn’t want them to go.’  
 c. Rekel je, da naj grejo stran ampak noče-m, da grejo.  
 said.M AUX.3 that SUB go.3PL away but not.want-1 that go.3PL  
 ‘He said that they should go away but I don’t want them to go.’

What we see in (31,32) and (33), in other words, is that the public commitment to wanting to make the prejacent true is tied to the actual speaker in matrix directives and to the original speaker in embedded directives. The same matrix/embedded asymmetry is observed with obviation, where the coreference ban holds between the actual speaker and the subject in matrix directives and between the original speaker and the subject in embedded directives. I propose that this parallelism is no coincidence.

Specifically, I propose that the *director*—the individual which is the locus of public commitments associated with directives—is syntactically encoded in directives in the form of a “perspectival PRO”. This null pronoun exists to satisfy a semantic requirement of a directive modal operator (OP<sub>Dir</sub>), yielding the structure in (34).

- (34) [<sub>CP</sub> C [<sub>MoodP</sub> PRO [<sub>Mood</sub> OP<sub>Dir</sub> ... [<sub>vP</sub> pro<sub>SU</sub> [<sub>v</sub> v [<sub>VP</sub> V [ ... ]]]]]]]]

The pronoun, which denotes the actual speaker in matrix contexts and the original speaker in embedded ones, counts as a local antecedent to the subject for the purposes of Condition B. The special semantic profile of directives therefore partly also shapes their syntax, indirectly causing the syntactic obviation effect. I proceed to lay out the analysis in more detail in the following sections.

### 3 Getting our perspective under control

The analysis presented here is designed with the goal of unifying obviation across matrix and embedded contexts while simultaneously deriving some of the unique semantic properties of directives. The starting point here is Quer (1998, 2001), who suggests that the semantics of subjunctives involves a shift in the *model of evaluation* of the proposition, where truth is relativized to models within a context and to individuals (see Farkas 1992a, Giannakidou 1998 for related ideas). In matrix contexts, the individual anchor is the speaker and the relevant model is the epistemic model of the

speaker—the world in which the proposition is assigned a truth-value is the actual world according to the speaker. Similarly, in embedded contexts the individual anchor is the matrix subject. My main point of departure is that the anchoring is instantiated representationally. The proposed directive operator ( $OP_{Dir}$ )—the locus of directive semantics—has a semantic requirement which is satisfied when it combines with an individual type element, a *perspectival PRO* (henceforth  $PRO_{pers}$ ); the pronoun serves as the aforementioned individual anchor.  $PRO_{pers}$  is bound analogously to subject  $PRO$  in obligatory control constructions (see Chierchia 1987, Pearson 2012, 2016), and counts crucially as a potential antecedent for the purposes of Condition B.

On top of this, the analysis assumes the modal analysis of imperatives of Schwager (2006), Kaufmann (2012), but with a further refinement: the difference between plain modal constructions used as directive speech acts and true directives is that only the latter involve  $PRO_{pers}$  as a grammaticalized representation of the source of the directive speech act. The refinement is meant to capture Quer's view of subjunctives in contrast to plain modals. Of course, the analysis of imperatives I adopt here is not the only one on the market. There has been a number of influential alternative proposals recently (see e.g. Portner 2007, Condoravdi and Lauer 2012, and von Stechow and Iatridou 2017), and it may be that they can be adapted to capture the relevant facts just as well. What I set out to show is only that the facts can be straightforwardly explained with very minor modifications of Kaufmann's approach.

### 3.1 Performative modals

Let us first briefly examine the *performative modal* approach to imperatives (see also Lewis 1979b) as developed by Schwager (2006), Kaufmann (2012). This particular approach is built around the observation that modal verb constructions can be used performatively just like imperatives. A modal construction can either have a descriptive reading as in (35), or can be used performatively as in (36). The modal construction in (36a) invokes an obligation for the addressee to call the speaker, while the one in (36b) is a permission for the addressee to come at 11.

- (35) a. You should do the shopping today (as far as I know).  
 b. Peter may come tomorrow. (The hostess said it was no problem.)
- (36) a. You must call me!  
 b. Okay, you may come at 11. (Are you satisfied now?) (Kaufmann 2012: 58)

Furthermore, both modals used performatively (37a) and imperatives (37b) disallow the speaker to express disbelief that the action described by the verb will take place.

- (37) a. Sam must go to confession (#but he is not going to). (Ninan 2005: 150)  
 b. Go to confession (#but I know you won't go). (Kaufmann 2012: 58)

Kaufmann concludes that at the level of at-issue content, imperatives are equivalent to modal declaratives. The differences between them arise due to specific presuppositions triggered only with imperatives. This view is summarized in (38).


- (38) **Imperative Semantics.** An imperative of the form ‘(SUBJECT) $\phi$ !’ denotes the same object as ‘SUBJECT/you should  $\phi$ ’ with performative should.

(Kaufmann 2012: 60)

The result is that modal verbs only give rise to performative effects in contexts where the conditions for performativity arise. Conversely, imperatives—though denoting the same object as their modal declarative equivalents—have an additional presuppositional meaning component that restricts their felicitous use to contexts where their modal declarative equivalents can be used performatively. The details regarding the presuppositional component are orthogonal to the main topic, so I do not discuss them in detail here. I focus instead on the semantics of the modal component of directives as a superset of imperatives, and depart from Kaufmann (2012) by arguing that modal declaratives and directives show differences beyond the presuppositional component, and that precisely those differences give rise to generalized obviation with the latter.

### 3.2 Grammaticalizing the point of view

For Kaufmann (2012), a modal operator equivalent in its at-issue content to a necessity modal ( $OP_{Imp}$ ), is present in every imperative clause and syntactically sits somewhere in the clause’s Mood domain. Taking this as a starting point, I propose that all directive clauses underlyingly have the structure given in (39); to be elaborated on below.



The most noticeable change is the  $PRO_{pers}$  in SpecMoodP, which is variable bound through lambda abstraction analogously to  $PRO$  in control infinitives (cf. Chierchia 1987, Pearson 2012, 2016),<sup>15</sup> which I discuss in more detail below. Silent perspectival pronouns or other syntactic means of encoding perspective have been invoked

<sup>15</sup> I follow Pearson (2012, 2016) in assuming that all clauses (embedded and matrix) are properties  $\langle\langle e, \langle s, t \rangle \rangle\rangle$ , as opposed to propositions  $\langle\langle s, t \rangle\rangle$ . To the best of my knowledge, this does not change any predictions regarding my core proposal. I chose to adopt this view, as it allows making use of the attitudinal operators proposed by Pearson (2012) in my analysis of matrix directive clauses in Section 3.4 without drastic alterations. I could have just as easily made all relevant clauses propositions and change the denotation of the attitudinal operators instead. Of course, I do not exclude the possibility that the two options make different predictions regarding phenomena not discussed in this paper. That said, for the sake of a simpler exposition, matrix-level CPs are presented as propositions in derivations before Section 3.4.

before—mainly in analyses of logophors or long distance anaphora (see [Bianchi 2001, 2003](#), [Speas and Tenny 2003](#), [Speas 2004](#), [Baker 2008](#), [Sundaresan 2014](#)), but here I argue explicitly for a semantically bound *PRO*, whose presence satisfies a semantic requirement of  $OP_{Dir}$ . Specifically, I propose that the result of combining  $OP_{Dir}$  with Kratzerian conversational backgrounds (modal base, ordering source; see below) is of type  $\langle st, \langle e, st \rangle \rangle$ , which makes it first combine with a proposition (type  $\langle s, t \rangle$ )<sup>16</sup> and subsequently with  $PRO_{pers}$  (type  $e$ ). As we will see later in Section 3.3, the difference in semantic type between regular modals and the more complex  $OP_{Dir}$  is semantically motivated. However, in order to better understand the proposed split between the two kinds of modal elements, let us first establish the necessary assumptions concerning the semantics of modals on which both [Kaufmann](#)'s and my analysis rest on.

I follow the standard assumption that modal verbs are quantifiers over possible worlds that combine with propositions. More importantly, I follow [Kratzer \(1981\)](#) (cf. [Kratzer 1991, 2012](#)) in assuming that the meaning of modals depends on *conversational backgrounds*—functions from worlds to sets of propositions ( $\langle s, \langle st, t \rangle \rangle$ , henceforth *cb*). The first of two conversational backgrounds is the *modal base*, which yields a (necessarily consistent) body of information, and the second is the *ordering source*, which induces an ordering amongst the worlds that comply with the modal base (and is possibly inconsistent). In practice, the modal base specifies the contextually salient relevant facts, while the ordering source specifies the criteria for comparing worlds compatible with those facts.

Like [Kaufmann \(2012\)](#), I deal only with finite ordering sources, so I employ simplified denotations for modals drawing on the *Limit Assumption* of [Lewis \(1973\)](#) (cf. [Kaufmann and Kaufmann 2015: 283](#), for a formulation in a Kratzer-style framework). I assume the semantics for the necessity modal ‘*must*’ in (40). Necessity is encoded as universal quantification over possible worlds, where  $O(f, g, w)$  relativizes the set of worlds, namely the ones that are compatible with  $f$  and optimal with respect to  $g$ .


- (40)  $\llbracket must \rrbracket^c = \lambda f. \lambda g. \lambda p. \lambda w. (\forall v \in O(w, f, g))[p(v)]$
- a.  $f$  is the modal base (the body of information)
  - b.  $g$  is the ordering source (criteria for comparing worlds compliant with  $f$ )
  - c.  $O(w, f, g)$  is defined as the set of worlds conforming to  $f$  at  $w$  (i.e., in  $\bigcap f(w)$ ) that are the best according to  $g$  at  $w$ .

Concerning how  $f$  and  $g$  come to combine with the modal, the most straightforward assumption is that they are introduced essentially as covert pronouns. Like referential pronouns, which are free variables, the value of a conversational background must also be supplied by the utterance context. ‘*Must*’ in (40) is type  $\langle cb, \langle cb, \langle st, st \rangle \rangle \rangle$ , so it requires two conversational backgrounds. As shown in (41) using a simplified entry for ‘*must*’, the modal has to first combine with a modal base  $m$ , then with an ordering source  $l$ , and only then with the proposition  $p$  expressed by  $vP$ .

<sup>16</sup> I ignore tense throughout, as it is orthogonal to the issue of obviation. Below I will note if tense is part of an analysis I adopt, and provide modified versions of the relevant denotations and derivations.



(41)



Kaufmann’s entry for  $\text{OP}_{\text{Imp}}$  is identical to that of ‘*must*’ above; all differences between the two are relegated to the presuppositional component of  $\text{OP}_{\text{Imp}}$ .<sup>17</sup>

(42)  $[[\text{OP}_{\text{Imp}}]]^c = \lambda f . \lambda g . \lambda p . \lambda w . (\forall w' \in O(f, g, w))[p(w')]$  (Kaufmann 2012: 86)


Whatever causes obviation (absent with modal verbs) must then be independent from this; possibly a syntactic factor. But this leaves unexplained why obviating constructions are cross-linguistically those associated with a particular semantics—directives being the prototypical case (Kempchinsky 2009), and the speaker distancing facts then have to be explained as an entirely separate phenomenon.

I propose instead that modal verbs and directives are semantically distinct, with consequences in their syntax. The directive operator ( $\text{OP}_{\text{Dir}}$ ), given in (43), has to combine with *centered conversational backgrounds*—a type of conversational background further restricted in relation to an individual of type  $e$ . They are functions from individuals to regular Kratzerian conversational backgrounds (type  $\langle e, cb \rangle$ ).

(43)  $[[\text{OP}_{\text{Dir}}]]^c = \lambda f . \lambda g . \lambda p . \lambda x . \lambda w . (\forall w' \in O(f_x, g_x, w))[p(w')]$ a.  $f_x$  is the body of information available to  $x$  in  $w$ b.  $g_x$  are criteria to decide between worlds compliant with  $f_x$  endorsed by  $x$ 

As a result,  $\text{OP}_{\text{Dir}}$  must first combine with the conversational backgrounds ( $m, l$ ), then the relevant propositional content ( $vP$ ), and finally an individual element ( $\text{PRO}_{\text{pers}}$ ):

(44)



The proposed  $\text{OP}_{\text{Dir}}$  thus differs from plain necessity modals in that it must take an individual argument. The function of this argument, embodied by  $\text{PRO}_{\text{pers}}$ , is to encode the source of the directive—the director: the actual speaker in matrix directives and the original speaker in embedded directives. The interpretation of  $\text{PRO}_{\text{pers}}$  in matrix directives requires some elaboration which will be provided in Section 3.4. Pending

<sup>17</sup> This is her preliminary version of  $\text{OP}_{\text{Imp}}$ . Her final version also takes into account temporal variables. And noted above, I ignore issues of tense in relation to the semantics of imperatives in this paper.

that, we make due with the stipulation that  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$  in matrix clauses always refers to the speaker of the utterance. In the case of embedded directives, however, we can derive the denotation of  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$  using a fairly standard semantic account of control.

I adopt here the general approach of Chierchia (1987) and Pearson (2012, 2016) (hinted at already in (39), where  $PRO$  is bound via a lambda abstractor in C). The derivation of a baseline infinitival control case like (45) is illustrated with a simplified example from Pearson (2016) in (46). The crucial thing to note about this approach is that control is analyzed as involving self-ascription of a property (see also Lewis 1979a, Chierchia 1987; and footnote 15), which will play a key role later on.

(45) John expects to become rich and famous.

- (46)  $\llbracket \text{expect} \rrbracket^{c:g} = \lambda P_{\langle e, \langle s, t \rangle \rangle} \lambda x \lambda w . \forall \langle w', y \rangle [ \langle w', y \rangle \in \text{Expect}_{x,w} \rightarrow P(y)(w') ]$
- a.  $\llbracket CP1 \lambda w_1 [ w_1 \text{ John expects } [CP2 \lambda x_2 \lambda w_3 [TP w_3 PRO_2 \text{ to become rich and famous}]] ] \rrbracket$
- b.  $\llbracket CP2 \rrbracket^{c:g} = \lambda x \lambda w . x \text{ is rich and famous in } w$
- c.  $\llbracket CP1 \rrbracket^{c:g} = \lambda w . \forall \langle w', y \rangle [ \langle w', y \rangle \in \text{Expect}_{John,w} \rightarrow y \text{ becomes rich and famous in } w' ]$  (Pearson 2016: 697)

An important feature of this approach is that there is no binding per se between the subject of the attitude verb and  $PRO$ . The attitude verb itself binds  $PRO$ . In (45,46), ‘*expect*’ takes as its first argument a property, and it functions as a universal quantifier over *doxastic alternatives* (see Lewis 1979a, Chierchia 1987) (cf. (47a)), specifically those alternatives that concern the attitude holder’s candidates for future realities (cf. (47b)). The two sets of alternatives can be identified with each other if tense is ignored and the correct characterization of “*expect*-alternatives” is orthogonal here (I refer the interested reader to the discussion in Pearson 2016).

(47) ***Doxastic alternatives:***

- a.  $\text{Dox}_{x,w} = \{ \langle w', y \rangle : \text{it is compatible with what } x \text{ believes in } w \text{ for } x \text{ to be } y \text{ in } w' \}$
- b.  $\text{Expect}_{x,w} = \text{Dox}_{x,w}$  with future-orientation

Returning to (46), we see that the quantification of ‘*expect*’ over the set of doxastic alternatives ultimately results in the attitude holder self-identifying as an individual who has the property of “being rich and famous” (46b) in their expected future realities (46c). The result is that the subject of the infinitive ranges over the individuals that John identifies with. For now, self-identification will be seen as equivalent to coreference for expository purposes.<sup>18</sup> With that, the subject of the attitude verb (John) and the subject of the infinitive ( $PRO$ ) come out as coreferential. This is possible because of the lambda abstractors introduced in the left periphery in the C of CP2 (46a); the abstractor over individuals ( $\lambda x_2$ ) and the subject of CP2 ( $PRO_2$ ) must be coindexed in obligatory control constructions, resulting in  $PRO$  being semantically bound by the matrix subject.<sup>19</sup> I have nothing to add on how the coindexation comes about, and I

<sup>18</sup> We will see in Section 3.5, how this relates to *de se* attitudes.

<sup>19</sup> With object control, alternatively,  $PRO$  corefers with the matrix object. See Pearson (2016) for an analysis in her framework. Interestingly, object control does not arise with  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$ , at least in Slovenian.

refer the reader to [Chierchia \(1987\)](#) and [Pearson \(2012, 2016\)](#) for discussion. I only propose that the coindexation also arises with constructions involving  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$ .

Thanks to abstraction over  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$ , a directive clause denotes a property in the current analysis (cf. (39)). The derivation for infinitives can thus be straightforwardly transposed to directives. This is exemplified with an embedded imperative in (48) (meant to correspond to a Slovenian embedded imperative) and its derivation in (49).

(48) *John said that leave.IMP!*

- (49)  $\llbracket \text{say} \rrbracket^{c,g} = \lambda P_{\langle e, \langle s, t \rangle \rangle} \lambda x \lambda w . \forall \langle w', y \rangle [ \langle w', y \rangle \in \text{Say}_{x,w} \rightarrow P(y)(w') ]$   
 $\text{Say}_{x,w} = \{ \langle w', y \rangle : \text{it is compatible with what } x \text{ says in } w \text{ for } x \text{ to be } y \text{ in } w \}$   
 a.  $[_{CP1} \lambda w_1 [ w_1 \text{ John says } [_{CP2} \lambda x_2 \lambda w_3 [ w_3 \text{ PRO}_2 \text{ OP}_{f_2, g_2} [ \lambda w_4 w_4 \text{ 2P leaves } ] ] ] ] ] ]$   
 b.  $\llbracket \text{CP2} \rrbracket^{c,g} = \lambda x \lambda w . (\forall w' \in O(f_x, g_x, w)) [ \text{addr}(c) \text{ leaves in } w' ]$   
 c.  $\llbracket \text{CP1} \rrbracket^{c,g} = \lambda w . \forall \langle w', y \rangle [ \langle w', y \rangle \in \text{Say}_{\text{John}, w} \rightarrow (\forall w'' \in O(f_y, g_y, w)) [ \text{addr}(c) \text{ leaves in } w'' ] ]$

The derivation in (49) is largely parallel to (46), the main differences are that  $PRO$  and the embedded subject are not the same individual (cf. (49a)), and that the attitude verb quantifies over a set of “*speech act*-alternatives” ( $\text{Say}_{x,w}$ ; see [Pearson 2016](#)). The subject of the embedded clause is a free variable with 2P features ( $\text{addr}(c) = \text{addressee in context } c$ ), while  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$  is the individual that the matrix subject (*John*) self-identifies with.  $\text{OP}_{\text{Dir}}$  combines with the proposition expressed by  $vP$  and yields a property that combines with  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$  and a world variable. The lambda abstractors in C then make the clause a property again, resulting in the CP2 illustrated in (49b). By the semantics of  $\text{OP}_{\text{Dir}}$  (cf. (43)), the centered conversational backgrounds are interpreted relative to the referent of  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$ . The lambda abstractors introduced in C then ensure that the subject of the attitude verb (*John*) self-identifies with  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$  in the embedded clause and consequently the bound variable components of  $f_x$  and  $g_x$ .<sup>20</sup>

The main upshots of the perspectival control analysis are: (i) we can reuse familiar semantic building blocks and machinery with minimal new assumptions, and more importantly (ii) we correctly predict that the modal component of embedded directives is always anchored to the matrix subject. And while the identification of  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$  with the speaker in matrix directives is merely stipulated for now, it too can be derived from an independent proposal by [Pearson \(2012\)](#). What is important at this point is that nothing in the semantics regulates the choice of the subject. Restrictions will only arise in the syntax as an indirect consequence of  $\text{OP}_{\text{Dir}}$ 's semantic requirements.

The only attitude verbs that can take directive complements are those verbs of speech where the speaker is the attitude holder, which may be because all reported directives must have previously been speech acts. But the present analysis clearly predicts that, should a language exhibit an object control analogue of perspectival control, *object obviation*, as opposed to *subject obviation*, would arise.

<sup>20</sup> For attitude verbs that, unlike ‘*say*’, have modal content (e.g. ‘*order*’), a doubling of modality arises ( $V_{\text{att}} + \text{OP}_{\text{Dir}}$ ) (cf. [Portner 1997](#)). A way around this is to follow recent work by Angelika Kratzer, which suggests that embedding attitude verbs only describe events of different types, while the modal component is located in the left periphery of the embedded clause ([Kratzer 2013](#)). This is needed independently to explain other instances of doubled modality like: ‘*Ralph advised that Orcutt should turn himself in*’. An analysis of embedded directives in these terms strikes me as promising, given that in Slovenian any embedding verb that can be construed as a verb of communication can take a directive complement.

### 3.3 Deriving generalized obviation and the distancing ban shift

The main issue that binding analyses of obviation have to deal with is how to characterize the binding domain so that the matrix subject may be considered a potential binder for an embedded pronominal subject. As the domain for Conditions A and B is generally thought to span at most a single clause, obviation contexts often end up being treated as exceptions to the rule; a common approach in this vein is to invoke an extension of the binding domain under the right conditions (see [Picallo 1985](#), [Rizzi 1990](#), [Progovac 1993](#)).<sup>21</sup> This issue is avoided in the current analysis, where instead of having to extend the binding domain, directives introduce an extra potential antecedent— $PRO_{pers}$ —within a regular sized binding domain.<sup>22</sup>

Under the current analysis, obviation can be analyzed as paralleling Condition B effects in control infinitives, where an object pronoun cannot be coreferential with the matrix subject in control infinitives (50a) (cf. the object anaphor in (50b)).

- (50) a. \*He<sub>i</sub> promised [  $PRO_i$  to shave him<sub>i</sub> ]  
 b. He<sub>i</sub> promised [  $PRO_i$  to shave himself<sub>i</sub> ]

Like with obviation, arguments in distinct binding domains appear to interact with each other with respect to Condition B. But, in fact, the coreference restriction applies within a single binding domain between the object pronoun and the  $PRO$  subject.

The idea is that in directives the relation between the subject  $PRO$  and the object pronoun in (50a) is paralleled by the relation between  $PRO_{pers}$  and subject pronoun (a silent *pro*). This is illustrated with (51a) compared to the grammatical (51b). Just like in the infinitival examples,  $PRO_{pers}$  acts as a proxy for the matrix subject inside the binding domain of the embedded subject (elaborated on below).<sup>23</sup>

- (51) a. \*He<sub>i</sub> said [ that  $PRO_i$  *pro\_i* leave! ]  
 b. He<sub>i</sub> said [ that  $PRO_i$  *pro\_k* leave! ]

The analysis also straightforwardly captures the matrix obviation facts. Domain extension analyses of matrix obviation would have to posit a null superstructure dominating matrix clauses such that it would contain a potential antecedent for the subject. Here the antecedent is already within the matrix clause and denotes the actual speaker (*spkr(c)*). Consequently, a subject cannot be 1P (SG/excl.), as this would constitute a Condition B violation (cf. (52a)), but the subject may have any other person value that does not yield a denotation coreferential with  $PRO_{pers}$  (cf. (52b)).

<sup>21</sup> This possibility is often correlated to a “defective” verbal inflection, attested in the relevant Romance languages in subjunctive verbal forms. But note that there is no link between inflection and obviation in Slovenian. Both imperatives and subjunctives have the same agreement paradigm as their indicative counterparts (indicated by the morphological segmentation of relevant examples; cf. Sections 2.1 and 2.2).

<sup>22</sup> In this sense, the current analysis is similar to that of [Kempchinsky \(1986, 2009\)](#) and [Bianchi \(2001\)](#), which attribute obviation to the presence of a special operator/functional head within the appropriate syntactic domain. The difference is that, unlike those accounts, I do not require any binding principles distinct from Condition B or assuming that the operator itself functions as the antecedent.

<sup>23</sup> This raises the question of why there is no equivalent of (50b) with directives. This could be due to the *anaphor agreement effect* ([Rizzi 1990](#), [Woolford 1999](#)); i.e. anaphora being absent in contexts that trigger agreement on the verb—in the case of Slovenian, the subject. This is independently supported by the fact that Slovenian categorically lacks nominative anaphoric and reciprocal elements.

- (52) a. \*[  $PRO_{spkr(c)}$   $pro_{spkr(c)}$  Leave! ] 1P.SG subject  
 b. [  $PRO_{spkr(c)}$   $pro_{k,addr(c)}$  Leave! ] 3P/2P.SG subject

In Section 3.4, we will see that the denotation of matrix  $PRO_{pers}$  is not rigid—it can change under the right conditions and the obviation facts change accordingly. This will provide further evidence for the current analysis, linking it to an existing theory on the semantics of matrix clauses. The theory can then be simplified by dispensing with the stipulation that a matrix  $PRO_{pers}$  must denote the actual speaker.

Recall also that only subjects of directives fall under the coreference restriction (which domain-extension accounts generally struggle with). I propose that this results from subjects—but not objects—simultaneously being part of two binding domains. The first domain (D1), illustrated in (53a), more or less fits the traditional conception of a binding domain, as it encompasses all the argument positions of a clause and thus captures all the canonical binding effects between subjects and objects. The second domain (D2), illustrated in (53b), is a new addition of the proposal.

- (53) a. [  $CP$  that [  $MoodP$   $PRO_i$  [  $Mood'$   $OP_{Dir}$  ( [  $vP$   $pro_{*k}$  [  $v'$  shave him $_{*k}$  ] ] ) ] ] ]  
 b. ( [  $CP$  that [  $MoodP$   $PRO_{*i}$  [  $Mood'$   $OP_{Dir}$  [  $vP$   $pro_{*i}$  ] ] ] ] ]<sub>D2</sub> [  $v'$  shave him $_k$  ] ] ] ]

D2 encompasses the subject and  $PRO_{pers}$ , which is crucial for obviation. Since arguments other than the external one are all introduced outside D2, they do not take part in obviation.<sup>24</sup> The two domains are not arbitrary: D1 corresponds to Chomsky’s (2000, 2001)  $vP$  phase, and D2 to his CP phase including the “edge” of the  $vP$  phase—in most versions of phase theory accessible to both phases. Phase-based locality can therefore be extended to binding, highlighting the exceptionality of the external argument position as part of both domains and getting the right results with respect to obviation.

At this point the sole purpose of  $OP_{Dir}$  may appear to be causing obviation in the syntax, but remember that the ban on speaker distancing parallels obviation across matrix and embedded contexts. The examples illustrating the ban with matrix (31) and embedded imperatives (32a) are repeated here as (54a) and (54b) respectively.

- (54) a. #Pojdi stran! Ampak noče-m, da gre-š.  
 go.IMP.(2) away but not.want-1 that go-2  
 ‘Go away! But I don’t want you to go.’  
 b. #Rekel je $_i$ , da pojdi stran in da noče $_i$ , da gre-š.  
 said.M AUX.3 that go.IMP.(2) away and that not.want.3 that go-2  
 ‘He said that you should go away and that he doesn’t want you to go.’

<sup>24</sup> These arguments can in principle move at least as high as Spec $vP$  and thus into D2, which complicates the picture. One reason why this does not affect binding could be that the movement is always focus related. Focus ameliorates obviation violations (Quer 2006 and footnote 14), and binding violations more generally (Eckardt 2002, Despić 2011, 2013, Charnavel 2015). However, this does not easily extend to object clitics, which probably also move at least as high as Spec $vP$  and are typically not focused. Another possibility is to invoke the  $A/A'$ -movement split, where only the former creates new binding possibilities. If movement to subject (SpecTP) is the only kind of  $A$ -movement that moves arguments from D1 to D2 (e.g. passivization), then all other instances of D1 to D2 movement are  $A'$ -movement therefore not a problem. I leave the best analysis to be determined in future work, but it must also be noted that these complications arise with virtually all movement-binding interactions, and are not specific to the current analysis.

- c. Rekel je, da pojdi stran ampak noče-m, da gre-š.  
 said.M AUX.3 that go.IMP.(2) away but not.want-1 that go-2  
 ‘He said that you should go away but I don’t want you to go.’

In matrix clauses the ban manifests itself as the impossibility for the speaker of the directive to distance themselves from the directive speech act (54a). In embedded directive clauses, the ban instead applies to the matrix subject, as reporting is infelicitous if the original speaker’s act of distancing is also reported (54b). Crucially, the actual speaker may freely distance themselves from the directing act (54c).

The distancing restriction and the matrix/embedded asymmetry, can be straightforwardly accounted for by the semantics proposed for  $OP_{Dir}$ , repeated here in (55).

$$(55) \quad \llbracket OP_{Dir} \rrbracket^c = \lambda f. \lambda g. \lambda p. \lambda x. \lambda w. (\forall w' \in O(f_x, g_x, w)) [p(w')]$$

- a.  $f_x$  is the body of information available to  $x$   
 b.  $g_x$  are criteria to decide between worlds compliant with  $f_x$  endorsed by  $x$

The ordering source here crucially refers to “*the criteria [ . . . ] endorsed by  $x$* ”, which means that not only is the ordering source relativized with respect to the individual  $x$  but that uttering the directive makes adds this to the individual’s public commitments. Given the analysis outlined above,  $x$  is always identified with  $PRO_{pers}$ : this means that in matrix contexts,  $x$  in  $g_x$  is the individual the speaker self-identifies with, and in embedded contexts,  $x$  in  $g_x$  is the individual the matrix subject identifies with.

This means the criteria that restrict the worlds that the modal operator quantifies over are always publicly endorsed by the director, encoded by  $PRO_{pers}$ . In this analysis, the infelicity of speaker distancing results from the directive speech act being a public endorsement of an ordering source by the director, while distancing is an attempt by the director to negate the endorsement of that same ordering source.

However, the ban on distancing is not limited only to directives as defined in this paper. It arises also when modal verb constructions are used performatively (see Kaufmann 2012, Condoravdi and Lauer 2012), but there is clear contrast with respect to directives as to whether speaker distancing can be coerced or not. Consider the examples in (56).<sup>25</sup> The imperative (56a) does not allow distancing even though “the recipe” is primed as a salient body of information. The modal construction (56b) in contrast bans distancing only under a performative modal reading.<sup>26</sup>

- (56) a. According to the recipe, put in the peppers now.  
 #But I don’t think that you should do that.  
 b. According to the recipe, you have to put in the peppers now.  
 (#)But I don’t think that you should do that.

I take the contrast to mean that simple modals *can* express speaker endorsement of an ordering source with the right conditions, while directive operators *must* express it. This basically parallels the pronoun/anaphor split: pronouns *can* be bound under the

<sup>25</sup> See also Condoravdi and Lauer (2017:191) for examples and discussion of a similar contrast between modal verbs and imperatives in the context of “speaker disinterested advice”.

<sup>26</sup> Despite not being a part of (North American) colloquial English, constructions with deontic ‘*must*’ seem to yield the same asymmetry. This seems to go against the claim made by Ninan (2005) that deontic ‘*must*’ is always interpreted preformatively in English when occurring in a matrix clause.

right conditions, but anaphora *must* be bound—which is not coincidental, given the role that control plays in the proposed analysis of directives. It is conceivable that the endorsement component itself is a prerequisite for performativity in all modal elements and that the differences between them arise solely from whether the individual variable of a modal *must* be bound or not, but I leave this possibility open for future exploration.

Further evidence showing that the endorsement component is hard-coded into directives comes from the embedding asymmetry in Slovenian. In (57,58) (assuming a scenario similar to (56)), *A* is chopping onions and asks *B*: ‘*How should the onion be chopped?*’ *B* may reply with (57a), a matrix directive clause, or (58a), a construction with an embedded directive clause. Note that (57a) cannot be felicitously followed up with a distancing act, as seen in (57b), whereas (58a) can, as seen in (58b).

- (57) a. Čebula naj bo drobno sesekljana ...  
 onion SUB AUX.FUT.3 finely chopped.F  
 ‘The onion should be finely chopped ...’  
 b. #. . . ampak noče-m, da je drobno sesekljana.  
 but not.want-1 that AUX.3 finely chopped.F  
 ‘... but I don’t want it to be finely chopped.’
- (58) a. Recept pravi, da naj bo čebula drobno sesekljana ...  
 recipe say.3 that SUB AUX.FUT.3 onion finely chopped.F  
 ‘The recipe says that the onion should be finely chopped ...’  
 b. . . . ampak noče-m, da je drobno sesekljana.  
 but not.want-1 that AUX.3 finely chopped.F  
 ‘... but I don’t want it to be finely chopped.’

The infelicity of (57b) shows that the speaker, as the director, has endorsed the recipe or another set of instructions as a relevant body of information.<sup>27</sup> In contrast, the possibility of distancing in (58b) reveals that the recipe itself counts as the director. An inanimate abstract entity can be count as the source of the directive speech act, even though pragmatically this does not make much sense. Under the current approach, this fact follows from the semantics of  $OP_{Dir}$  and how it relates to  $PRO_{pers}$ . It is unclear, how the same facts could be captured by a purely pragmatic account.

In sum, the requirement of  $OP_{Dir}$  to combine with  $PRO_{pers}$  (in conjunction with an appropriate theory of control) can cause obviation in the syntax and yields the speaker distancing ban at the level of interpretation. In the case of obviation, the proposed analysis offers a simple solution to the problem of how to characterize the binding domain in directives: binding domains are the same across all clauses, it is the configuration of potential antecedents that is different in directives. Similarly, in the case of speaker distancing, the analysis captures the exceptionality of directive clauses—the ban does not arise only from the illocutionary force of a directive speech act, it follows from the specialized semantics of the proposed modal  $OP_{Dir}$ .<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Unfortunately, examples parallel to the English ones with adverbials in (56) are marginal in Slovenian with matrix directive clauses for unknown reasons. To the extent that marginal examples can be compared to the grammatical (57a) and (58a) in terms of the distancing ban, they seem to pattern with (57a) and do not allow distancing, as predicted. I leave open why the examples are only marginally acceptable.

<sup>28</sup> Although tense was not discussed, it has a key role in directives (Kaufmann 2012: §3.2.2) and infinitives (Pearson 2016). It appears that the matrix subject must self-identify as the embedded  $PRO_{pers}$  with respect

### 3.4 Matrix directives and the interrogative perspective shift

Up until now, I stipulated that  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$  in matrix directives consistently refers to the speaker of the utterance. I showed that this derives the impossibility of (exclusive) 1P subjects in matrix directives as an instance of a Condition B violation between  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$  and the subject. The contrast this aims to explain is repeated in (59), with the ungrammatical 1P subjunctive in (59a) and the grammatical 2P imperative in (59b).

- (59) a. \*Naj si pomaga-m!  
SUB REFL.DAT help-1  
 int.: ‘I should help myself.’  
 b. Pomaga-j si!  
help-IMP.(2) REFL.DAT  
 ‘Help yourself!’

But this is not the only pattern in matrix directives. In questions, (exclusive) 1P subject are allowed, as shown in (60a) for a polar question and (60b) for a constituent one.

- (60) a. Naj si pomaga-m?  
SUB REFL.DAT help-1  
 ‘Should I help myself?’  
 b. Komu naj pomaga-m?  
who.DAT SUB help-1  
 ‘Who should I help?’

This does not mean, however, that in matrix questions subjects can vary freely. Consider (61a) and (61b)—the 2P imperative counterparts of the examples seen in (60).

- (61) a. \*Pomaga-j si?  
help-IMP.(2) REFL.DAT  
 int.: ‘Should you help yourself?’  
 b. \*Komu pomaga-j?  
who.DAT help-IMP.(2)  
 int.: ‘Who should you help?’

Imperatives are absent in questions and they exist only for 2P and inclusive 1P subjects—those whose denotation always includes the addressee. In contrast, subjunctives are possible in questions and they are used for all other subjects—those whose denotation always excludes the addressee. This is summarized in Tables 3 and 4.

‘pomagati’ (to help)	singular	dual	plural
1P (= excl.)	*naj pomaga-m	*naj pomaga-va	*naj pomaga-mo
1+2P (= incl.)	IMPOSSIBLE	pomaga-j-va	pomaga-j-mo
2P	pomaga-j	pomaga-j-ta	pomaga-j-te
3P	naj pomaga	naj pomaga-ta	naj pomaga-jo

**Table 3** Baseline pattern of matrix obviation in Slovenian

‘pomagati’ (to help)	singular	dual	plural
1P (= excl.)	naj pomaga-m	naj pomaga-va	naj pomaga-mo
1+2P (= incl.)	IMPOSSIBLE	*pomaga-j-va	*pomaga-j-mo
2P	*pomaga-j	*pomaga-j-ta	*pomaga-j-te
3P	naj pomaga	naj pomaga-ta	naj pomaga-jo

**Table 4** Interrogative pattern of matrix obviation in Slovenian

to the time of the original utterance. The equivalent of: ‘I said that leave.IMP, but now I don’t want you to’ is fine in Slovenian, indicating it is the *original context speaker* that self-identifies with  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$ , not the *actual context speaker*, despite being the same individual. This may relate to similar constraints with (partial) control infinitives (see Pearson 2016), but I leave the details to be worked out by a future me.



Looking at both patterns in terms of obviation is revealing here: the default pattern shows a gap with subjects that refer to the speaker—Condition B effect with a speaker-denoting  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$ , whereas the interrogative pattern shows a gap with subjects that refer to the addressee. If the two restrictions have a common source, which I suggest they do, then the latter pattern arises due to the presence of an addressee-denoting  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$ .<sup>29</sup> This shift in the denotation of  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$  is actually expected if we assume that matrix clauses are dominated by attitudinal operators (following Pearson 2012), and that this is how  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$  receives its denotation in matrix clauses.

Pearson (2012) proposes, for independent reasons, that matrix clauses are properties dominated by special attitudinal operators: ASSERT (62), which occurs in matrix declarative clauses, and QUEST (63), which is its counterpart in matrix questions.

$$(62) \quad \llbracket \text{ASSERT} \rrbracket^{c:g} = \lambda P_{\langle e, \langle i, \langle s, t \rangle \rangle \rangle} : \forall \langle w', t', y \rangle \in \text{Dox}_{\text{spkr}(c), \text{world}(c), \text{time}(c)} \rightarrow P(x)(t')(w') . P \quad (\text{Pearson 2012: 128})$$

$$(63) \quad \llbracket \text{QUEST} \rrbracket^{c:g} = \lambda Q_{\langle \langle e, \langle i, \langle s, t \rangle \rangle, t \rangle \rangle} : \forall P \in \mathcal{Q} \rightarrow \exists \langle w, t, x \rangle \in \text{Dox}_{\text{spkr}(c), \text{world}(c), \text{time}(c)} : \forall \langle w', t', y \rangle \in \text{Dox}_{\text{addr}(c), w, t} \rightarrow P(y)(t')(w') . Q \quad (\text{Pearson 2012: 168})$$

ASSERT is a covert operator that takes a root sentence meaning (a property) as its argument and returns a property only if the property is true in the speaker's belief worlds. This is due to the operator's presuppositional component which also establishes ASSERT as a quantifier over doxastic alternatives of the speaker. What makes ASSERT different from an attitude predicate is that the latter may introduce a different person feature on the associated abstractor depending on the attitude holder/subject, while ASSERT is restricted to introducing 1P on its abstractor (Pearson 2012: 151).

I adopt a modified version of ASSERT, named COMMIT (64), to avoid confusion when non-assertive constructions like directives are interpreted. The operator is in fact underspecified, and can be part of all sorts of speech acts executed with propositions (I postpone the speech act aspect of directive clauses and operators until Section 3.6). The derivation of a matrix imperative (65) is given in (65a) through (65c).

$$(64) \quad \llbracket \text{COMMIT} \rrbracket^{c:g} = \lambda P_{\langle e, \langle s, t \rangle \rangle} : \forall \langle w', y \rangle [ \langle w', y \rangle \in \text{Dox}_{\text{spkr}(c), w(c)} \rightarrow P(y)(w') ] . P$$

$$\text{Dox}_{x, w} = \{ \langle w', y \rangle : \text{it is compatible with what } x \text{ believes in } w \text{ to be } x \text{ in } w' \}$$

$$(65) \quad \text{Leave!}$$

$$\text{a. } [ \text{COMMIT } [_{CP} \lambda x_2 \lambda w_3 [ w_3 \text{ PRO}_2 \text{ OP}_{f_2, g_2} [ \lambda w_4 w_4 \text{ 2P leaves} ] ] ] ] ] ]$$

$$\text{b. } \llbracket \text{CP} \rrbracket^{c:g} = \lambda x \lambda w . (\forall w' \in O(f_x, g_x, w)) [ \text{addr}(c) \text{ leaves in } w' ]$$

$$\text{c. } \llbracket (65\text{a}) \rrbracket^{c:g} \text{ is defined iff } \forall \langle w', x \rangle [ \langle w', x \rangle \in \text{Dox}_{\text{spkr}(c), w(c)} \rightarrow (\forall w'' \in O(f_x, g_x, w)) [ \text{addr}(c) \text{ leaves in } w'' ] ]$$

COMMIT is an identity function with a definedness condition, so the only consequence of it combining with a directive clause CP is that the meaning of CP can only be defined if the speaker self-identifies with  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$ . That is, the presuppositional component of COMMIT restricts the set of doxastic alternatives  $\langle w', x \rangle$  to those compatible with the speaker's belief at  $w$  to be  $x$  in  $w'$ . Within the current approach, this means: (i) that

<sup>29</sup> Note here, in relation to the discussion in Section 2.3, that partial referential overlap between plural 2P/inclusive 1P subjects and the addressee is not tolerated. This seems to be in line with Schlenker's (2005b) observation that 1P (i.e. the speaker) is more tolerant towards partial referential overlap.

$PRO_{\text{pers}}$  is coreferential with the speaker and induces a Condition B violation with the subject if the subject is 1P exclusive, but also (ii) that the speaker, through  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$ , binds the variable in the centered conversational backgrounds  $f_x$  and  $g_x$ , which makes the distancing ban apply to the speaker.

Now I turn to questions and the QUEST operator, which I renamed ASK for sake of consistency with COMMIT. The denotation of ASK is provided in (66). ASK takes as a complement an interrogative sentence  $Q$ , which denotes a set of properties (type  $\langle\langle e, \langle s, t \rangle \rangle, t \rangle$ ), and introduces the presupposition that, for every member of this set  $P$ , it is compatible with the speaker's beliefs that  $P$  is true at each of the addressee's doxastic alternatives. The derivation of a directive clause under ASK is given in (67). I assume that the set of properties expressed by a question comes about through the WH operator, which turns the property expressed by its prejacent into a set of properties,<sup>30</sup> as shown in (67b). In the sample derivation for a polar question, the resulting set of properties contains a property and its negated counterpart.<sup>31</sup>

- (66)  $\llbracket \text{ASK} \rrbracket^{c:g} = \lambda Q_{\langle\langle e, \langle s, t \rangle \rangle, t \rangle} : \forall P [P \in Q \rightarrow \exists \langle w, x \rangle [\langle w, x \rangle \in \text{Dox}_{\text{spkr}(c), w(c)} \wedge \forall \langle w', y \rangle [\langle w', y \rangle \in \text{Dox}_{\text{addr}(c), w} \rightarrow P(y)(w')]]] \cdot Q$
- (67) *I leave!?*
- $\llbracket \text{ASK} \rrbracket_{\text{CP WH}} [ \lambda x_2 \lambda w_3 [ w_3 \text{PRO}_2 \text{OP}_{f_2, g_2} [ \lambda w_4 w_4 \text{1P leaves} ] ] ] ] ]$
  - $\llbracket \text{CP} \rrbracket^{c:g} = \{ \lambda x. \lambda w. (\forall w' \in O(f_x, g_x, w)) [\text{spkr}(c) \text{ leaves in } w'] , \lambda x. \lambda w. \neg (\forall w' \in O(f_x, g_x, w)) [\text{spkr}(c) \text{ leaves in } w'] \}$
  - $\llbracket (67a) \rrbracket^{c:g}$  is defined iff  $\forall P [P \in Q \rightarrow \exists \langle w, x \rangle [\langle w, x \rangle \in \text{Dox}_{\text{spkr}(c), w(c)} \wedge \forall \langle w', y \rangle [\langle w', y \rangle \in \text{Dox}_{\text{addr}(c), w} \rightarrow P(y)(w')]]]$

The key difference, compared to (65), is that now the addressee's doxastic alternatives are relevant for  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$ . The denotation of  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$  must be compatible with what the speaker believes the addressee self-identifies as. This is because, as opposed to COMMIT, the ASK operator introduces 2P features on its abstractor. This explains why obviation behaves differently in matrix questions—the 1P subject ban becomes a 2P subject ban. Because imperatives are the dedicated directive form for 2P subjects in Slovenian (and more generally),<sup>32</sup> the obviation pattern that arises due to the addressee-denoting  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$  effectively derives the absence of imperatives in information seeking questions. The standard (usually tacit) assumption regarding the non-existence of imperative questions is that the two clause types are simply incompatible—given a system where any clause may only belong to one of the core universal clause types at a time (cf. Sadock and Zwicky 1985). The analysis above, in contrast, derives the ban as a consequence of ASK and the proposed semantics for the directive operator, without requiring stipulated restrictions on combining clause types.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>30</sup> The WH operator essentially yields what in the current system amounts to Karttunen's (1977) *proto-questions* (in his case sets of propositions), which then become either polar or constituent questions.

<sup>31</sup> Notice that negation scopes high in (67b), as it is interpreted as relatively weak in directive polar questions. In most cases, negation will be interpreted low (i.e. below  $\text{OP}_{\text{Dir}}$ ) due to pragmatic strengthening in order to ensure that the positive and negative answer resolve the issue of what to do (see Kaufmann 2016b for *Answerhood* as a presupposition of imperatives).

<sup>32</sup> All languages with imperatives have at least 2P imperatives (Zanuttini 2008, Zanuttini et al. 2012).

<sup>33</sup> This explanation of the lack of imperative questions is less restrictive than the clause typing one, which might be independently needed. Imperatives can occur at least in echo and rhetorical questions (Kaufmann

### 3.5 Perspectival *PRO* is inherently *de se*

The current proposal rests on  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$  being parallel to *PRO* in infinitives, apart from not being the subject of the clause. More evidence of parallelisms between the two would therefore be desirable. Control constructions involving attitude predicates have long been argued to obligatorily express *de se* attitudes (Morgan 1970, Chierchia 1987). If the parallelism I argue for holds, we expect directives to be the same and  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$  to have an obligatory *de se* interpretation. This prediction is borne out.

In order to show that  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$  is obligatorily *de se*, let us consider what it means to be a *de se* attitude and look at a canonical control case. Consider Pearson's (2016) definition of a *de se* attitude, which I will follow in this paper:

- (68) An attitude *de se* is an attitude [...] that has the following properties:
- i) *Aboutness condition*: the attitude is about the attitude holder and
  - ii) *Awareness condition*: the attitude holder is aware that the attitude is about herself (Pearson 2016: 694)

In other words, the attitude cannot be about the attitude holder without them being aware that this is the case. In practice, this means that the obligatory *de se* nature of *PRO* can be identified through contexts where individuals misidentify themselves. In such cases it is possible for the attitude holder to not be aware that the attitude is about them, which should not be possible to express with a control infinitive. One such context, taken from Pearson (2016), is provided in (69).

- (69) CONTEXT: *John is an amnesiac. He reads a linguistics article that he himself wrote, although he has forgotten this fact. Impressed, he remarks, 'The author of this paper will become rich and famous. Unfortunately, I won't.'*
- a. #John expects [ *PRO* to become rich and famous ].
  - b. John expects [ that he will become rich and famous ]. (Pearson 2016: 695)

In (69), only (69b) has a possible reading where it is true in the supplied context, while (69a) can only be false. This follows from the self-identification which results from the attitude verb combining with a set of doxastic alternatives (see Section 3.2).

In order to see if  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$  patterns the same, we need a context where the attitude holder misidentifies him/herself as not the director. Consider the scenario in (70).

- (70) CONTEXT: *Charles VI is having one of his episodes again. He forgot that he is the king, that he has a wife and children, and believes his name is Georges. He also believes that his mute guard is the king, and decides to interpret his guard's commands and wishes from his facial expressions. The queen is upset with her husband not remembering her, and is begging the stoic guards to do something about it. Charles is oblivious to the fact that he*

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and Poschmann 2013), which are not true information seeking questions. This can be explained in the current approach with different kinds of interrogative operators. There is also further evidence from Slovenian suggesting that the pattern of matrix obviation—and hence the denotation of  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$  in matrix clauses—is more flexible. The additional data (omitted for reasons of space), concerns directives in sequential scope marking questions (Dayal 1994, 2016), which behave like embedded directives for the purposes of obviation, but are syntactically matrix questions. I discuss this and its implications in more detail in Stegovec (2017).

*caused all this and is actually amused by all the commotion and excitement. But he also notices the growing expression of discomfort on the mute guard's face, so he interprets it to the other guards as, 'The king wants her gone.'*

- a. #Karel VI. je rekel stražarjem, da naj jo odstranijo.  
Charles VI AUX.3 said.M guards.DAT that SUB 3.F.ACC remove.3PL  
'Charles VI told the guards to remove her.'
- b. #Karel VI. vam je rekel, da jo odstranite.  
Charles VI 2PL.DAT AUX.3 said.M that 3.F.ACC remove.IMP.2PL  
'Charles VI told you (the guards) to remove her.'
- c. Karel VI. je rekel stražarjem, da jo morajo odstraniti.  
Charles VI AUX.3 said.M guards.DAT that 3.F.ACC must.3PL remove.INF  
'Charles VI told the guards that they must remove her.'

There are two ways to report what happened: with an embedded directive (cf. (70a,b)), or an embedded modal+infinitive (cf. (70c)). The idea is that Charles VI utters an unintentional command—the guards take it as such since talking about himself in third person is but a minor oddity in a day in the life of The Mad King. But Charles VI himself believes it to be a command from the mute guard. Although the judgment is delicate, the directives in (70a,b) cannot be used to accurately describe what transpired in (70), while the construction in (70c) can—the verb 'reči' ('say') is compatible with the speaker not knowing whether the utterance was a command or not.<sup>34</sup> This indicates  $PRO_{pers}$  is obligatorily *de se*, and the proposed analysis of directives, according to which they are analogous to control constructions, straightforwardly captures that.

Returning briefly to obviation; corefering subjects can be used to show that  $PRO_{pers}$  differs from *pro* subjects in terms of being obligatorily *de se*. As an anonymous reviewer notes, the proposed account of obviation relies crucially on Condition B not applying between the matrix and embedded subject, but between  $PRO_{pers}$  and the subject—both in the embedded clause. This predicts that if the embedded subject is not coindexed with  $PRO_{pers}$ , but is coindexed with the matrix subject, there should be no Condition B violation and hence no obviation. This is in fact borne out, as obviation is voided if the embedded subject is coindexed with the matrix one, but construed *de re* (Schlenker 2005b, Szabolcsi 2010). Consider the scenario in (71) (cf. (70)).

(71) CONTEXT: *Charles VI, still believing he is not the king, chances upon the guard he believes to be the actual king. The guard is taking a break, drinking heavily and not looking that well. Worried for the health of his king, Charles VI writes a note to all the guards suggesting 'The king should drink less.'*

- a. Karel VI.<sub>i</sub> je predlagal, da naj manj pije.<sub>i</sub>  
Charles VI AUX.3 suggested.M that SUB less drink.3  
'Charles VI suggested that he should drink less.'
- b. Predlagal si<sub>i</sub>, da manj pij<sub>i</sub>.  
suggest.M AUX.2 that less drink.IMP.(2)  
'You suggested you should drink less.'

<sup>34</sup> The only way in which a subjunctive like (70a) or imperative like (70b) can be used as a report of the scenario is jokingly. That is, drawing attention to the fact that a directive is not appropriate given the scenario and the reporter knows that the king was not actually giving an order to the guards. In contrast, the modal+infinitive in (70c) does not have this effect, which further shows that the asymmetry is real.

Charles VI's suggestion in (71) can be reported as in (71a), with an embedded subjunctive, or as in (71b), with an embedded imperative (this could be the queen talking to the king in one of his lucid moments). What is important is that these sentences are grammatical because the embedded subject is not interpreted *de se*, even though the subjects refer to the same individual. The matrix attitude verb binds the embedded  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$  like in the standard case, yielding self-identification with the attitude holder, but the embedded subject is related to the attitude holder here only through a suitable acquaintance relation. Because of this  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$  and the subject—although coreferential—are not coindexed, which circumvents Condition B/obviation.<sup>35</sup>

These facts not only show that  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$  and the subject differ in their *de selde re* possibilities, but also that obviation is sensitive to the *de selde re* distinction. This has long been established for other binding restrictions (see Lakoff 1972, Anand 2007).<sup>36</sup>

### 3.6 Getting from propositions to speech acts and an interim summary

In the discussion up to this point, the focus was on the distinctive semantics of directive clauses at the truth conditional at-issue level, and nothing was said about how such clauses ultimately gain their speech act status. Given that directives were defined in terms of their canonical speech act function, this is a step that cannot be ignored.

I propose that the transition to the speech act level is mediated by the attitudinal operators COMMIT and ASK, which I modify slightly for this purpose. In order to move beyond the truth conditional at-issue semantic level, we need to adopt a model for discourse contexts and context change. I take here as a starting point the treatment of sentence meaning in *dynamic semantics* (Kamp 1981, Heim 1982, Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991). That is, a sentence is a function that maps input discourse contexts into output discourse contexts, or: the meaning of a sentence is its context change potential (CCP). Let us assume, following Gunlogson (2003), the CCP of a sentence is defined in terms of an update to the *commitment set* of an individual discourse participant, the *set of public beliefs* (PB) (see also Lauer 2013). I modify this to fit the current proposal, where all clauses are properties, so that PBs are sets of properties:  $PB_S^c$  and  $PB_A^c$ , the public belief sets of the speaker ( $S$ ) and addressee ( $A$ ) of context  $c$  respectively.

<sup>35</sup> The reviewer points out that in principle one could also give the subject a *de se* construal through an identity acquaintance relation. This would yield a *de se* reading and void obviation just like the *de re* reading, which is not desired. I concur and suggest that this option is unavailable because the possibility of a *de se* construal through binding blocks *de se* construals by alternative means in that derivation, or: if you can get *de se* through binding, then you must get *de se* through binding. This additional condition is meant to reflect conditions like *Rule I* (Reinhart 1983), and perhaps there is a deeper connection between the two that should be explored. But that task is well beyond the scope of this paper, so I will not attempt it here.

<sup>36</sup> There is, however, a difference in *de selde re* asymmetries between directives and infinitives. As noted by an anonymous reviewer, Sharvit (2011) observes that Condition B is not lifted between *PRO* and *de re* construed object pronouns in control infinitives. If subjects of directives are restricted in the same way in relation to  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$ , we may expect that Condition B should not be lifted under the same conditions and hence that (71a) and (71b) should remain ungrammatical even under a *de re* reading. Although I will not attempt to offer a worked out analysis, I suspect this difference may be due to an independent subject/object asymmetry. Subjects and objects differ in matters related to binding: we find a lot of (anti-)subject orientation but no (or very little) (anti-)object orientation cross-linguistically (see Büring 2005:58–60 for discussion and references); similarly languages often have object anaphors, but not subject ones (see footnote 23 about the anaphor agreement effect). It may be that a related subject/object asymmetry is also at play here.

The modified COMMIT and ASK serve to update sets of public beliefs (on top of what was discussed in Section 3.4): COMMIT adds its prejacent (the property expressed by the clause) to  $PB_S^c$ , and ASK adds to  $PB_S^c$  the property of wanting the addressee to commit to the truth of one of the properties in the set.<sup>37</sup> This allows the property expressed by a directive to be used performatively; by updating the *PB* component of the discourse context, the speaker either publicly commits to the necessity of the prejacent (COMMIT) or to wanting the addressee to commit to the necessity of the prejacent (ASK). The difference between matrix and embedded directives is then in the individual that binds the centered conversational backgrounds of  $OP_{Dir}$  (speaker in matrix/matrix subject in embedded). Strictly speaking, embedding of a directive is not embedding of a speech act. A directive construction only gets its CCP at the matrix level, whether a matrix directive or an attitude verb with a directive complement.

This concludes the overview of the core analysis. The take away message is that obviation and speaker distancing are both manifestations of perspectival control. Perspectival control arises with specific moods/modals, where the role of the controlled pronoun is to semantically restrict the relevant modal operator. This has consequences for both the syntax and semantics of such clauses, unifying a number of phenomena that prima facie appear unrelated. Of course, the fact that these phenomena can receive a unified account does not mean they should be analyzed that way. In the next section, I overview two most plausible alternative accounts and conclude that they do not fare as well with the Slovenian data as the proposed account.

#### 4 Comparison to other approaches

Broadly speaking, the present account fits into the family of binding accounts of obviation, where the phenomenon is reduced to some version of Condition B. The main deviation, and I argue—advantage, of my account in relation to similar ones is that it ties obviation to a semantic source and that instead of extending the binding domain it introduces a proxy antecedent inside the existing binding domain.

But binding approaches are not the only ones on the market, so it needs to be shown that they—and the version I argue for specifically—have an advantage when it comes to the Slovenian data. Similarly, it can not be excluded a priori that what I describe as generalized obviation follows from an independently proposed analysis of directives or imperatives. To that extent, I look at the main alternative account of obviation—the *blocking account* (Bouchard 1982, Farkas 1992b, Schlenker 2005a), and an alternative account of subject restrictions in directive clauses—the *positive constraint account* (Zanuttini 2008, Zanuttini et al. 2012), respectively.

##### 4.1 Blocking accounts of obviation

The main idea behind blocking accounts to obviation is that in cases where the matrix and embedded subjects are coreferential, infinitival subject control constructions block the use of an equivalent subjunctive—or related construction (Bouchard 1982, Farkas

<sup>37</sup> An account roughly along these lines is worked out in more detail in Davis (2011).

1992b, Schlenker 2005a). More precisely, if an attitude verb requires its complement to express a *de se* attitude, a control infinitive is used because it is the clause type directly associated with the expression of *de se* attitudes (*PRO* is obligatorily *de se*; see Section 3.5). This is argued to be sufficient to block the use of an equivalent subjunctive, as subjunctives are argued to express a broader notion of world dependency.

The appeal of analyzing obviation this way is that infinitives and subjunctives are typically in complementary distribution in embedded contexts. Consider (72).

- |      |   |  |        |
|------|---|--|--------|
| (72) | a. *Je veux que je parte.<br>I want that I leave.SUB.1<br>int.: ‘I want for me to leave.’ | b. Je veux partir.<br>I want leave.INF<br>‘I want to leave.’ | French |
|------|---|--|--------|
- (Szabolcsi 2010: 1)

If the obviation violating example (72a) were grammatical, it would have basically the same interpretation as the infinitival (72b). The two clause types can also be selected by the same matrix verbs, and are only in complementary distribution when it comes to their subjects—subjunctives occur when subjects have disjoint referents, infinitives when they are coreferential. The blocking analysis captures this straightforwardly. It also captures the fact that obviation is voided when a *de re* reading of the embedded subject is coerced (Schlenker 2005a, Szabolcsi 2010, Zu 2016, 2018).<sup>38</sup>

However, blocking is problematic when it comes to Slovenian directives, because they are never in direct competition with control infinitives. The matrix verbs that can select directive complements never take infinitive complements. We see this with the contrast between (73a) and (73b); *reči* (‘say’) does not take infinitive complements.

- |      |   |              |
|------|---|--------------|
| (73) | a. Rekel sem (ti) <sub>i</sub> , da pomaga-j <sub>i</sub> sestri.<br>said.M AUX.1 2.M.DAT that help-IMP.(2) sister.DAT<br>‘I told you that you should help sister.’ | (imperative) |
|      | b. *Rekel sem (ti) <sub>i</sub> pomagati <sub>i</sub> sestri.<br>said.M AUX.1 2.M.DAT help.INF sister.DAT<br>int.: ‘I told you to help sister.’                     | (infinitive) |

Indeed, the intended interpretation of (73b) involves object control, but even in subject control configurations with *reči* (‘say’), as in (74), which we know can yield obviation (cf. (74a)), the infinitive complement remains ungrammatical (cf. (74b)).

- |      |  |              |
|------|--|--------------|
| (74) | a. *Rekel si <sub>i</sub> , da pridi <sub>i</sub> na obisk.<br>said.M AUX.2 that come.IMP.(2) on visit.ACC<br>‘You said that you should come visit.’ | (imperative) |
|      | b. *Rekel si <sub>i</sub> priti <sub>i</sub> na obisk.<br>said.M AUX.2 come.INF on visit.ACC<br>inf.: ‘You said that you should come visit.’         | (infinitive) |

The reverse is also the case: infinitive selecting attitude verbs cannot take directive complements. The verb *hoteti* (‘want’) can select an infinitive complement in (75a), but subjunctive (75b) or imperative (75c) complement is impossible, regardless of the identity of its subject and whether or not it corefers with the matrix subject.

<sup>38</sup> The competition approach can in principle be extended to matrix clauses as well (see Zu 2016, 2018 for an analysis of matrix clauses in a conjunct-disjunct marking language, and Section 5.2 for some discussion).

- (75) a. Hoče- $m_i$  pomagati $_i$  sestri. (infinitive)  
 want-1 help.INF sister.DAT  
 ‘I want to help sister.’
- b. \*Hoče- $m_i$ , da naj pomaga $_k(-m_i)$  sestri. (subjunctive)  
 want-1 that SUB help.3(-1) sister.DAT  
 int.: ‘I want that I/(s)he should help sister.’
- c. \*Hoče- $m_i$ , da pomaga- $j_k$  sestri. (imperative)  
 want-1 that help-IMP.(2) sister.DAT  
 int.: ‘I want that you should help sister.’

If directives are systematically absent in the contexts where infinitives occur and vice versa, the two are never in competition and the conditions required for blocking never arise. A way out for blocking would be to say that directives are actually in competition with the modal+infinitive construction that we saw throughout the paper can be used to paraphrase directives excluded by obviation. However, unlike with control infinitives, the subject of such constructions can be an unbound *pro* or even an overt NP (76a). Such constructions are also not restricted to canonical control contexts, as shown by (76b) where no attitude verb is present.<sup>39</sup>

- (76) a. Rekel si $_i$  da mora $_k$  (Luka $_k$ ) priti na obisk.  
 said.M AUX.2 that must.3 (Luka) come.INF on visit.ACC  
 ‘You said that he/Luka must come visit.’
- b. Luka mora priti na obisk.  
 Luka must.3 come.INF on visit.ACC  
 ‘Luka must come visit.’

The modal+infinitive construction is therefore, unlike a subject control infinitive, not specialized for subject coreference/*de se* attitude contexts, which means that it cannot block directives from being used just in those contexts.

Relatedly, recall that partial coreference is permitted under the right conditions with directives, as illustrated again here with (77) (see Section 2.3).

- (77) Rekel sem $_i$ , da zapo- $j$ -mo $_{i+k}$  to pesem.  
 said.M AUX.1 that sing-IMP-1PL this song  
 ‘I said that we should sing this song.’

Even if the mere existence of corresponding subject control infinitives were somehow sufficient to yield blocking (disregarding the fact that the competing constructions are never complements of the same verbs), we would expect—given the existence of partial control—that the use of directives in (77) would also be blocked (see also Pearson 2012, 2016 for evidence that partial control also involves *de se* attitudes).

In sum, the lack of competition between directives and control infinitives in Slovenian means that a blocking account of obviation cannot be successful; at least not any version that I am familiar with. Since the analysis proposed in this paper does not rely on competition, these data are wholly unproblematic for it.

<sup>39</sup> It may also be that the modal verb in such constructions is a raising verb, where the subject moves from its base position into the specifier of the modal, roughly in line with the proposal for modal verbs in Wurmbrand (1999). But even under this analysis such constructions are not obligatory control infinitives.



## 4.2 Obviation as a positive constraint

Another alternative to the binding analysis is that the obviation pattern actually arises due to a conspiracy of positive constraints. The binding approach derives the obviation pattern by excluding particular subjects (a negative constraint), but it could also be that the pattern arises because directives *require* a very specific kind of subject, and subjects coreferential with the attitude holder simply do not fit the bill.

On Zanuttini's (2008) proposal, imperative subjects stand in a special relation with a dedicated *Jussive* functional head, which both semantically binds the subject and agrees with it. The Jussive head bears 2P features, which through this relation make it so that only 2P subjects are possible in imperatives. Expanding this analysis further, Zanuttini et al. (2012) look at a range of clause types in Korean: imperatives, which only take 2P subjects (78a), exhortatives, which only take inclusive 1P subjects (78b), and promissives, which only take exclusive 1P subjects (78c).

- (78) a. Cemsim-ul sa-**la**. (imperative)  
 lunch-ACC buy-IMP  
 'Buy lunch!'
- b. Cemsim-ul sa-**ca**. (exhortative)  
 lunch-ACC buy-EXH  
 'Let's buy lunch!'
- c. Cemsim-ul sa-**ma**. (promissive)  
 lunch-ACC buy-PRM  
 'I will buy lunch!' (Zanuttini et al. 2012: 1234)

They argue that each clause type corresponds to a Jussive head associated with a different feature: Jussive-imperative = 2P, Jussive-exhortative = 1P+2P, and Jussive-promissive = 1P. Each restricts its respective subject to the specified person value by semantically binding it. But what is most relevant in relation to Slovenian is that in Korean all three clause types can also occur in embedded contexts in speech reports:

- (79) a. Ku salam-i Inho-eykey<sub>i</sub> [swuni-lul towacwu-**la**<sub>i</sub>]-ko malhayss-ta.  
 that person-NOM Inho-DAT [swuni-ACC help-IMP]-COMP said-DC  
 'He told Inho to help Swuni.'
- b. Ku salam-i<sub>i</sub> Inho-eykey<sub>k</sub> [swuni-lul towacwu-**ca**<sub>i+k</sub>]-ko malhayss-ta.  
 that person-NOM Inho-DAT [swuni-ACC help-EXH]-COMP said-DC  
 'He told Inho let's help Swuni.' (indirect speech)
- c. Ku salam-i<sub>i</sub> Inho-eykey [swuni-lul towacwu-**ma**<sub>i</sub>]-ko malhayss-ta.  
 that person-NOM Inho-DAT [swuni-ACC help-PRM]-COMP said-DC  
 'He said to Inho that he promises to help Swuni.' (Pak et al. 2008: 170)

In such cases, the subjects of the embedded clause are crucially shifted to the original context (Pak et al. 2008),<sup>40</sup> that is: (i) imperative subjects refer to the original addressee (matrix indirect object) (79a), (ii) exhortative subjects to the original speaker and addressee simultaneously (matrix subject and indirect object) (79b), and (iii) promissive subjects to the original speaker (matrix subject) (79c).

<sup>40</sup> Pak et al. (2008) assume in their paper Schlenker's (2003) approach to shifting indexicals.

But how would this approach translate to the Slovenian paradigm? Minimally, we would have to posit: a Jussive-imperative head with 2P features (80a), another version with inclusive 1P+2P features (80b) (cf. Zanuttini et al.'s exhortative), and a third Jussive-subjunctive head with no positive person feature specification (80c).

- (80) a. Jussive-imperative<sub>1</sub> = [addressee] (2P)  
 b. Jussive-imperative<sub>2</sub> = [addressee; speaker] (inclusive 1P)  
 c. Jussive-subjunctive = [∅] (3P)

In matrix contexts, this derives all attested subjects and excludes the unattested 1P exclusive ones. Complications arise, however, with embedding and questions, where 1P subjunctives *are* attested. Obviation in embedded directives can in principle be described in context shift terms: subjects each shift to the corresponding speech act participant in the original context, and since no Jussive head in (80) just has a [speaker] feature, the result is equivalent to obviation. The problem is an empirical one: in Slovenian, arguments in embedded directives are strict indexicals (see Stegovec and Kaufmann 2015 regarding imperatives). The subject of an embedded 1P subjunctive must refer to the actual speaker, which can correspond to any individual in the original context.<sup>41</sup> If, therefore, (80) is to be extended to embedded contexts, the features have to be strict indexicals. But then (80) fails to derive the attested pattern: 1P subjunctives are predicted not to exist and the obviation effect is left unexplained. Furthermore, it is unclear how this type of approach could be extended to matrix questions, which fail to make accessible an original context with potentially different participants.

Note moreover that the suggested extension of Zanuttini et al.'s account derives obviation as a conspiracy of three positive constraints and context shift (in principle all potential parameters of variation). This fails to capture the parallelism with control, the correlation of collective plural readings with the tolerance for partial referential overlap (cf. Section 2.3), and other cases where obviation is voided (e.g. with *de re* construed subjects; cf. Section 3.5). It is not surprising that the analyses of Zanuttini (2008), Pak et al. (2008), and Zanuttini et al. (2012) cannot be extended to derive obviation. It is not what they were designed to do. But as I suggest in Section 5.2, some of their observations about Korean may be integrated into the current system.

## 5 Extensions

The paper so far focused almost exclusively on Slovenian data, but the proposed analysis is meant to be applicable to other languages with similar patterns as well as other related phenomena. In this section I highlight a few such relevant extensions. They are not meant as fully fledged analyses, but only rough illustrations of how the analysis could be extended and where it needs to be developed further.

<sup>41</sup> Pak et al. (2008) also observe for Korean that overt subjects of embedded jussives are unshiftable and show a number of additional restrictions; e.g. they can only refer to a subset of referents of the matrix indirect object in imperatives and a subset of referents of the matrix indirect object and matrix subject in exhortatives. None of these restrictions are observed in Slovenian embedded imperatives with overt subjects.

### 5.1 Obviation outside imperatives and subjunctives

If modal operators that semantically select for an individual element (like  $OP_{Dir}$ ) are generally an option in grammar, they could in principle occur outside obviating subjunctives and directives proper. Furthermore, since the defining property of obviating constructions in this view is ultimately semantic, we may expect obviation to not always correlate with specific clause types—as used to be the perceived view.

In fact, obviation can be found outside the clause types it is most commonly associated with, in which case it seems to be associated with a particular semantics. Costantini (2014) identifies a case of obviation with indicative clauses in Italian. In (81), ‘*sapere*’ (‘(come to) know’), a semifactive, takes indicative complements. The construction “*implicates that the source of information is indirect. [(81)] is infelicitous in a context where the speaker has witnessed Maria’s leaving (Costantini 2014: 13)*”.

- (81) Ho saputo che Maria é partita. Italian  
 have known that Maria is.IND left  
 ‘I have come to know that Maria has left.’ (Costantini 2014: 13)

As seen in (82), ‘*sapere*’ gives rise to obviation with an indicative complement. Which, as Costantini points out, is not predicted by standard approaches to obviation.

- (82) Pietro<sub>i</sub> ha saputo che ha<sub>\*i,k</sub> il mal di testa.  
 Pietro has known that has.IND.3.SG the headache  
 ‘Pietro has come to know that he has a headache.’ (Costantini 2014: 13)


In the current approach, semifactives with this indirect information interpretation can be analyzed as selecting for a (covert) modal operator which, like  $OP_{Dir}$ , requires the presence of a controlled  $PRO_{pers}$ ; only that here  $PRO_{pers}$  encodes that the individual it denotes is the indirect recipient of the knowledge of the prejacent.

It may be that similar cases are more common cross-linguistically, but they have not been identified due to the expectations that the semantic and syntactic profile of subjunctives and directives would be restricted to only those clause types. The analysis outlined in this paper certainly suggests that obviation could have a wider distribution.

### 5.2 Non-obviating subjunctives and other related constructions

The flip side of finding obviation outside the usual clause types is finding clause types usually associated with obviation not displaying it. In fact, the syntactic requirements of  $PRO_{pers}$  were set aside until now for this reason. Presumably, the distribution of  $PRO_{pers}$  is subject to syntactic licensing considerations, just like its counterpart in infinitives. Consider that while  $PRO_{pers}$  combining with  $OP_{Dir}$  semantically satisfies the operator, nothing in the semantics of  $OP_{Dir}$  prevents it from being saturated by another type  $e$  element—such as an argument moving to the relevant position.

Consider Balkan-type subjunctives (Quer 2006: 674–676), which, though morphologically subjunctive, behave more like control infinitives. One could analyze such cases in the current approach—in contrast to obviating subjunctives (cf. (83a))—as involving raising of a subject  $PRO$  to combine with the operator in MoodP (cf. (83b)).



The semantics associated with the operator would be the same in both cases, the difference between (83a) and (83b) would amount to different parametric options in the syntax concerning the licensing of  $PRO_{\text{pers}}$  vs.  $PRO$ —the former yielding obviation, and the latter an equivalent to control. The second option is in fact reminiscent of approaches to modal verbs in the tradition of Zubizarreta (1982), where modal constructions are essentially raising constructions. However, just like with the original raising approach to modal constructions, it is not entirely clear how such constructions can be interpreted, which is an issue I leave open for the time being.

Another possibility would be that the obviation and raising options co-exist within a language as two competing constructions. This is, in fact, a way to view the phenomenon of *conjunct-disjunct marking* in languages like Newari (Hale 1980, Zu 2016, 2018). In such languages, conjunct morphology surfaces on the verb with 1P subjects in matrix declaratives, 2P subjects in questions, and subjects coreferential with the matrix subject in embedded clauses; disjunct morphology, in contrast, surfaces with 2P and 3P subjects in matrix declaratives, 1P and 3P subjects in questions, and subjects of disjoint reference with the matrix subject in embedded clauses (see Table 5).

	baseline		question		embedded	
CONJUNCT	✓ 1P	✗ 2P/3P	✓ 2P	✗ 1P/3P	✓ control	✗ obviation
DISJUNCT	✗ 1P	✓ 2P/3P	✗ 2P	✓ 1P/3P	✗ control	✓ obviation

**Table 5** The conjunct-disjunct marking pattern

The distribution of disjunct morphology basically parallels directives in Slovenian—obviation with respect to the relevant attitude holder. Conjunct morphology, on the other hand, essentially marks control. In the current approach, these can be analyzed respectively as the obviating (84a) (cf. (83a)) and raising structure in (84b) (cf. (83b)).

- (84) a.  $[\lambda_i [PRO_i [OP_{\text{disj}} [vP SU_{*i,k} [v \dots ]]]]]$   
 b.  $[\lambda_i [SU_i [OP_{\text{conj}} [vP t_i [v \dots ]]]]]$

The conjunct construction in (84b) differs from that in (83b) in that the raised argument is not  $PRO$ ,<sup>42</sup> but the subject is nonetheless bound by either the dominating attitude verb or appropriate attitudinal operator (see Pearson 2012 for an analysis of conjunct marking in these terms, but without the raising of the subject).

The parallelism with obviation in Slovenian is not complete though—obviation persists in Slovenian with non-singular subjects. Thus, 2P plural and dual subjects are banned in directives in matrix questions, as shown in (85).

<sup>42</sup> Although this too could be analyzed as an overt counterpart of the infinitival  $PRO$  (cf. Szabolcsi 2009).

- (85) a. Pomaga-j-te si!  
 help-IMP-2PL REFL.DAT  
 ‘Help yourselves!’
- b. \*Pomaga-j-te si?  
 help-IMP-2PL REFL.DAT  
 ‘Should you help yourselves?’

Vera Zu (p.c.) informs me that the pattern is more complicated with conjunct-disjunct marking, at least in Newari. With plural (inclusive and exclusive) 1P subjects, what matters for the choice of conjunct or disjunct morphology seems to be whether the speaker knows the answer to the question or not. If the speaker does not know the answer, *disjunct* is used, but if the speaker already knows the answer, *conjunct* is used. This suggests the status of the question matters in conjunct-disjunct systems. Within the current system the difference could be attributed to different types of the ASK operator (see footnote 33), with differences in the updates to the speaker’s and addressee’s public belief sets. I leave this open for future exploration.

Finally, this parameterized approach may also offer an alternative way to view the Korean data discussed in Section 4.2. Consider that imperatives and exhortatives together have the distribution of imperatives in Slovenian. In matrix contexts, they occur respectively with 2P and inclusive 1P subjects. Promissives, on the other hand, occur with the subjects excluded by obviation—in matrix contexts, exclusive 1P.

The first two can then be analyzed as obviating constructions: a standard configuration without referential overlap (cf. (86a)) and one with partial referential overlap (cf. (86b)) (only illustrated for embedded context for sake of convenience). Whereas the promissive can be analyzed as a raising-to-operator construction (cf. (86c)).

- (86) a.  $[_{vP} SU_i [v [IO_k [V_{att} [CP \lambda_i [PRO_i [OP_{Imp} [_{vP} SU_{*i,k} [v \dots ]]]]]]]]]]$   
 b.  $[_{vP} SU_i [v [IO_k [V_{att} [CP \lambda_i [PRO_i [OP_{Exh} [_{vP} SU_{i+k} [v \dots ]]]]]]]]]]$   
 c.  $[_{vP} SU_i [v [IO_k [V_{att} [CP \lambda_i [SU_i [OP_{Prm} [_{vP} t_i [v \dots ]]]]]]]]]]$

This characterization is in principle compatible with that of Pak et al. (2008), Zanuttini et al. (2012).  $OP_{Imp}$  and  $OP_{Exh}$  can be viewed as manifestations of  $OP_{Dir}$  specialized respectively for 2P and inclusive 1P subjects (cf. Slovenian imperatives vs. subjunctives), while  $OP_{Prm}$  is a raising configuration specialized for 1P. Crucially, in Korean, all must shift accordingly in embedded contexts, as argued by Pak et al. (2008), so that the person values correspond to speech act participants in the original context.

An important prediction of this parameterized approach is that the identity of the individual element combining with the operator should also determine the distancing facts; i.e. who is associated with the public commitments about the prejacent. Note that this is always predicted to be the attitude holder; the parametric split only regulates whether the attitude holder also corresponds to the subject of the clause or not. Whether these predictions are confirmed cross-linguistically or not, is yet to be established.

### 5.3 Strange (in)clusivity

The final remark concerns not an extension of the account per se, but an empirical observation that touches upon a number of theoretical issues. It pertains to the interpretation of (in)clusivity in embedded clauses in relation to context shifting.

Slovenian 1P directives are imperatives with inclusive 1P subjects and subjunctives with exclusive 1P subjects. Interestingly, in embedded contexts the interpretation of 1P exclusive subjects does not correspond to the exclusion of the addressee, as exclusivity is standardly understood—neither the addressee of the original context, nor the addressee of the actual context. The inclusive subject of the imperative in (87a) must refer to both the actual speaker and addressee. The subject of the subjunctive in (87b), however, is exclusive with respect to the original speaker—the denotation of the subject can include either the actual or original addressee or both, as long as it includes the actual speaker (strict 1P indexicality) but not the original speaker (exclusivity).

- (87) a. Rekel je, da po-j-mo.                      b. Rekel je, da naj poje-mo.  
           said.M AUX.3 that sing-IMP-1PL            said.M AUX.3 that SUB sing-1PL  
           ‘He<sub>i</sub> said we<sub>k(+i)</sub> should sing.’            ‘He<sub>i</sub> said we<sub>k(\*+i)</sub> should sing.’

I am at this state, not aware of any analysis that could derive these facts. But they strike me as related to *monstrous agreement* and other cases of interactions between agreement and context shift that have received much attention in the recent literature (see Sundaesan 2011, Messick 2017, Deal 2018 i.a.). Given the key role (in)clusivity plays in the interpretation of person, such facts should certainly be considered in future work on shifting indexicals.

## 6 Conclusion

In this paper I proposed a new type of control configuration that I dubbed perspectival control. This configuration involves control of a perspectival *PRO* located in the Mood domain of a clause, where the *PRO* saturates a special kind of modal operator. I have argued that this configuration arises in directive clauses, where perspectival *PRO* serves as an individual-type restrictor for the modal component of the clause, resulting in the public commitments associated with the modal operator to be attributed to the individual the perspectival *PRO* denotes. The perspectival control configuration, although existing to fulfill a semantic requirement, has repercussions in the syntax in the form of the subject obviation effect: *PRO* can function as an antecedent for a subject pronoun and give rise to a Condition B effect. Although the data used to argue for the analysis came almost exclusively from Slovenian, this analysis can be extended to other languages and be tailored to deal with a number of seemingly unrelated phenomena. Even more importantly, the discussion in this paper should inform future discussions of directive clauses, theorizing concerning mood and modality, and the syntactic and semantic representation of discourse related information.

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